SOCIAL THEORY

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Social theory and its past

I. Christianity and classical social theory

(1) The tradition of our culture, the culture of the West, which has now become the culture of the world, is organized around two ideas. The preeminence of these two conceptions is what most distinguishes our civilization from all others; the main source of its own form of greatness.

(2) These two ideas were originally the product of the great religious tradition of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—the near-Eastern religions of salvation. All oriented to a transcendent, creative personal God who manifests Himself in history. The appearance of this tradition represented a breakthrough in moral insight that may well be taken as the turning point in human history, even by those who reject all of the theological claims of these religions.

(3) Though these two ideas are the basis of whatever is most significant in the history of our culture, their implications became manifest only little by little. Today there is still no reason to believe that their revolutionary impact is close to exhaustion.

(4) The first of these ideas: the idea of embodied spirit. Man is neither a body, nor a spirit within a body. He is an embodied spirit. What is spiritual and what is bodily have so come together that they are incapable of existing apart. Now, this view differs from a number of alternative conceptions that have prevailed in other cultures, and have often gained currency in our own tradition:
a) Materialist monism. Nothing but matter in man—human nature wholly a part of the physical world. May be anti-reductionist for reasons of explanatory convenience.
b) Radical dualism. Spirit and matter are two wholly discontinuous substances. Sometimes they have been viewed as of equal power, but at war with each other. At other times, material reality has been taken as a veil of illusion covering spiritual reality. Some variant of this dualism has periodically reappeared in the form of a succession of heretical movements throughout the history of the salvation religions.

(5) Implications of the idea of embodied spirit. Do not follow necessarily from it, but were developed upon the basis of it.

a) People are radically individual. Each individual a unique composite of body and spirit rather than just an instantiation of some general spiritual or material substance. Gave new life to the Homeric idea of individual character, which had been progressively diluted in the development of Greek culture and finally destroyed by the Neo-Platonism of the Hellenistic period.
b) All aspects of man's existence are morally significant. The corporeal setting of one's existence, the conditions of material existence came to be seen by an extension of the same idea as part of man's spiritual situation.
c) The spiritual significance of history—as the stage on which one's finite life is experienced. The brief moment of decision during which one accepts or refuses participation in the divine order. Rejection of the notion that history is just the backdrop of existence—the realm of appearances without importance to the quest for salvation. This Western view of history differs from both otherworldly spiritualism and ethical worldliness—the two poles between which the moral life of most other civilizations has oscillated.

(6) What these implications have in common: the refusal to draw a sharp line between the sacred and the profane—for the world of the body, of the material conditions of life, and of history itself is no longer viewed as merely profane.

Joel 2:28 And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions.

John 1:13 And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.

(7) The classical moments in our culture, e.g., our art, seem to be those in which the doctrine of embodied spirit is fully recognized. Art becomes decadent when it loses itself in pure form or pure matter—when it becomes merely didactic or merely sensuous.

(8) The idea of the power of transcendence. Man always capable of overcoming all the concrete determinations of his existence.
Rooted in the prophetic attack on idolatry and continued in the Christian and the Islamic ideas of the fragility of earthly power—all of which is treated as dust in the face of God.

The religious basis of this transcendence is that the individual in the midst of his earthly activity is also oriented to a supernatural reality. His striving and the striving of mankind as a whole are governed by a desire for completeness and perfection that can never be wholly satisfied within history.

(9) Implications of this idea:
   a) Individual: can always grow beyond the limits of his own existence: by the combination of good will and divine grace or historical accident.
   b) No set of social practices is sacred; what is good at one moment becomes bad at another. No form of social life represents a final and complete expression of humanity. Nothing finite can do justice to the longing for the infinite.

(10) The central notion: man as a precarious union of the finite and the infinite; one needing the other and yet tugging against the other.

(11) Relationship between the ideas of embodied spirit and of the power of transcendence. To be spirit means that the demand for the infinite and the absolute is implicit in all one's activity. Thus,
the idea of transcendence is, in part, an interpretation of the idea of embodied spirit. Complementary, but in tension. Body and spirit always connected as an indivisible unity; yet the spirit is always capable of going beyond its concrete conditions. To be wise is to give regard to both aspects of this tension. All of social thought a meditation on these two conceptions and on their relation to each other.

(12) Consider now the connection of these ideas to the tradition of social theory. Social theory: an identifiable moment in the intellectual history of the West: Montesquieu and his successors. What was revolutionary about social theory: For the first time it transformed the traditional insights into a way of understanding society. Everything that is most profound and valuable in classical social theory goes back to these ideas. But they were given a novel direction.

(13) From the idea of embodied spirit: the notion of viewing a social situation as a whole—a whole in which material things have significance. The thought is that a picture of man's place in the world is embodied in the actual logic of social relations, as well as in people's explicitly professed beliefs. Thus, a form of economic organization also contains an interpretation of what is and is not important in human life. Nothing is simply a framework of the moral life; everything is a part of it. This view consistent with the belief that:
6.

a) There may be conflicting logics of social life at work in any given historical situation;
b) The principles of these competing logics may be more or less unconscious.

(14) From the idea of transcendence: the notion of the radical contingency of every set of social arrangements. What was thought to be given turns out to be made. The structure of everyday discourse must be shattered and then reconstituted. Most of everyday life goes on in a trancelike state. People are devoted to routine both because they have forgotten about their approaching death and because they are trying to forget about it. It is the task of critical social thought to awaken us from this dull and resentful coma.

Yet the world of appearances that must be shattered also contains an element of truth; the pretenses of a society reveal that society's true nature in the very course of veiling it.

With the idea of revealing the contingency of social arrangements goes this other idea: though we are not what we pretend to be, our disguises betray us.

(15) The irony of this development. These conceptions go back to a religious tradition that persisted in a debased form when modern social theory emerged. Yet they achieved prominence at precisely the time when this religious tradition was being abandoned and attacked by the critical intelligentsia. The intellectuals had thought and lived as pagans when they professed to be Christians, but they turned into Christians when they became
pagans, and the moment of their apostasy was the hour of their conversion.

(16) However, they lost consciousness of the relations between this way of understanding society and the deep insights into man from which it had arisen. This was to impose limitations upon the development of their ideas.

II. Ancient political philosophy and classical social theory

(1) Social theory also defined itself by contrast to ancient political philosophy—the Greek tradition of thought about society.

(2) Main ways in which classical social theory differed from ancient political philosophy:

   a) clear distinction drawn between understanding and evaluation;

   b) rejection of the suprahistorical idea of human nature;

   c) the unity of fact/value and the centrality of human nature were connected in ancient political philosophy because the view of human nature was at once descriptive and evaluative.

Beginning of the rejection of the ancient view in Machiavelli's theory: a sword plunged into the flank of the Western body politic causing it to cry out and struggle with itself (Meinecke).

(3) Yet what was rejected avenged itself.
a) The classical social theorists repeatedly compromised with a mixture of descriptive and evaluative categories. Examples: Marx's ambivalence about the moral import of history (history as immanent morality and history as determined so as to make the moral point of view irrelevant); Durkheim's use of the categories of the normal and the pathological. The problem faced by the classical social theorists: to be critical without being merely cynical; to develop the idea of a moral order without sanctifying established power.

b) They could never wholly dispense with the notion of a human nature which provides the perspective from which different social situations can be compared and judged, and the dynamic of history understood.

(4) To put order into their ideas about these problems, the classical social theorists would have to have come to terms with their religious heritage.

That religious tradition might have suggested to them the possibility of a mode of social thought that is critical without being cynical and that refuses to identify the moral order with any of the transitory approximations to it that men build in history. Based upon the idea of a human spirit embodied in particular forms of social life, yet always capable of transcending them. In this way, the classical social theorists might have been able to combine a recourse to the notion of a human nature with a refusal to treat
that nature as if it were unchanging and above history. But this intellectual development was made difficult by the fact that they had lost touch with the religious sources of their own learning.

III. Enlightenment criticism and classical social theory

(1) The third tradition by opposition to which classical social theory defined itself: enlightenment criticism. Only gradually did social theory distinguish itself from this tradition. The two came together in the work of Montesquieu.

   The concern of Enlightenment criticism: to elucidate the nature of the modern experience and to contrast it with something that came before.

(2) Contrast to the ancient republican ideal:
   a) Not a utopia of peace and equality in writers from Machiavelli to Montesquieu; on the contrary, marked by oppression and conflict.
   b) The truly distinctive characteristic of the republic: the transparency of individuals to each other. Recognition of total interdependence. Everything private is also public.

(3) The modern situation: the individual occupies a multiplicity of roles; he is never visible to others or, ultimately, to himself as a whole being. He is something different in each of the contexts of his life. Result: loses both the sense of self and the confidence...
in his own ability to distinguish truth from convention, at the same time that all social arrangements come to be viewed by him as arbitrary and illegitimate.

(4) The two-fold consequence of this situation:

a) Increase in subjectivity; in the felt power to stand apart from social situations.

b) But, paradoxically, this situation of being disjointed from a sense of social place also weakens the experience of individuality.

(5) Thus, the ambivalence of Enlightenment criticism toward modernity:

a) Delight in the newfound recognition of subjectivity.

b) Yearning for situation in which one is integrated with nature, with others, and with one's own work.

(6) The attitude of the classical social theorists toward Enlightenment criticism. They accepted the diagnosis as far as it went, but attempted to go beyond it:

a) to search for the profound causes of this development in the organization of society and, specially, in the organization of power

b) to ask whether or how this predicament might be transformed.

(7) No way to pass judgment on this situation without crossing the divide between understanding and evaluation. They would have to assess it from the perspective of the needs and possibilities of human nature. This would require them to temper their total rejec-
tion of the tradition of ancient political philosophy and of the salvation religions.

IV. Conclusion

(1) Classical social theory defined by a triple opposition to Christianity, ancient political philosophy, and Enlightenment criticism.

(2) The failures of classical social theory derive from a too simple rejection of the past. In a sense, this repudiation was inevitable. Moral and intellectual progress cannot be achieved without a struggle in which the enemies within oneself and outside oneself must often be slaughtered before they can be forgiven. That is why the history of thought is a history of violent emotions and awful suffering. Yet, in the end, we must always return to the traditions we have cast off and rescue the truth they contain from the error in which it is buried.

a) The program of deepening Enlightenment criticism calls for an attempt to distinguish the false from the true in the tradition of ancient political philosophy.

b) The attempt to do that in turn implies a more conscious return and reappropriation of the dominant ideas of Western culture—the ideas of embodied spirit and of man's power to transcend all the concrete manifestations of his existence.
(3) Implications of this analysis for our attitude toward classical social theory: in order to come to terms with classical social theory, we must also come to terms with everything that went before it. The ultimate task of any critique of the tradition of social theory must be a reacquisition of all our past.

(4) Modern social science has remained under the spell of this classical tradition—vulgarized themes of Marx, Weber, or Durkheim, or a compound of them. But precisely because it has never taken a clear break, it has become increasingly less faithful to the intentions that gave power to this tradition. We must try to proceed differently: to break away from it in order to preserve what is valuable in it, as well as in the traditions against which it fought.

(5) The child must rebel against its parents; the student must turn against his teacher; and the artist must shatter the conventions that made his art possible. All lasting endeavor begins in imitation progresses through betrayal, and ends with the reestablishment of continuity at a deeper level. For this is the law of the spirit: that it is only by renouncing what one loves that one can recreate it
The intellectual context of social theory today

I. Review

(1) Theme of yesterday's lecture: the relationship of social theory to three traditions against which it reacted: the transcendent religions, ancient political philosophy, and enlightenment criticism.

(2) The crucial ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence.
   a) These ideas closely related by interdependence and tension.
   b) The idea of transcendence as an interpretation of the idea of spirit. The thrust toward universality in knowledge and action.
   c) Yet they also tug against each other. Though spirit is always embodied, it is never restricted to any one of its embodiments.

(3) History of social thought a meditation upon these two ideas and upon their relationship to each other. The source of a new way of understanding society.
   a) From the idea of embodied spirit, the notion of society as a meaningful totality. There is a logic of social relations, an interpretation of life, implicit in the forms of social organization and even in the most material and prosaic aspects of society.
b) From the idea of transcendence the notion of the contingency of social arrangements.

(4) In the course of transforming this tradition, the social theorists suppressed its sources.

(5) The second tradition against which they reacted: ancient political philosophy.
   a) The rupture between fact and value.
   b) The abandonment of a suprahistorical idea of human nature.

(6) Their ambivalence toward the themes of ancient political philosophy.

(7) They might have found an escape from their dilemmas by re-elaborating the original ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence.

(8) The development of Enlightenment criticism not possible without a reconsideration of some of the themes of ancient political philosophy.

(9) Conclusion: to come to terms with the tradition of social theory we must, also, at least implicitly, come to terms with the traditions that preceded it.

II. Introduction

(1) My objective in these next introductory classes is twofold: to anticipate some elements of the standpoint that will underlie my criticism of social theory and to suggest the starting points for thinking about social theory today. With respect to the
latter, I shall inquire into the significance of the situations of philosophy, science, and politics itself for social theory.

(2) My remarks today will be divided into two parts:

a) Discussion of the philosophical framework of social theory.

b) Inquiry into the relationship between the philosophical context of social theory and the philosophical situation of legal thought.

III. The philosophical situation

(1) Classical metaphysics had a core tradition, which persisted through many variations. The elements of this tradition were perhaps most clearly formulated in the mature philosophy of Aristotle. The ideas of a suprahistorical human nature and of the merger of understanding and evaluation are simply a part of this broader tradition. The relations between mind and the world and between being and goodness.

(2) Mind and the world: essentialism

a) The world as a system of natural kinds.

b) This system transparent to the mind.

c) Hence, the intuitive idea of science. No sharp discontinuity between immediate experience and theoretical truth.

(3) Being and goodness: moral objectivism.

a) The concept of objective value.

b) Moral objectivism as an extension of essentialism. Hence, denial of the contrast between understanding and evaluation.
c) Relationship between being and goodness determined teleologically. Thus the emphasis on the idea of human nature as both a descriptive category and a regulative ideal.

(4) Modern thought dominated by a rejection of this view of the world. It operated as a constraint upon progress in the understanding and domination of the world. It no longer fitted with social experience.

This criticism began in the nominalism of the late Middle Ages, flourished during the 17th century, and has been progressively developed by modern philosophy, science, and social thought.

(5) The overthrow of essentialism:
   a) Trend toward some kind of conventionalism.
   b) The priority of the problem of knowledge over the problem of being.
   c) The counterintuitive idea of science.

(6) The overthrow of moral objectivism:
   a) Idea of the arbitrariness of moral judgments; their subjectivity and individuality.
   b) Rejection of teleology. The causal-mechanistic view of the world.

(7) The rejection of the classical view created enormous problems for social study. Indeed, in a striking sense, it made social study untenable.

(8) Problems created by the rejection of essentialism.
a) The counterintuitive idea of science goes against the element of self-reflection implicit in social life. What people think about their situation is part of what their situation is, though it is not the same as that situation.

b) Again, an element of a self-reflective understanding is the importance we give to the particular differences among individuals, groups, events, and situations. Science proceeds by flattening out the particularities among things.

c) Consider how this difference affects an approach to causation. Importance of theme: to transform the notion of cause is to renew human thought (Taine).

1) The paradox of causality. Tension between the needs for discreteness--imputing a particular effect to particular causes--and completeness--everything is caused by everything else.

2) Why this paradox is moderated in the natural sciences. Basic elements of matter are supposed to have a repetitive character. Moreover, the differences that do or might exist among particular instances of a single category are viewed as less important than in the social sphere. Consequently, we can understand any given situation in terms of a very small number of variables and disregard all others. But in social study this is not so.
3) As a result, there is enormous pressure in social study to emphasize circular causation: total structures in which everything causes everything else.

4) But, at this point, discreteness has been sacrificed to completeness. Does anything then remain of the causal conception at all?

d) At the level of everyday discourse, one talks in terms of purposes and intentions. How can such language be squared with causal determinism? This brings us to the issue of being and goodness in modern social thought.

(9) Problems created by the rejection of moral objectivism.

a) People treat their moral-ideals as more or less capable of justification. The principle of fidelity to subjective experience requires us to take this belief seriously.

b) Turns out to be impossible to make sense of history without making assumptions about human nature or human needs and possibilities and about their relation to concrete forms of social life. But the characterization of these needs and possibilities necessarily cuts across the distinction between understanding and evaluation.

(10) The philosophical situation of the classical social theorists.

a) They could no longer accept the classic metaphysic. The modern view seemed sanctioned by science.

b) Yet the modern view of mind and morals appeared to destroy the very possibility of an adequate understanding of socie
c) How could the social theorists transcend the modern metaphysic without falling back into the ancient one?

(11) The typical form of the mediation between these competing aims: to use the language of the modern metaphysic and yet to attempt to pull away from its implications. Hence, a tension between the surface and the depths in the work of each of these thinkers. This produces the basic dilemmas of their thought. Vulgar modern social science has held on the surface, and suppressed the depths. We must bring these depths to light before we can hope to move beyond classical social theory.

(12) How I fell into the same error in *Knowledge and Politics*. I proposed to conduct the polemic against the modern metaphysic in the language of the ancient one although I did not and do not want to re-instate the Aristotelian view of the world.

(13) What is necessary: to transcend the distinction between the two metaphysics; to find a third one. My hypothesis: the germs of this alternative view are implicit in the development of modern philosophy, science, and social study. Though I say that the classical social theorists had no explicit solution, I also claim that there are certain elements of a solution implicit in their practice.

(14) What keeps us from carrying out this project? The belief that modern science has confirmed the modern metaphysic so that all rebellion against this metaphysic flies in the face of what science has taught us about the world. Thus, to resolve the philosophical prob-
lem, we must liberate ourselves from a set of prejudices about the nature of science and the content of the scientific view of the world.

IV. Social theory and natural science

(1) Premises of modern philosophy appear to be vindicated by science. Thus, the importance of a critique of conventional views about both the nature of scientific practice and the content of the scientific world view.

(2) The classical social theorists were obsessed by the problem of the relationship between social thought and natural science. They oscillated between devotion and anathema:

a) to force social study into the framework of natural science as that framework was perceived;

b) to deny that social study is science. But, then, what kind of rationality is left to social thought, given the tendency to identify rationality with science in modern philosophy?

It is necessary to relativize the distinction between science and non-science, and to establish a more generous conception of reason.

(3) Changes in the view of scientific practice.

a) Against naive reductionism: No one circumstance verifies or falsifies a theory. Theories can only be verified or falsified as a whole.

b) Against naive realism: There is no absolute distinction
between the content of theories and the criteria for choosing among theories. The development of new theories generates new conceptions of what science is.

These arguments have contributed to narrow the supposed disparity between the controls that operate on social theory and physical science.

(4) What about the content of the scientific world view? The view of science -- the one that seemed to vindicate modern philosophy -- is a compound of two main elements, centered in physics.

   a) Classical mechanics: the world as a machine whose parts never run out. Time and space as an absolute background. All movements reversible.

   b) Laplacean determinism. If one knows the positions occupied by all the bodies of the universe at a given point and all the forces operating on them, one could by mathematical analysis determine the totality of the past and future. The contradiction in Laplacean determinism.

(5) This view of the world has disintegrated. The present-day image riven by uncertainty and contradiction.

(6) The puzzle of mathematics and logic. Why are the laws of nature written in the language of mathematics? Mystery dispelled as long as you can view mathematics and logic as a grand set of tautologies; a powerful machine for working out the hidden implications of our premises. Developments in mathematics and logic have shaken our confidence in this. Suggested that even the most formal areas of thought have a creative element; stressed the limits of formalization.
Revived the old mystery. We are driven to conclude either that mathematical and logical systems are empirical theories about the world like all other theories, or that there is a certain fund of structures of consciousness that have a crucial role in our representation of reality.

(7) The puzzle of physics. Inability to resolve the issue of the structure of matter and to choose decisively among the two themes of the wave continuum and atomistic discontinuity. Suggestion that reality is basically capable of different interpretations according to the practical nature of our relationship to it.

(8) The puzzle of biology. Biology dominated by a rejection of teleology. But there are phenomena for which our present understanding does not seem to account without reference to the role of purposes in evolution. Example: orthogenesis. The problem of the role of purposive action is not resolved in either natural science or social theory by the rejection of teleology.

(9) The puzzle of science itself. Progress by abstraction and generalization. An even more hollow form of knowledge, despite the commitment in principle to deduce all particulars from increasingly general theories. Social thought, in its attempt to develop a contextualized form of knowledge, might be seen as contributing to the resolution of a problem that has arisen in the physical sciences themselves.

(10) Conclusions.

a) Modern science can no longer be taken as a vindication of modern philosophy. On the contrary, it is hindered
in the solution of its own internal problems by its lack of an alternative philosophical scheme.

b) The relationship of social study to physical science should not be one of subservience or opposition but of participation in common problems. We students of society thought that the scientists would have to be either our masters or our enemies; instead, they have become, to everyone's surprise, our allies.

V. Conclusion

(1) A revolutionary situation in thought. What distinguishes such a situation: distinctions among the special disciplines melt away. The problems of these disciplines become inseparable from the most general problems of speculative theory. The field of vision is suddenly expanded and distorted; one is thrown back and forth between the most concrete and the most abstract concerns.

(2) This intellectual crisis is rooted in a moral situation. Modern philosophy gives voice to a fundamental experience of the world as a dark place where truth cannot easily or at all be distinguished from opinion or right from convention. The effort to move beyond the premises of modern philosophy is inseparable from the secret hope that this experience of darkness and despair is not the final word in human life.

(3) It is necessary to recognize in the most general crisis of theory your immediate situation. In this way, theoretical disputes are no longer an alien power, while, on the other hand, your moral predicament is dragged out into the open and changed from a private
curse into a public dilemma.

(4) Theory in general and social theory in particular ought not to be regarded as either a diversion from our dilemmas or as a sufficient solution to them. It is neither a balsam, nor a cure for moral anguish.

People tend to view theory as a toy to play with or as a magic wand to conjure with; a toy with which to forget the truth about their situation; a magic wand with which to change their situation without the need to struggle, to suffer, and to wait.

But, beware! If you treat theory too frequently as a toy, it may one day explode in your face. And if you use it too often as a magic wand, it may change your heart of flesh into a heart of stone.
The political context of social theory today

I. Review

(1) My subject last time: the intellectual context of social theory.

(2) First point: Two main traditions of philosophy available to us. Each characterized by a set of views about the relation between the mind and the world and between being and the good. Neither of these traditions adequate to purposes of social theory.

   a) Ancient essentialism makes it difficult to uncover the contingent character of social understandings and the existence of false consciousness. Ancient moral objectivism stands in the way of the development of a critical conception of moral beliefs and of their uses as devices for the legitimation of established power.

   b) The modern rejection of essentialism and the modern idea of science makes it difficult to deal adequately with the self-reflective character of social reality, the importance of particulars, and the role of purposive conduct. The modern denial of moral objectivism cuts the ground from under a conception of human nature that might serve as the perspective from which different social situations are compared and basic trends in history understood. For the characterization of human nature necessarily crosses the divide between understanding and evaluation.
(3) Second point: the predicament of the social theorists was created by the fact that they were unable either to retreat to the premises of ancient philosophy or to accept the premises of modern philosophy. For the implications of the novel view would jeopardize the possibility of a specifically social understanding of human affairs. They accepted the modernist critique of the older view, but they were not able to accept modernism itself unreservedly. The consequence is that their works are marked by a constant tension between the surface acceptance of the modern ideas and the deep-seated effort to escape the implications of these ideas. We must attempt to recapture this tension in our own approach, for the development of social theory depends upon the possibility of finding a philosophical alternative. Though the classical social theorists had no explicit conception of such an alternative, perhaps some of its elements can be found in their work.

(4) Third point: A major obstacle to the search for this third position is the prejudice that modern science vindicates modern philosophy. An implication of this view: that social study must be either like natural science or without a proper mode of rationality. But the authority of this prejudice has been undermined in two ways. First, a changing conception of scientific practice emphasizes that the disparity between the controls that operate on natural science and social study is less than at first appears: a) Scientific theories can only be verified or falsified as a whole. b) There is no absolute distinction between the content of scientific theories and the criteria by which one chooses among
theories. Second, the classical view of science has disintegrated into a series of paradoxes in mathematics, physics, biology, and the conception of science itself. From this analysis, I draw two conclusions. First, natural science can no longer be seen as a corroboration of modern philosophy; it too is embarrassed by the lack of a philosophical alternative. Second, the proper relationship between natural science and social theory is one of participation in a common predicament.

(5) Fourth point: a thesis about the general character of our intellectual situation. The problems one faces in social theory are connected with the issues that arise at the most general philosophical level, but these problems are also linked to the quality of our moral experience. Premises of modern philosophy derive much of their authority from the fact that they describe a moral experience of modern men; only to the extent that experience is changed, together with the objective social realities that give rise to it can we become free of these premises.

Thus, one ought not to conceive of the task as one of dreaming up a philosophical alternative. Two kinds of laborious dialogues are called for:

a) A dialogue between speculative thought and specific disciplines. Philosophy articulates the outline of an alternative view implicit in the practice of these disciplines, and the very exercise of the articulation contributes to further advance in the specialized areas.
b) A dialogue between theory and politics. Theory suggests political action, which changes experience, and thereby makes new theory possible.

II. Introduction

(1) The need to relate the study of social theory to a view of the present situation of politics. The connections:
   a) Social theory grew out of a particular political predicament.
   b) I shall argue that some of the most significant limits to the development of social theory are actual political limits.

(2) Three levels of analysis of increasing degrees of concreteness:
   a) the biological setting: the relationship between community and autonomy; altruism and individuation;
   b) the politics of the liberal state: the problem of power and legitimacy;
   c) the character of interpersonal relations in the liberal state: the logic of trust and distrust.

III. The biological setting: altruism and individuation

(1) A basic model that dominates much of biological thinking, especially evolutionary biology. This model has had an enormous impact upon the development of social thought. The idea of the differentiated manifold. Progress consists in passing from a situation in which there is a juxtaposition of identical elements to one in which there is an organization of dissimilar elements.
Thus, integration and differentiation increase simultaneously. Ideological significance of this: autonomy and community reinforce each other.

(2) Two paradoxes of sociobiology.

a) The static paradox of altruism. How can the preference for self-sacrifice be made consistent with the idea of an evolutionary preference for reproductive value? The group as a gene pool. Difficulty of carrying this analogy over to man: the wider scope of human altruism. The problem of the relationship between individuality and sociability has been changed by the ability to make normative judgments. Perhaps the mutual reinforcement of autonomy and community can reach a higher degree in humanity precisely because of the existence of a sphere of moral consciousness. This sheds light on the:

b) The dynamic paradox of altruism. The "pinnacles of social evolution": the colonial invertebrates, the social insects, the nonhuman mammals, and man. With respect to the first three groups, the elements of cohesiveness, altruism, and cooperativeness seem to decline while individuation increases. Mankind has reversed this trend. The biological realization of the ideal of the differentiated manifold depends upon the intervention of consciousness.

(3) In the course of making possible a higher degree of reciprocal reinforcement between individuality and sociability, consciousness
creates another problem: the reconciliation of a sense of the contingency of social arrangements with a sense of natural order.

(4) Modern society obsessed with these two dilemmas—more rather than less than the societies that preceded it.

(5) Manifestation of these problems in the legal and political spheres:

a) Unprecedented degree of individuality. Will this make possible a greater degree of community consistent with autonomy or, on the contrary, destructive of autonomy?

b) Disintegration of customary patterns. New sense of arbitrariness of social arrangements. Does this mean that the idea of a natural order is lost forever?

(6) The specific dilemmas of modernity do not supersede the original biological problems, but give them a new meaning. How can we reinterpret the notion of the differentiated manifold?

IV. Power and legitimacy

(1) What is the basic relationship between structures of power and devices by which they are legitimized in modern society? What light does this relation throw on the role of social theory?

(2) Contrast to civilizations in which there is a high degree of domination; the social hierarchy is inclusive. Serves as the structuring principle of the division of labor. It is precisely in these societies that the social order is viewed as self-legitimating. Society part of natural order. Critical social theory impossible.
(3) The kind of law that exists in such a society: custom + sacred law + ruthless discretion reserved to the prince.

(4) In such a situation, the dilemmas to which I earlier referred are kept at a low-level equilibrium.

   a) Autonomy constrained and sociability forced.
   
   b) Sense of immanent order is simply a result of the weakness of consciousness.

(5) In modern society: the diminishment of hierarchy paradoxically makes the remaining forms of hierarchy less legitimate. The two low-level equilibria are disrupted: autonomy now seems to subvert community and thus in the end to destroy itself; the discovery of the contingency of social arrangements seems to lead to a belief in arbitrariness of all institutions.

(6) The place of social theory in a society characterized by power without legitimacy. Caught between two roles:

   a) Justification of established power: ideology.
   
   b) Unmasking of all normative judgments as arbitrary and historically determined.

How can social thought be critical without being cynical? How can it long for the discovery of an immanent order without reifying and justifying actuality?

V. The logics of trust and distrust

(1) What is the consequence of this situation of power and legitimacy for the character of interpersonal relations? I shall deal with this
problem through the conception of a logic of trust and distrust in social life. A basic mode of dealing among people is constantly repeated. This logic cuts across the distinctions between late capitalist and state socialist, bourgeois and bureaucratic societies. (2) The core of trust is vulnerability, the willingness to put oneself in another's hands in a situation in which the other may do one harm. Trust represents a relative lack of control over one's dependence on others. There is never a conclusive justification that one can give for the act of trusting. Trust is the converse of loyalty, the act by which we share other people's fate. It participates in the qualities of love (the gift of self), hope (the willingness to act on the principle that interpersonal relations may be perfected), and faith (the risk for which there is never sufficient reason).

(3) Everyday life in advanced capitalist and state socialist societies characterized by three features.

(4) First characteristic: the proliferation of low trust relationships.

The contrast between high and low trust relationships:

a) Demand for careful definition of rights and duties versus a community of shared meanings and purposes (a style of creative mutual encouragement);

b) Insistence on short-term reciprocity (exacting as much as one can) versus promotion of long-term goals;
c) Interpreting deviations from expectations as self-interested versus presuming that they are in good faith. Trust ordinarily creates trust; distrust, distrust. There is a vicious circle of bureaucratic regulation: refractory conduct based upon distrust leads to more regulation, which produces more distrust.

(5) There is a proliferation of low trust relationships at every level of social life:
   a) in the events of daily life-exchange and work;
   b) in the relations among groups and classes, whence inflation;
   c) in the relations among states, at each other's throats because they fear annihilation.

(6) Second characteristic: inequality in the allocation of trust. Trust arises in a context of subordination as well as in one of coordination. Here, to be trusted means to be allowed a large amount of discretion in one's work. Thus, high-discretion work more easily serves as an expression of personality. High discretion increases the vulnerability of one's superiors or of the people who depend on one's efforts. Thus, trust as discretion represents an interpretation of the idea of autonomy, but it is also part of the more general idea of trust as vulnerability.

   In general, the person in the low discretion job, who is not trusted, reciprocates by distrusting his superiors. This need not be so. There may be a recognition that the interests of the group require certain jobs to be low-discretion jobs.
(7) This differential allocation of the experience of trust as autonomy correlates roughly with a distribution of objective access to wealth, power, and knowledge. Each type of inequality sustains and reinforces the other.

(8) How are differential allocations of trust established and perpetuated?

a) Pure force; never sufficient in the long-run.

b) Legitimation of differences as existing in the common interest. Almost always unjustified. Example: much of the argument that the organization of production, as we know it, is dictated by objective requirements of efficiency.

c) Most often, the two kinds of support combine. A shaking of the underlying power relationships may then lead to a rapid disintegration of the legitimizing ideologies.

(9) Third characteristic: the dialectic between the everyday life of distrust and shelters of community. The desire for trust re-asserts itself in these shelters.

a) In everybody's life: the family community. The family as a structure of power ennobled by sentiment.

b) The activity of the elites: they want to live in communities of trust. But, characteristically, they succeed only in part. High discretion in the job, but little trust among the jobholders.

(10) The moral characteristics of the elite bureaucratic organizations:
a) The contradiction between the preaching of liberal legalism and bureaucratic impersonality (the gospel of distrust) by the elites and the quest for community in their own personal situations.

b) The conflict between the achievement of trust as autonomy and the complete absence of trust of the individuals in each other (trust as community), despite the constant appeal to a communal ideology.

c) The conflict between their need for mutual recognition and the prominence of mutual distrust. Like prisoners handcuffed together. To depend so completely upon the opinion of people whom one utterly distrusts is a good definition of hell.

The existence of these conflicts in the life of the society is a point of conflict and change.

(11) The role of law. The characteristic form of normative order. Its features map those of the logic of trust and distrust itself.

a) The proliferation of distrust: pursuit of arbitrary private interest within a domain of protected rights. Outside of that province, one has no claims. Oscillation between individualism and collectivism.

b) The inequalities of trust. Acceptance and perpetuation of substantive inequalities implicit in the very commitment to formal generality.

c) The shelters of community. The basic policy of the law is abstention from interference in the internal life of
the family and private associations. Fears being like Midas and turning into gold whatever it touches.

(12) Political implications of this analysis:

a) Necessary to break through the logic of distrust in order to attain the communal ideal. An interpretation of the higher reciprocal reinforcement of autonomy and community. Might also be viewed as the condition of a solution to the problem of reconciling the sense of contingency with the recognition of a moral order. The practices developed might be seen as less than arbitrary; expressions of collective human needs developing through history.

b) In the process, one must often begin by creating distrust. False legitimizing ideologies must be exposed. The communal ideal may serve as an apology for domination. The problem of the creation of community must never be separated from the problem of the overcoming of domination.

(13) The virtues I claim for this kind of analysis as an example of social understanding.

a) Economy of understanding: from the microscopic to the macroscopic; from dealings among individuals to struggles among nations;

b) Takes account of the self-reflective character of social life: cuts across the distinction between consciousness and organizations or external behavior, but does not identify the two. The focus is on relations.
c) Oriented to a moral ideal as part of the very analysis of social life, yet this moral ideal does not vindicate established power.

(14) Conclusion. My argument about the political context of social theory concludes, as did my discussion of its intellectual context, with the evocation of a bond between the most general structures of thought and power in our world and the most minute features of everyday experience. Critical thought depends upon recognizing this bond. Transformative politics requires us to act upon this recognition.

Each human encounter, fleeting and fragile as it is, passes judgment on the whole of history. The way we treat other people reveals our secret thoughts about what we are capable of becoming.

Our public and our private lives are separated from each other by a screen of fear and delusion. But the tradition of our culture, which has helped build this screen, has put a hammer alongside it. This tool and weapon is theory. The partition is very thick, and the hammer very small. But if one holds the hammer firmly in one's hand and if one swings it with great force, the screen will break.
I. Review

(1) Last time, I discussed the political context of social theory. Three levels of analysis.

(2) Starting out with the biological idea of the differentiated manifold, two dilemmas.
   
a) How can individuality and sociability grow together? By moral judgment, which presupposes consciousness.

b) From the development of consciousness there comes a second dilemma: How to reconcile the recognition of the contingent and conventional character of social life with a belief in the existence of a moral order.

(3) The problem of power and legitimacy.
   
a) In modern European society, there was a disruption of the low-level equilibria by which these dilemmas are dealt with in other forms of social life.

b) The very weakening of the hierarchical order contributes to the subversion of belief in the available legitimations of social hierarchy. The less hierarchy there is, the less legitimate the remaining forms of hierarchy appear to be.

c) The problem for social theory: to be critical without being cynical.
(4) The disruption of legitimation affects the character of everyday life. Three features I mentioned:
   a) Proliferation of low trust relationships.
   b) Differential allocations of trust.
   c) Dialectic between havens of trust and the overall situation of distrust.

(5) How these features are reflected in the characteristics of law.

(6) The method of social understanding exemplified by this kind of analysis.

II. Introduction

(1) Today, I begin my study of the tradition of social theory. The major immediate sources of this tradition, all more or less contemporaneous with what I called Enlightenment criticism:
   a) Classical political economy and utilitarianism: society as an association of self-interested traders. The basic schema of social life is the individual's calculus of the most effective means to achieve his own more or less arbitrarily chosen ends. Both description and ideal.
   b) A reactionary, often mystical tradition that emphasized the organic character of social life. The group had a degree of reality and of moral worth distinct from the worth and the reality of its members. Modern individualism a transitory or pathological deviation from this normal condition. Fundamental mechanism of social life: the acceptance by the individual of shared values of the group.
c) I want to focus on a third tradition, which grew directly out of Enlightenment criticism. Represented in the works of Montesquieu and Tocqueville. May be called the liberal theory. It perceived the profound disorder of social life and of the moral sentiments brought about by the dissolution of aristocratic society. However, it regarded the process by which this dissolution was taking place as irreversible. And its attitude toward it was ambivalent: both an occasion for the growth of individuality and a threat to individuality itself. The danger: that one might have independence without diversity and equality without community. It rejected both the means-ends and the shared values schemata. Shall have more to say about this tradition next time.

(2) Today, however, I go back to a work that seems to have little to do with social theory at all: the Persian Letters. Published in 1721, in many ways a perfect early specimen of Enlightenment criticism. Nevertheless, I have chosen it for discussion because it is proto-social theory. It anticipates many of the themes of later social thought and carries some of them to a degree of depth which later works were unable to equal. This was made possible in part by its non-theoretical form, which allows Montesquieu to suggest what he might have not been capable of explicating fully.

Many of the deepest perceptions of modern society can be found in the works of the modernist writers. The problem: how to give them a theoretical form—to systematize in theory the insights of art.
(3) Montesquieu was a moderate and a brilliant man, but, despite his moderation, he was dangerous and, despite his brilliance, he was profound.

He was concerned to preserve the privileges of the upper classes and especially of the professional gentry. And he identified their interests with the interests of freedom. Yet he helped create a mode of social understanding that was potentially radical because it emphasized that society was an interconnected whole and that its arrangements were contingent. Set in motion a chain of reasoning that would lead to the relentless critique of modern society. This subversive, aristocratic lawyer, this cosmopolitan child of the provincial professional classes, this skeptical and sarcastic defender of the idea of moral order perfected the art of holding the dagger of criticism under the cloak of edification.

(4) The story of the Persian Letters. Two elements:

b) The seraglio element: The progressive disintegration of the harem during Usbek’s absence.

(5) Plan of the discussion:

a) The concerns of modern consciousness as brought out in the Parisian part of the story.
b) The political analysis and the political lesson contained in the seraglio narrative. A proto-analysis of the problem of domination.
c) What is the relation between these two parts of the book?
The most remarkable fact about the work is the seeming
disparity between these two strands.

III. The structure of modern consciousness

Justice and facticity

(1) The first, overwhelming impression one gains from the Persian
Letters: the conventional character of social life. We live sur-
rounded by a web of appearances and delusions. Moreover, what is taken
as part of nature is merely the prejudice of the age and the place.
Everything seems to be other than what it is and everything might be
other than what it is.

(2) This sense of arbitrariness extends to people's understandings
of each other and of themselves. Exemplified in letter 54 by the
two friends who agree to make each other appear as wits. Every group
a mutual admiration society.

(3) Yet appearances are not merely cast aside. They reveal the
truth about society in the very course of hiding it. Thus, the theme
of unmasking in social thought.

(4) This practice of demystification implies that there is a truth
hidden under appearances, a truth by reference to which the con-
ventions of society can be shown up for what they are. Moreover,
this truth is a moral truth; it has a normative weight.

(5) How is one to prevent this Archimedean point from being gobbled
up by cultural relativism. Why shouldn't the norms of justice and
equity be viewed as mere conventions? The only thing they would have
to base themselves on would be enlightened self-interest. If the individual who lived in an allegedly just society could get away with injustice without being discovered, there would be nothing to stop him.

(6) Letter 83 brings out very clearly the resulting tension in Montesquieu's thought. On the one hand, justice is "a relation of suitability among things." On the other hand, even if there were no God (i.e. even if there were no cosmological basis for these principles), we would still have to act as if they had an unquestionable authority. Enlightened self-interest would itself be insufficien
We can no longer believe that justice is objectively founded, but if we treat it as no more than a noble lie, or a convenience of self-interest, how can we expect its persuasive force to be stable?

Individual and social virtue

(7) The second major conflict is between two conceptions of the relation between virtue and society. They are expounded, respectively, in two of the great moral fables of the Persian Letters: the myth of the Troglodytes (letters 11-14) and the myth of Apheridon and Astarte in letter 67.

(8) Themes of the story:

a) Civilization depends on the identification of individual interest with self-interest. Failure to maintain this bond leads to the extinction of the wicked Troglodytes. The Darwinian aspect of the story.

b) Virtue harder taskmaster than law. The sharing of ends better than legal compulsion. The early descendents of
the good Troglodytes need no calculus of interests to proceed as they do. There is a spontaneous sharing of understandings and values, a perfect union of individuality and sociability.

c) The moral ideal is one of identification of the individual with society.

(9) Themes of the story of Apheridon and Astarte (letter 67):

a) The fact of incest. Relatively unimportant that marriage between brother and sister is permitted among the Gabars.

b) The prohibition against incest as the most universal of social rules; the point at which the universality of nature meets with the conventionality of culture (Lévi-Strauss).

c) Apheridon and Astarte find virtue and happiness by defying the conventions of the surrounding society. The reverse message of the myth of the Troglodytes: virtue here is founded upon the individual's rejection of the claims of the wider society.

(10) What is the relation between the two dilemmas of justice and arbitrariness, and individual and social virtue?

a) For any given person, the tension between individual and society can only be attenuated by bringing the social order into harmony with moral standards in which he can acquiesce. The justice/arbitrariness problem must be solved.

b) Our confidence in the moral standards of society depends in part, though perhaps only in part, on the social conditions under which those judgments developed, the extent to which they represent more than factional interests.
IV. The logic of despotism: a theory of the dynamic of domination

(1) I turn now to the seraglio part of the story. Its refined erotic character. The erotic story contains a political message, which we must try to bring to light.

(2) Usbek's harem as both a contrast to European society and a warning about its inner dangers. Louis XIV and his admiration for oriental politics. The situation of the French nobility: its political emasculation.

(3) The world of Parisian sociability which Usbek and Rica encounter is already the modern world. No longer capable of achieving the ideal republicanism of the Trogloodytes. Always on the verge of falling into despotism. This social situation is one in which the characteristic indirectness of social relations and the darkness of the social world (the impossibility of seeing through it easily) facilitates the seizure of power by despots and their servants.

(4) The harem situation as one of differential trust. The attempt to preserve it by a legitimizing ideology. A structure of power ennobled by sentiment. Further defined by the role of each of the participants.

(5) The women. Kept in bondage by both fear and love. In the harem, unlike the monogamous marriage, life is wholly eroticized. The women instruct each other in the use of their chains. The enslaved have a perverse moral interest in their own enslavement. The legitimizing ideology justifies them in seeing their own situation, which they take to be inescapable, as not entirely degrading.
Yet despotism is unstable. The instability cannot be explained by the self-interest of the enslaved. For the women, it is the sexual instinct that exercises an emancipatory function. In humanity, the "instincts" themselves are touched with a moral significance and a moral power.

(6) The eunuchs. These are the men whom the "blade of a knife separated ... from nature," and thus from themselves. The idea of self-estrangement. They have lost the means to satisfy their desires, but not their desires themselves. The analogy to the situation of the professional and bureaucratic classes. From earliest youth, they are brought up for eunuchdom. By allowing themselves to be emasculated (i.e. assuming the position of staffers), they hope to participate in power. Then they discover that their bargain is a losing one; they are powerful only so long as they serve their masters. The appearance of dominion is the reality of impotence.

(7) Usbek himself. He is unable to control the harem. His relationship to people: one of possession. Fidelity is transmuted into the concern of the bourgeois propertyowner: the desire to exclude others from enjoyment.

The inability to control and to possess leads Usbek to derangement. He too is a prisoner of the system. The dominators as well as the dominated are enslaved by the system of domination.

(8) What is the political lesson of the denouement? It is ambiguous. Is the ancien regime or the modern liberal state the highest form of social life to which modern men dare aspire? Or is there some way to give a new and realistic meaning to the republican ideal through the radical transformation of society and
the overthrow of the mechanisms of domination? It would be an
understatement at best to say that after 250 years this question
remains open.

V. Conclusion: Despotism and contemplation; the problem of
practical reason

(1) What is the relationship between the two parts of the work?
Montesquieu himself referred to a "secret chain" binding the letters
together. The most important link in the chain would be the one to
connect the Parisian and the seraglio stories.

(2) The key to a solution lies in the double role of Usbek. Usbek
is the master of the harem. But he is also the man who has left his
homeland in search of wisdom, just as he had to retire from court as
a consequence of his determination to speak the truth. He and Rica
did not want to live by the light of the East alone.

(3) The modern bourgeois intellectual, like the despot, pretends
to a kind of abstractness from the social contexts of his existence.
He wants to stand outside them and to look at them from outside. In
another way, the despot claims to control and to use other people
without really caring for them.

(4) The style of the Persian letters often seems like a witty inter-
pretation of the sensibility of the voyeur. This is the style of
both Usbek the harem manager and Usbek the observer of society. In
both cases, it is the eye that seeks instruction and enjoyment,
without deliberately sharing responsibility and involvement. And
it therefore has an exploitative relationship to its human objects.
(5) For more than two thousand years, despite countervailing religious influences, the ideal of detached contemplation stood at the core of Western art and speculative thought. Ultimately, God Himself could be pictured by rationalist deism as a being who sets up the world system and watches it with His all-seeing eye but does not Himself share in the fate of His creatures.

(6) Can one define a relationship between the mind and the world—a form of social understanding—that is based upon going beyond this ideal of contemplative detachment? From the standpoint of a view that afforded primacy to practical reason, if there is a God, and if He is indifferent to our suffering, we would be justified in dragging Him down from heaven, if we could, and punishing Him.

(7) When the disengaged mind discovers that Usbek the observer and Usbek the despot are one and the same person, it denounces itself. The discovery of a hidden affinity between contemplation and domination is like the thirteenth chime of a clock—the thirteenth chime of a clock, which not only startles us, but makes us wonder about the previous twelve chimes and indeed about the clock itself.
The liberal theory of society in Montesquieu and Tocqueville

(1) Review

(1) Yesterday I began a discussion of a major strand of the origins of classical social theory—the liberal theory of society. To be distinguished from two other traditions

a) The utilitarian: Society is and ought to be an association of self-interested individual traders. The means-ends schema.

b) The organicist: Society is or ought to be a hierarchy of groups with a reality and a worth distinct from the worth and reality of its members. Modern individualism, a pathological deviation. The sharing of values schema.

c) The liberal theory distinguished more clearly between what actually happened and what was desirable. They saw the dissolution of aristocratic society as irreversible and they inquired into the opportunities and the dangers which this dissolution created for the development of individuality.

(2) The Persian Letters as proto-social theory. Its elements:

a) An analysis of the structure of modern consciousness.

b) A view of the logic and dynamic of a system of domination—the seraglio.

(3) The structure of modern consciousness.

a) Justice and arbitrariness. Caught between the suspicion that there are no objective normative principles and the
realization that social order requires us to believe in their existence and to act as if they existed.

b) Individual and social virtue. Virtue as a condition of acceptance of the collective standards and virtue as denial of the standards of society.

c) There is a relationship between the organization of power in society and the degree of confidence we are entitled to have in its dominant practices and beliefs.

(4) The theory of domination. The harem as a model of despotism. The ambiguous character of the Parisian world: between republicanism and despotism. The indirectness of social relations.

a) With respect to the women: the conflict between the acceptance of a legitimizing ideology (pretense of community) and the clarity of insight that the instincts themselves possess.

b) With regard to the eunuchs: the pact with power leads in fact to powerlessness. Indispensable intermediaries of the despot.

c) Usbek himself imprisoned by his own system.

d) What are the possibilities? Republicanism or Parisian sociability.

(5) The affinity between domination and contemplation. What is needed: not to abandon reason, but to change the conception of reason. The issue is not one of activism or thought but of the spirit in which one acts or thinks.
II. Introduction

(1) Some remarks about the social theorists as people. Though I shall criticize them severely, I believe that they are all among the greatest teachers of the human race. In every case, the intellectual achievement was made possible by extraordinary moral qualities.

a) Perhaps the most necessary of these qualities was their courageous independence from petty interest and passing prejudice. Each of them was a state within a state, and each was willing to abandon the shelter of a craven subservience to convention. One of the requisites of greatness in thought: the willingness to make oneself vulnerable. Thus, there is a fundamental affinity between the conditions for intellectual and moral progress. Intellectual courage participates in the nature of personal trust.

b) Nevertheless, in each case their thought was colored by a very particular social context. It is one of the pleasures of intellectual history to see how the aspects of independence and dependence come together—often reinforcing rather than destroying each other. The decadent aristocracy (Montesquieu and Tocqueville). The radical merchant class (Bentham). The bureaucratic professoriate (Hegel).

(2) Plan for today:

a) The spirit of the laws and the structure of liberal society.
b) Tocqueville and the dynamism of liberal society.

c) The underlying dilemmas of this tradition of thought. Critique of these dilemmas.

III. The Spirit of the Laws: the nature of liberal society

(1) The Spirit of the Laws, the first work of social theory in the modern sense.

(2) Notable for its perception of society as an integrated totality—transformation of the idea of embodied spirit.
   a) In the texts assigned, Montesquieu studies the nature (organization) and principle (the dominant passion) in each form of government.
   b) Much of the rest of the book is occupied with the study of material influences on politics. These influences operate always through the consciousness of the members of society.

(3) The ambiguous break with ancient political philosophy.
   a) Montesquieu goes from normative to descriptive method.
   b) From an unhistorical to an historical view of human nature.
   c) With respect to (b), the crucial characteristics of consciousness:
      1) Held widely by members of a community; irreducible to individual beliefs.
      2) No clear division between ideals and perceptions. Distinction between fact and value vanishes at the deepest level of the mind.
d) Break incomplete. New ideas in old words.

(4) Normative elements remain; there is a
   a) law product of divine reason;
   b) law derived from human nature;
   c) law that is inherently common to all human societies.

(5) Universal image of man. The passions on which each political
    regime plays are drawn from a more total conception of man within
    which each of these passions has a place. Montesquieu speaks as
    if there were a limited repertory of basic outlooks and emotions
    available to men in society.

(6) The republic (democratic and aristocratic); despotism; and
    monarchy. Try to understand them both as examples of the struggle
    to relate consciousness to organization and, more specifically, as
    parts of an inquiry into the nature of modern society.

(7) The republic. Its two forms:
   a) Its structure. Elected government; relative social
      equality; constant redistribution of property.
   b) Principle on which the republic is based. Virtue: love
      of country and of equality. Private interest coincides
      with social good. As soon as there is social differen-
      tiation, the republic is in danger. Moderation as a
      surrogate for virtue.
   c) Essence of republic: alliance of concern with universal
      good and respect for separateness of individuals. But
      how can this be? Fundamental—experience of modern society
is one of disparity between private and social interest. Only frugal habits and small territory make this possible. Montesquieu evokes Sparta and Rome. Presents political dream of liberalism. Remains a dream because it is unclear how a truly universal interest could ever be generated in such a society. The education of the school is repeatedly defeated by the education of the world.

(8) Despotism

a) Its structure. A single will prevails without legal constraints. Domain of caprice. Represented by Oriental empires. In the republic, all are equal because they are everything. Under despotism, they are equal because they are nothing. Transparency of Republic versus darkness of despotism. No law except as command of ruler. Only religion limits the power of the ruler.

b) The principle is fear. Possession of self in the republic contrasts with the sentiment of our nothingness under despotism.

c) In the effort to reach the republican ideal by crushing the intermediate ranks of society, we risk despotism. Both despotism and the republic imply an absence of intermediate bodies between the state and the individual. Despotism is the liberal's nightmare just as the Republic is his dream. If the Republic is the liberal's dream and despotism is his nightmare, what then is his reality?
(9) Monarchy
   a) Its structure. Single man at top, whose will is limited by law. Differentiated social order. Classes and institutions relatively independent. Separation of powers.
   b) Principle: honor. Each moved by private interest and by the sentiments of his group. They are kept in line by their reciprocal need for each other's recognition. Under the republic, each has a self; under despotism, he is robbed of this self and subject to the despot's whim. In the monarchy, what self the person has, he owes to others. The Newtonian system in society.
   c) Nonetheless, the monarchy is fragile. Will there be any institutional system for ensuring the coincidence of private and social interest? How is social interest to be defined? Once fundamental political equality is recognized, what will stop progress toward the equalization of social circumstances?

(10) The dream, the nightmare, and the reality of liberal society. May be criticized in two directions:
   a) Underplays the despotic dynamic in the evolution of liberal society.
   b) Disregards the possibilities of recapturing the republican ideal.

IV. The Tocquevillian critique of the liberal theory of society

(1) Way to understand Tocqueville's criticism:
a) Internal criticism: suggestion that the liberal system is unstable; the possible remedies.

b) The Ancien Regime analyzes this instability in detail; Democracy in America suggests its more general structure and the way in which it may be remedied.

(2) The immediate historical problem. The late 18th century revolutions had produced regimes that did not fit well into any of Montesquieu's categories. Despotic and liberal democracies.

(3) The main factors that tend to disrupt the ancien regime, which has many of the features of Montesquieu's monarchy:

a) The revolution from below: commercialization. The break-up of the estates and the recognized transitoriness of all social positions;

b) The revolution from above; the growth of state bureaucracy and a change in the nature of this power: becomes purely instrumental. All society as a subject of political will.

1) the basic element is a lack of correspondence between the state and civil society,

2) the problem of revolutionary reforms; partial reforms reveal the inadequacy of the total system, depriving it of its sanctity.

3) the attack on the aristocracy destroys the ancien regime. The deep flaw in aristocratic society.

c) The alienation of intelligence:
1) the separation of the intelligenstia from power;
2) the union of religious and political revolutions;
3) the idea of the malleability of society.

(4) The pathology of liberal society; the tendency toward despotism.
   a) The subversion of legitimacy. The disorganization of the emotions.
   b) Privatism. Oscillation between government as framework and as nurse. The public is privatized instead of the private being publicized. Politics about the whole of life. Government then appears as an external tutelary power.

(5) The proposed remedies:
   a) to the subversion of legitimacy: religion.
   b) to privatism: voluntary associations.

(6) Why these solutions are of dubious efficacy:
   a) Religion itself privatized.
   b) Voluntary associations:
      1) Partial association of role occupants;
      2) organized around private interests.

(7) The situation of contemporary political thought. The conception of an invincible logic that cannot be shattered. Hence, the alternation between despairing resignation and revolutionary utopianism.

V. The false dilemmas of liberalism

(1) Underlying this structure of thought, there is a set of dominant
concerns. They present themselves as dilemmas. But are they true dilemmas?

(2) Aristocracy and democracy. These thinkers recognized and admired the loftiness of the aristocratic ethic. At the highest levels of society, there would be room for the greatest amount of diversity and self-assertion. But the cost of this would be the oppression and standardization of the masses. The natural tendency of democracy: the increasing emancipation of the masses would destroy the occasions of diversity at the top without extending them to the rest of society. All men would be ambitious, but all their ambitions would be petty.

(3) Individuality and sociability. Montesquieu's monarchy and Tocqueville's democracy represent modest compromises between individuality and sociability. Sociability in the form of equalization without community. Individuality in the form of privatism without true diversity (for such diversity would be aristocratic).

The premise is that there is an inevitable trade-off between individuality and sociability: the more of one, the less of the other.

(4) Legitimacy and cynicism. Religion a mere convenience or a moral truth. Unwilling to reject arbitrariness because they are moderns or to accept it because they tremble at its consequences—and the men with the daggers are waiting outside.

(5) The liberal theory of society moves beyond optimistic reformism to self-conscious tragedy. Is this the necessary tragedy of mankind
or simply the tragedy of an age? Is it the truth about our situation? Or is it the delusion of a purely contemplative mind—which, looking at the world from afar, can no longer imagine how it might be changed?

The importance of distinguishing the dilemmas that are truly universal from those that are specific to a particular form of life and thought.

(6) Aristocracy and democracy. The questions: Can one distinguish aristocratic diversity and loftiness of ambition from the particular social forms within which it is imprisoned in aristocratic society? The premise of the liberal dilemma: that the ethos of each form of social life is completely bound up with the concrete institutions and practices of the society. But there is another view. The ethos represents an interpretation of what it means to be human. At its most general levels it is capable of being rescued from its particular social manifestations and given a new but not wholly different interpretation in an alternative form of social life. An interpretation of the ideas of embodied spirit and of transcendence.

To make sense of this notion in social theory one must suppose that these different modes of experience are connected with one another. That each of them is a tendency or dimension of the human spirit; that they are capable of complementing and changing each other, by joining together in more inclusive wholes. Comparison to Panofsky's conception of art history.

(7) Individuality and sociability. The failure to acknowledge that it is true both (a) that individuality and sociability require and reinforce each other and (b) that they undermine each other. How
individuality requires sociability: (a) depends on the social medium of culture; (b) the need for recognition; (c) the fact that one can only be perfected by making oneself vulnerable to others. There is a certain threshold limit to this mutual reinforcement: the distinction between self and other cannot be wholly overcome. By sharing their ends and understandings of the world, one is in danger of losing one's own individuality. The objection to liberalism is that it fails to distinguish adequately the level of conflict between individuality and sociability that is inherent in the distinction between self and others from the level that results from the structure of domination in modern societies.

(8) Legitimacy and cynicism. This dilemma based upon the misconception that one must choose between the view that there is an objective (cosmological) basis for normative judgments and the view that all such judgments are arbitrary. Values either objective or subjective. Disregards the possibility that the authority of social practices and beliefs may be proportional to the extent to which they are expressions of collective human needs rather than of the interests and ideals of dominant groups. Such a view would require us not to take for granted the structure of domination in modern society.

(9) The forms of spirituality available to the elites in modern bourgeois and bureaucratic societies:

a) A shallow and optimistic reformism. Belief in the possibilities of endless progress within the given system.
b) A despairing and tragic liberalism that identifies the dilemmas of modern society and modernist consciousness as the universal condition of man. Leads into a stoic religion of resignation to the world as it is, complemented, but not reversed, by a utopian flight from political reality.

(10) The root of this tragic liberalism is idolatry: the vice that consists in mistaking the contingent for the necessary and the transitory for the eternal.

A lesson for the spirit in which to approach social study. The first and most common kind of failure consists in the tendency to underestimate the constraints imposed upon action and thought by any social system. The blindness to the "stubborn resistance of material things" and, even more, to the power of modes of thought and conduct of whose very existence we may be only imperfectly aware. This is a failure of lucidity: the spirit is embodied and, at any given moment, its embodiments impose limitations upon it.

But once one has grasped these constraints, one must then learn to discover the secret flaws and the hidden possibilities of transformation latent in every historical circumstance. The failure to detect these occasions is a failure of hope, which is also a limitation of insight. When lucidity has laid the ground for hope, hope itself can become a higher form of lucidity. To be both lucid and hopeful—that would be wisdom, if one could have it.
Theories of social order

I. Review: the liberal theory of society in Montesquieu and Tocqueville

(1) I singled out for discussion one among the various traditions that lie at the origins of classical social theory. Characterized by:
   a) Its perception that the disintegration of European aristocratic society was an irreversible process;
   b) Its ambivalence toward the moral and political implications of this process. A spur or a threat to individuality?
   c) Its rejection of both the means-ends and the sharing of values accounts of social conduct.

(2) The typology of governments in the first three books of the Spirit of the Laws. One may see this typology as a source of insight into the dominant concerns of the liberal imagination, its hopes and fears, and its sense of the limits of political possibility.
   a) The republic whose principle is virtue. The dream of liberalism: perfect harmony of the individual and the collective consciousness.
   b) Despotism whose principle is fear. The nightmare of liberalism: subjection to a capricious will untrammeled by law. The central preoccupation of liberalism: to avoid direct subjection to another's will. Law as the antidote to personal dependence. The common feature of the two governments: the absence of intermediate bodies
between government and the individual. The danger that as we try to carry out the communal republican ideal we may in fact end up with despotism.
c) Monarchy whose principle is honor. Each individual moved to perform his role by his need to be recognized by his fellows. The social context: one of a proliferation of intermediate bodies and legal restraints on public power. An artificial link between private interest and public order.

(3) Tocqueville's argument in the "Ancien Regime" and "Democracy in America." A study of the instability of the aristocratic liberal society, of the birth of a new post-revolutionary order, of the despotic tendencies that menaced this order, and of the measures that might allay these tendencies.

a) The disintegration of the ancien regime:
   1) the revolution from below: commercialism;
   2) the revolution from above: the expansion of governmental power and the change in its character;
   3) the opposition of the intelligentsia to the government.

b) The pathology of democratic society:
   1) the subversion of legitimacy;
   2) privatism.

c) The solutions:
   1) the reaffirmation of religion and morals;
   2) the establishment of voluntary associations.

d) The inadequacy of these solutions.
e) The resulting sense of a labyrinth without an exit.

(4) The dilemmas of liberalism. Though largely implicit, they gave unity to this tradition of thought. In each case, there is a conflict between two ideals or two visions that appears to be insoluble. Upon looking more closely, we discover that this claim to universality is at least partially false. A danger in philosophy and in politics: to fall into the opposite error and to treat these dilemmas as entirely false. The task: to distinguish the aspect of these conflicts which inheres in the nature of society and subjectivity from the aspect that depends upon the organization of modern society and, specifically, upon its structure of domination. Once we tear away the legitimizing ideologies, certain ultimate problems remain. It is of the utmost importance that they be recognized for what they are.

a) Aristocracy and democracy.

1) Each form of social life associated with a characteristic ethos, a mode of experience.

2) One of the marks of the aristocratic ethos: its high-spiritedness and largeness of ambition. At the cost of the standardization of the masses. The emancipation of the masses would destroy forever the social basis of this ethic rather than extending it to the people. The reign of equality would also be the reign of pettiness.

3) Another view. Each mode of experience is interpretive and constitutive of human nature. Embodied in specific social practices yet capable of being dis-
sociated from them. The analogy to art history. The universal element in every style is reinterpreted and if necessary reinvented by other styles rather than simply discarded.

4) The practical application of this idea: the need to distinguish between the superbness of a dominant caste and the high-spirited possession of self which is built upon the individual's sense that he is always capable of transcending the limitations of consciousness and practice in the groups to which he belongs.

b) Individuality and sociability

1) The liberal thesis that there is a trade-off between them.

2) But, on the contrary, this is only half of the truth. It is true both that they require and that they undermine each other.

3) The need to distinguish those interferences between individuality and sociability that inhere in the distinction between self and others from those that result from contingent structures of domination. No way to tell a priori into which category a given interference fits. No general presumptions.

4) The practical importance of this principle. The twin dangers. Modernism in art and thought cultivates the sense of tragedy. Identifies the conflicts of liberal society with the necessary condition of man.
Vindication of the established order. The opposite danger: the effort to create a total and impossible harmony of individuality and sociability suppresses the former and transforms the latter into a new form of domination. The manifestation of this distortion is a terroristic politics.

c) Legitimacy and cynicism.

1) Liberal thought hesitates between conceptions that seem equally unacceptable: that there is an objective basis for normative judgments and that all such judgments are arbitrary. These correspond, respectively, to the positions of "ancient" and "modern" philosophy. Impossible to accept the ancient position without accepting the idea that values are real entities that can be apprehended by the mind. Such a view leaves no room for the sense that man creates his values as well as discovering them. It also serves as a device by which contingent beliefs and practices are given an appearance of necessity.

2) But we must not assume that the categories of objective and subjective valuation are exhaustive. Our willingness to rely upon collective practices, to take them as authoritative, may depend on the extent to which we see them as representing merely factional interests of dominant groups rather than collective needs and aspirations chosen in conditions of greater
autonomy and equality. The problem of the basis of normative judgment not an all or nothing matter; an issue of degree.

3) This view coherent only insofar as we acknowledge that no one set of social practices can constitute a definitive rendition of human nature and thereby attain perfect objectivity. The individual moral imagination capable of going beyond any particular form of social life.

d) The common ground in my treatment of these dilemmas. Theoretical lucidity as well as political prudence require that we find an alternative to both the belief in the possibility of a secular millenium and the conviction that the conflicts of our present situation are inescapable. Our understanding of the limits of possibility affects our thinking and action in the world today much more deeply than we imagine.

II. Introduction

(1) My purpose today: to speak in general terms about theories that deal with the basis of order in society. This will serve two functions:

a) to place the liberal theory of society within the broader context of alternative theories;

b) to introduce the study of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.

(2) Plan of the class:

a) Enumerate and criticize four main kinds of theories of social order.
b) Suggest two ways of looking at the relation among these four kinds of theory.

c) The premises that account for the inadequacies of these theories of social order.

d) The proper role of theory in the transformation of these premises.

III. Theories of social order

(1) The starting point of the modern analysis of social order. The perception of a double breakdown:

a) of established forms of social hierarchy;

b) of the kinds of moral beliefs that were partly shaped by these forms and, in turn, lent them support.

(2) The private interest theory. Exemplified by utilitarianism and classical political economy. Two versions of the theory. The more general and more familiar: society as an association of self-interested traders. These individuals have divergent wants, ends, or interests. They specialize in different activities and then exchange their goods and services with each other. Each one ends up with more than he would have if he attempted to satisfy all his wants for himself. Thanks to the institutions of the market (and to other forms of reciprocity in social life), the very diversity of ends becomes a device of harmony. Because each individual can treat his fellows as a means to the satisfaction of his own ends, social order is possible without the repression or transformation of egotism. The major objections to this view:
a) Exchange and reciprocity can only occur within the context of rules and institutions such as the laws governing contract and property. The calculus of means and ends can only operate when there are stable criteria that determine what sorts of conduct a person may resort to in order to further given goals, i.e. what counts as a legitimate means. These rules and institutions presuppose a set of shared beliefs and values. Without these shared values and beliefs, there would be no consensus for choosing the rules and no common standpoint from which to interpret their meaning when the time came to apply them.

b) The collective goods problem. The private interest theory makes sense for one kind of good upon which society depends but not for another. Commodities are ordinarily non-collective goods, i.e. goods such that nonpurchasers can be excluded from their consumption. With respect to non-collective goods, diversity of interests may promote integration in the manner described. But then there are collective goods, i.e. goods such that nonpurchasers cannot be excluded from their consumption. An example would be defense. Insofar as collective goods are important, integration requires agreement on a common policy, shared understandings and values. But there are many collective goods about which men are willing to struggle in even the most privatized and commercialized of societies. Among these goods are the basic rules and practices of social life themselves.
(3) A narrower version of the private interest theory. An important strand in the genesis of political economy. The passions have been let loose by the decay of social hierarchy and moral precept. Among the passions we can distinguish one that is constructive and peaceful rather than subversive and warlike: the interest in money-making. Difficulty: underestimates the change that occurs when the commercial capitalist classes seize power for themselves. They will use that political power to promote their interests against other classes and other peoples.

(4) Integration from above: the state theory. Found in one form in Hobbes and in another in Hegel. There is a distinction between the state and civil society. The disorder is rooted in civil society; hence, it may be extirpated by the state. The state intervenes in civil society to impose its order: men as self-interested traders must accept the constraints on self-interest established by the dictatorial sovereign or by the collectivity of men as citizens (absolutist and democratic variants). The fundamental objections are found in Marx's critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state:

a) The state is a limited agency. When the state and society can be conceived as two entirely different entities, politics touches upon but a limited aspect of life.

b) The people who staff the government are themselves part of society. Hence, they are necessarily partisan. Not only do they belong to classes with interests of their own, but the bureaucracy itself develops its own interests and ideals which it tries to present as the universal
interest of society. Modern liberal capitalist society is a society where by definition all interests are private interests; there can be no public interest.

c) The very existence of politics as a separate sphere of life—the separation of state from society—is a symptom of moral and social disintegration: a circumstance in which man acts as a communal being only when he acts politically—and even then his acts are more often than not expressions of selfish interest. The state, which is a product of disintegration, cannot be its cure.

(5) Integration from below: The theory of moral discipline. Exemplified by Tocqueville. Would play a central role in Durkheim's thought. The egotism of civil society and the subversion of legitimacy are to be contained by moral discipline: the resurgence of morals and religion, the cultivation of a sense of shared values, and the creation of associational forms that would stimulate such consensus. In this tradition, the social theorist aspires to the role of moral teacher. Objections:

a) Insofar as there are generally shared values in modern society, they are self-regarding ones, i.e. the ideal of private autonomy. What people have in common is precisely what pulls them apart. Shared values would have to be imposed values; consensus means the subversion of freedom.

b) The spirit of religion does not survive the rationalism of modern society. No stable cosmological framework on which to rely.
c) The normative beliefs that do remain are privatized; they have little public authority.

d) All such forms of moral consensus justify and veil realities of domination. Hence, they cannot survive the onslaught of critical thought.

(6) The group domination theory. Exemplified by a certain kind of interpretation of Marx. All these responses to the question of order are inadequate. They are a mythical solution to a mythical problem. They all assume that society is an association of roughly equal individuals in struggle with each other. But in fact the main subjects of social action are groups and classes. There is a structure of group and class domination of society and this structure creates and imposes its own order. At one blow, the ground seems to be taken out from under all the other theories of order.

(7) But to say that this fourth theory makes the other three unnecessary is but a half-truth. The problem to which the other theories address themselves is not simply the existence of an order, but its legitimacy in the eyes of the members of society themselves. The issues of existence and legitimacy are connected because an illegitimate order cannot be stable. Therefore, we must complete the theory of group domination by saying: There is an order but one that has lost its basis of justification. Commonly interpreted as a conflict between authority and equality.

(8) The psychological counterpart of this situation of power without legitimacy. The individual recognizes himself as part of a collective
structure in whose moral authority he is unable to acquiesce. Oscillates between resignation and revolt. Isolated without being independent; resigned without being reconciled.

IV. Two ways of looking at the relations among the theories of order

1) One approximation to understanding the relations among these theories in a quasi historical fashion.

a) The private interest, state, and moral discipline theories belong to the prehistory of classical social theory. Though they proposed different solutions to the problem of order, they were all based upon a common perception of what the problem was.

b) The group domination theory as formulated by Marx represents a rejection of the premises on which the earlier theories of order were based. Order is created and maintained by the differential power of classes and production units. A first moment in the evolution of classical social theory.

c) The focus of concern in the generation of Durkheim and Weber was the problem of legitimacy. The first three doctrines of social order were answers to a misconceived problem. But the group domination theory was not enough. What were the consequences for social life of the fact that these modern liberal capitalist societies were unable to settle upon stable principles of legitimacy? And under what circumstances might such principles be rediscovered and agreed upon? But what are we to say of
this concern? Was it as the Marxists claimed the mark of a more or less indirect effort to shore up the bourgeois order? Or did it represent, on the contrary, as Marx's critic's argued, the introduction of a theme to which Marx had failed to do justice? This question must remain open for our study of the classical social theorists.

(2) There is a second way to conceive the relation among the theories of social order. It is frankly unhistorical, but perhaps it can lead us more directly to the core of the conceptual links among these doctrines. There is a dialogue going on among these theories which we must learn to overhear.

a) The doctrine of moral discipline is inapplicable because it seeks to restore a situation that is irretrievably lost—unreflective acquiescence in shared moral beliefs and in the power systems with which those beliefs are associated. It is a cure that the very nature of the disease renders ineffective.

b) The doctrines of the harmony of private interests, of state order, and of group domination may describe a situation of fact, but they do not tell how the problem of legitimacy is or might be solved to our satisfaction. Until we have grouped the relationship between the way men actually live their lives and the beliefs they do, can, or should entertain about their obligations to each other, we cannot understand how societies hang together or why they change.
c) The theoretical inadequacy of the doctrines of social order reflects an actual political inadequacy in the life of modern societies: the difficulty of carrying conviction in the attempt to define social order as moral order.

V. The source of the problem

(1) The theoretical and political inadequacy has its source in a structure with two elements. Both these elements indispensable to an understanding of the situation. Everything turns on their relation to each other.

(2) The first element: a structure of unequal power and trust. The hierarchical order less integrated and inclusive than in aristocratic societies. Its two main aspects: (a) class system of inherited degrees of access to wealth, power, and knowledge; (b) a commitment to meritocracy in the division of labor. These aspects complement and conflict with each other. Class position influences job occupations, but meritocracy has its own dynamic and ends up changing the character of the class system and the place of individuals within it.

(3) The second element: skepticism about the possibility of objective normative judgments. All such judgments now tend to be viewed as individual and arbitrary.

(4) The two elements are related to each other as follows:

a) The weakening of the hierarchical order was a precondition for the increasing abandonment of earlier beliefs in the objectivity of normative judgments. The power structures
no longer seemed a self-legitimating part of the natural order of things. Moreover, the dominant beliefs seemed compromised by their association with these structures. b) On the other hand, power relations cannot be rendered legitimate unless we know wherein legitimacy consists. We depend on each other and we ought to, because dependence is an aspect of trust, and the willingness to enter into relations of trust is indispensable to the joint progress of our individuality and our sociability. But how can we distinguish dependence as trust from dependence or subjection to domination? How can we create a situation in which collective beliefs and practices are more than the projections of a factional interest?

(5) The intellectual puzzle of the theory of social order is thus shown to be based upon a real political puzzle. Can we break out of this structure? Or is it eternal? Can a change in the power relations within which our moral beliefs arise be expected to give new content and, above all, new authority to those beliefs. That is what a break out of the structure would have to consist of.

VI The role of theory

(1) What is the role of theory in this transformation? Ordinarily viewed as a necessary though insufficient condition of change. But there are two difficulties with this view.

a) Change—even radical change—may be, and often is, an utterly unintended consequence of action undertaken for other purposes and upon wholly mistaken premises about the world.
b) The fact of self-consciousness may serve as an excuse for inaction. The critical mind delights in the position of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, who, according to Dr. Johnson, felt "some complacency in his own perspicacity and . . . [received] some solace of the miseries of life, from consciousness of the delicacy with which he felt, and the eloquence with which he bewailed them."

(2) We must affirm not that self-enlightenment is a condition of change, but that is a good in itself. Even this, however, somewhat misses the point. It is a good whose authority cannot be long eluded. Any form of social life based upon a denial of this good is in principle unstable.

(3) In previous eras, however, this instability existed only in principle and in the long run. But in modern society the relation of intelligence to the social order was modified. For the most part, social thought was condemned in the past to the double role of celebrating and moderating established power. It was the halo of the existing order, and the thinker or the artist who was neither a Jewish prophet nor a Greek philosopher had no place to sit in but the throne-room, together with the soldiers and the priests. But in modern European history the relationship of culture to the social order underwent a change. On the one hand, the social order, loosing its appearance of naturalness, became increasingly dependent on theoretical, artistic, and popular culture for the principles of legitimation indispensable to its own stability. Thus, the need for a set of justifications that would not fade away under the light of
self-consciousness. On the other hand, however, it became possible for a part of this culture to escape from the thronerooms and to pass judgment upon the kings of the earth. That is why the time of moral confusion, the era in which power begins to be stripped of pretence, is also the age in which the truth has achieved a new degree of power.
Social Theory

March 3, 1976

Marx's early doctrine of human nature

I. Review

(1) Last Monday, I spoke about theories of social order.
   a) The issue at stake: How do societies hang together?
      Connected with the question: Why do they change?
   b) This issue addressed in a concrete context rather than
      in the abstract. The concrete historical context:
      the diagnosis of a factual and moral breakdown of aristocratic
      society.

(2) The theory of private interests. Society as an association of
    private traders. Diversity of interests transformed into a device
    or integration through the mechanisms of exchange and reciprocity.
    a) The problem of the implicit context.
    b) The problem of collective goods.

(3) A narrower version of the private interest interest. The
    interest in moneymaking can keep the savage passions at bay.
    a) Disregards the uses to which the commercial classes may
       put political power.

(4) The theory of the state. The state imposes its order upon
    civil society.
    a) The problem of the limited scope of politics.
    b) The problem of the partisanship of the state.
    c) The problem that the state-society distinction is itself
       a symptom of the malady.
(5) The theory of moral discipline. The need for a resurgence of morals and religion, the cultivation of a sense of shared values, and the creation of associational forms that would stimulate such consensus. The social theorist aspires to the role of moral teacher.
   a) The problem of the divisive character of the shared ideals.
   b) The problem of the privatization of moral beliefs.
   c) The problem of the false legitimating uses of moral consensus.

(6) The group domination theory.
   a) Denies the premise upon which the other theories are based—that society is an association of individuals with roughly equal degrees of power.
   b) Does not deal with the problem of legitimacy; there is an order but one that has lost its basis of justification.

(7) The psychological counterpart to this situation. The individual alternates between resignation and revolt.

(8) One way of looking at the relationship among these four theories is historical.
   a) The prehistorical theories: private interest, state, and moral discipline.
   b) First moment: order created and maintained by the differential power of classes and production units.
   c) Second moment: shift to issue of legitimacy. Vindication of established power or development of the tradition?

(9) Second way to conceive the relation among the theories.
   a) Doctrine of moral order inapplicable. Seeks to restore
a situation that is irretrievably lost.

b) The doctrines of private interest, of the state, and of group domination describe a situation of fact without telling us how the problem of legitimacy might be adequately resolved.

(10) The source of the problem in a structure with two elements:

a) A power system that includes class and meritocracy.

b) Skepticism about the possibility of objective normative judgment.

c) Change of the power system a precondition of intellectual change.

d) Power relations cannot be rendered legitimate unless we know wherein legitimacy consists. The need to distinguish between dependence as subjection to domination and dependence as trust.

e) Intellectual puzzle based upon a political puzzle. Can a change in the power relations within which our moral beliefs arise be expected to give new content and, above all, new authority to those beliefs?


II Introduction

(1) General plan of my discussion of Marx:

a) His early philosophical anthropology—the theory of man in Marx's thought up to about 1845.
b) His theory of the capitalist economy as stated in Capital.
c) His views about classes and the state.
d) His methodological and political program.

(2) Plan of my remarks today about Marx's early speculative writings.

a) The background of his thought; in what sense his achievement was revolutionary.
b) The economic aspect (the Economico-Philosophical Manuscripts)
c) The political aspect (the Jewish Question);
d) The philosophical aspect (Intr. to the Critique of Hegel's Phil. of Right, Theses on Feuerbach);
e) Critical questions about Marx's view of the relation between human nature and history.

III The background of Marx's thought

(1) The theme of much social thought ever since the advent of Enlightenment criticism. This theme had come to play an increasingly prominent role in the early 19th century and was of central concern to Marx's philosophical mentor, Hegel. The reconciliation of two demands:

a) The search for radical subjectivity, absolute freedom, separation of the self from the world. The preoccupation of classical liberalism.
b) The quest for total integration—with nature, with others and with one's own social place. Of increasing concern from the time of the Romantic Movement.
(2) Two ways to view this desire for synthesis.
   a) An interpretation of the problem of individuality and sociability. Whether and to what extent the two might be reconciled.
   b) In broader terms, the theme of integration represents the idea of embodied spirit; the theme of subjectivity, the idea of transcendence.

(3) Why this concern became crucial at a certain moment in the history of Western culture. An important factor was the situation of the intelligentsia itself.
   a) Independence of the third estate from centralizing governments. A combination of political and religious developments that was unique to the West.
   b) The potentially adversary character of the intelligentsia within the third estate.
   c) The intelligentsia rediscovered its predicament as a universal one, characteristic of other groups and classes.

(4) Hegel's response to this situation: a change of consciousness might suffice. If only one understood the world correctly, one might see that the elements of reconciliation were already at hand. The method saw the various forms of social life and the contradictory aspects of the existing society as so many manifestations of an absolute spirit that was becoming perfect by becoming complete.

(5) The atmosphere of left-wing intellectual criticism within which Marx reached intellectual maturity:
a) At an epistemological level. The return to a crude materialism or empiricism. Reassertion of the subject-object distinction. The problem: the uncertainty of knowledge; the multiplicity of interpretations to which any historical circumstance is subject.

b) At a political level. They tried to give content to the ideal of integration. Proceeded by the method of Jacobin criticism: holding bourgeois society to its own ideals. The problem: criticism and practice were arrested within the bourgeois universe of discourse.

c) The combination of naive empiricism and Jacobin criticism has marked much of the left ever since.

(6) What was revolutionary about Marx's early thought? He perceived that the epistemological and the political problem shared the same nature and called for the same solution.

a) The separation of subject and object was the epistemological counterpart to the political separation of the self from the world.

b) The true solution: Not to pretend that mere shifts in consciousness could cancel out these conflicts.

c) Instead, revolutionary practice was required. The way the subject knows the object and assures itself of its knowledge, is by grappling with the object and changing it. The way the self deals with its estrangement from the world is by seeking to change it. By remaking the world, it remakes itself.
(7) Implications of this revolutionary redefinition of the situation
   a) At an epistemological level: an alternative to both a
      flat denial and a simple acceptance of the subject-object
      distinction.
   b) At a political level, a union between philosophy and
      politics.

(8) What was first perceived as a condition peculiar to the intel-
    ligentsia was now shown to be the objective condition of speculative
    thought and everyday life.

    The situation grasped as a totality; a structure of contradic-
    tions with an immanent solution.

IV Economic analysis

(1) Work is the means by which the self can overcome its separa-
    tion from the world.

(2) Hegel had maintained that all manifestations of spirit involve
    a surrender of universality and, in this sense, a self-estrangement.
    Marx, on the contrary, drew a sharp distinction between objectifica-
    tion and estrangement or alienation, i.e. those manifestations of
    self that do not involve a surrender or loss of self and those that do

(3) The forms of estrangement:
   a) from the products of labor;
   b) from labor itself;
   c) from the species nature;
   d) from others.
(4) Alienated labor as the source of private property. The need
to overcome reification in political economy.

(5) Overcome through communism. Naturalization of man and
humanization of nature.
   a) Man overcomes his separation from others.
   b) Therefore also from nature, which he perceives as a
      product of the species, but only insofar as it has been
      transformed by work.
   c) The very mode of cognition must be changed. The distinc-
      tion between individuality and sociability must be abolished

(6) In what precisely would this abolition consist? What would we
learn from our inability to define it?

V  Political analysis

(1) The evolution of the state-society distinction.
   a) The Greek city-state. Social status determined by
      political right. We are interested in men as citizens.
   b) The feudal society. Political right determined by social
      status: the reign of particularism. We are interested
      in men if not as individuals at least as members of a
      particular estate or rank within the society.
   c) Liberal society. Political right and social status
      separated. The universalism of the citizen or legal per-
      son coexists with the particularism of the worker engaged
      in the struggle for private gain.
d) The estrangement of the self from its own true nature. Man's existence as a universal or communal being has been transferred to the state, just as it had been previously transferred to God. The political experience of being a citizen, like the religious experience of worshipping God, represents an ecstatic deviation from everyday life rather than a transformation of it.

e) The basis is laid for doing away with the division between the universal and the particular in man, between his communal and individual aspects. This requires overcoming the division between state and society.

(2) Communism is this overcoming. Man will reappropriate his communal nature, projected into the state, just as he will re-appropriate his creative powers enslaved to the dominant class.

(3) But how could there cease to be a tension between his universality and his particularity? What would the metaphor mean in concrete political terms?

VI The philosophical analysis

(1) The dilemma of idealism and materialism. Its solution in the Int. to the Critique of Hegel's Phil. of Right and the Theses on Feuerbach: revolutionary practice.

(2) The unity of theory and practice interpreted as a concrete alliance of the intelligentsia and the proletariat. Up to now in history, those who acted did not understand, and those who understood did not act. This situation must be transformed by a mode of thought that abolishes the distinction between theory and practice, making all practice theoretical and all theory, practical.
(3) The guiding Hegelian myth of the master and the slave. The ideologies of the slave: Stoicism, Skepticism, the Unhappy Consciousness. At some point, the slave must change the world if he is to escape slavery and thereby liberate both himself and his master. The task is to achieve in an earthly paradise what the ideologies of the slave want to achieve in thought or in heaven.

(4) The proletariat a universal class: because it is driven back to the level of animality and because its interests coincide with those of humanity as a whole. Hence, when philosophy presents the proletarian view of the world, its standpoint is no longer a factional one.

(5) But can anything particular become truly universal?

VII Criticism of the philosophical anthropology

(1) The common quality of the different aspects of Marx's thought. The drama of the self is being played out on a larger scale in the history of the species. At the end of the drama, the abolition of the dialectic of the master and the slave will allow men to express their creative and communal gifts. Ours would then be a world of which we might say what Gonzalo says of his enchanted island in the Tempest, "a world where all of us have found ourselves when no man was his own." Mankind will then be the true and sole object of its own worship.

(2) Three problems
   a) Descriptive: What are the consequences of the view that there is no human nature?
b) Moral: What are the implications of the idea that the ideal can only be realized in history?

c) Metaphysical and political: What are the implications of the view that the ideal can be realized completely in history?

(3) Descriptive: The idea of human nature.

a) Tension between acceptance of the idea of human nature (the species being) and its rejection (human nature as the totality of social relations). To the extent there is a rejection, the following difficulties arise.

b) The problem of the dynamism of history. Marx wants to believe that history follows a pattern. But what accounts for the element of design if not the persistence of certain root problems--needs and aspirations at least partially accessible to consciousness. If not, one seems forced to choose between two other solutions that are inadequate:

1) The unfolding of unconscious structures of the mind. Doesn't account for change or, at least, for conscious political change;

2) The automatism of history; history would have to have its own law

(4) Moral.

a) Marx's view is that the ideal (e.g. the total reconciliation of individuality and sociability, particularity and
(90.

 universality) can be realized only in the history of the species. But what is the basis of the duty to struggle in history if only those who live at the end of history can attain the ideal and thereby confer meaning on their lives? Are we to play our preassigned parts in the cruel and stupid machinations of history that make some men the tools of others just as nature makes the suffering and extinction of one animal species the device for the triumph of another?

b) Two alternative ways to deal with such a predicament: (1) acknowledgment of absurdity and (2) determinism. Either one recognizes the gratuitous character of the political struggle or one says that the issue of whether to engage in it or not does not arise because as a matter of fact one will engage in it.

c) Thus, there is a close relation between Marx's tendency to accept causal determinism as a method and his view of the place of the ideal in history. His exhortations to action not justified by the logic of his system.

(5) Metaphysical and political. What follows from the notion that the ideal of total reconciliation of individuality and sociability, particularity and universality can be realized in history?

a) Three views: history has nothing to do with the realization of the ideal or is cyclical; history is progressive and ends in the complete realization of the ideal; history is progressive but the ideal is incapable of being realize
completely in it. Necessary imperfection of the world.

b) Exemplified by the impossibility of a total reconciliation of autonomy and community. The impossibility of describing the reconciliation symptomatic of the impossibility of realizing it. Part of the very nature of subjectivity.

c) We come back to the issue: How to avoid taking as given the present imperfections without adopting the thesis of the secular millenium? What turns on this: the spirit in which one does politics. The need to avoid both the despairing or self-interested acceptance of actuality and the terroristic denial of incompleteness.

(6) Conclusion. The claim that the ideal can be realized completely rather than just progressively in history falsifies the place of man, results in the triumph of the principle of immanence, and contributes to the deification of the practices or beliefs of an age.

Imperfection resides in finitude, and finitude is the essential nature of mankind. Everything that is great in man turns on his finitude. It is because he has the suffering of his divisions, the awareness of his limits, and the certainty of his death that he is always capable of becoming more than he is.
Marx's theory of the capitalist economy

I. Review: Marx's philosophical anthropology

(1) The background of Marx's thought.

a) An epistemological problem: Given the distinction between subject and object, how do we ensure the certainty of knowledge? How do we deal with the multiplicity of possible interpretations of every historical circumstance? The answer contained in the second thesis on Feuerbach: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice."

b) A political problem: The situation diagnosed as one of estrangement of the self from the world. Not enough to take the position of the critic who imagines himself superior to society. Such a critic can hold society up only to its own ideals; he cannot conceive alternative ideals. Hence, he remains enslaved to that from which he imagines himself free. Thus, the lesson of the third thesis on Feuerbach: "it is necessary to educate the educator himself." By attempting to change the total structure of society we change ourselves, what we are able to be and to see: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice."
(2) The common solution to the epistemological and the political problems is therefore revolutionary practice. What are the marks of revolutionary practice?

a) It deals with society as a whole rather than with separated aspects of it. Oriented to totality. Thus, according to the tenth thesis, the standpoint of the new materialism is human society, or social humanity.

b) It works out from the contradictions of the existing social situation. Thus, according to the fourth thesis, secular life must be "understood in its contradiction" in order to be revolutionized in practice.

c) It seeks to understand and change human life by focusing on the concrete contradictory aspects of society rather than on an abstract human essence. It treats all abstractions as partial, distorting devices. Thus, the lesson of the sixth thesis equating the human essence with the ensemble of social relations.

The orientation to totality, the exploitation of contradiction, and the willingness to multiply one-sided positions in order to create a more inclusive result—these are the marks of revolutionary practice and therefore also of the method by which revolutionary practice is grasped in thought and carried out—the dialectic.

(3) I then went on to consider the three main aspects of the philosophical anthropology and to suggest the character of their unity.

a) The economic writing culminates in a view of the transcendence of the distinction between individuality and sociability, mankind and nature, under communism.
b) The political argument leads to a conception of the union between individuality and sociability, particularity and universality, through the vanishing of the distinction between state and society.

c) The philosophical argument points to the emergence of a class whose particular situation coincides with what is universal in humanity and whose self-understanding is therefore no longer the projection of a factional interest.

d) At all stages, there is an evocation of a circumstance in which all tension between the universal and the particular, the social and the individual, disappears. But it seems that we cannot define with precision what this would mean. And this, I argue, is symptomatic of a defect in the philosophical anthropology as a whole.

(4) First criticism: the idea of human nature.

a) Tension between maintenance and rejection of an idea of human nature—the idea of the species being and the claim that human nature is simply the ensemble of social relations, so that there would be as many human natures as there are forms of social life. To the extent the idea of human nature is dissolved into that of social relations, two other problems arise.

b) How to account for the general character and patterns of historical change. If they are not based on human nature, then they must be based on laws of history as independent as possible from our spiritual life, e.g. the evolution of "productive forces."
c) How to compare societies with each other.

(5) Second criticism: The thesis that the ideal can be realized only in the history of the species.
   a) What is the situation of those who live before the moment of realization of the ideal? Why should they struggle?
   b) We seem forced to choose between saying that political striving is gratuitous and that it is determined.

(6) Third criticism: The thesis that the ideal can be realized completely in history.
   a) Not true. A central aspect of the ideal, the reconciliation of individuality and sociability. Individuality depends on participation in shared understandings and evaluations. But it also turns on the individual's ability to stand slightly outside the circle of shared beliefs and values.
   b) To disregard the residual but crucial tension between individuality and sociability is to foster situations in which the former is suppressed and the latter is used to justify new forms of domination.
   c) Both theoretical lucidity and political prudence require that critical, revolutionary thought and practice learn to dispense with the myth of total integration.

II. Introduction

(1) The historical significance of capitalism: a bridge between Marx's philosophical anthropology and his political economy.
(2) Some aspects of the economic theory. Only those most directly related to the general theory of society.

(3) The virtue of the economic theory.

(4) Criticism of the economic theory.

III. From philosophical anthropology to political economy

(1) The primacy of the economic factor in the philosophical anthropology itself. Work is the central way of living in the world and remaking it. Need to discover in political economy the anatomy of civil society.

(2) Capitalism as a form of social life. It cannot admit the truth about itself, but it reveals itself in the process of concealing itself.

It appears to be an association of self-interested individuals, engaging in transitory and narrowly defined exchange relationships. Governed by freedom, equality, property, and Bentham. Relations among people seem to be relations among commodities. Is this illusion or is it reality? It is both.

(3) The element of reality. Men act as if freedom, equality, property, and Bentham governed the world. They treat each as commodities, working for the enrichment of their masters or for their self-enrichment. At a deeper level, the interest in abstract labor as a commodity reflects a new stage of historical development in which the power to go beyond all the concrete determinations of existence has been recognized.
(4) The element of illusion. The source of value is labor rather than circulation. Relations among commodities are in fact relations among people. These relations are part of a system of domination. And this system is contingent rather than part of a natural order.

(5) What generates the discrepancy between reality and illusion? An objective logic of mine and thine. Later described as the historical development of modes of production.

The forces of production operate through a system of relations of production. At certain crucial moments the development of these forces of production can no longer be accommodated within the given set of social relations. The existing system of social relations must be destroyed. This becomes possible through the activity of a rising class, which comes to understand that its own interests are bound up with the development of the productive forces of society and that the development of these forces requires the smashing of the system of social relations and the creation of a new system.

(6) From this perspective Marx surveys the basic achievements and contradictions of capitalism. The achievements:

a) The rationalization of human conduct. Social life increasingly liberated from religious superstition and subject to a ruthless calculus of efficiencies.

b) The universalization of social relations. Everything can be exchanged for everything else and everyone has formally equal entitlements. The fundamental unity of mankind is recognized, but still only under the abstract and partial forms of political democracy and an exchange economy.
(7) The basic contradiction under capitalism: Labor socialized, but the appropriation of the fruits of labor still private. There is a conflict between the pursuit of private self-interest and the dictates of interdependence in the organization of the society's productive forces.

IV. The structure of the economic theory

(1) Things have value in use and in exchange. The puzzle of classical political economy: (a) how to derive prices from use value; (b) how to explain the genesis and the appropriation of a surplus. Marx concerned primarily with the latter; only subsidiarily with the former.

(2) If we look at the sphere of circulation, we find that things are traded off for their exchange value. How can there be a surplus? The fetishism of commodities creates the mystery of profit.

(3) The solution: to look for a commodity whose use value has the peculiar feature of being a source of exchange value. This is labor power. The most important economic fact is that human labor can be expended in a longer time than that which is required to produce it. The capitalist pays the laborer the socially determined standard of subsistence for himself and his family. This is the exchange value of labor power—and it corresponds to a certain portion of the working day. But the capitalist gets the use of the worker's labor power for the whole working day. The value produced by the worker beyond what the capitalist pays him is the surplus value and the relation between surplus and salary is the rate of exploitation.
(4) A crucial part of this view: an independent argument that there will be a reserve labor army. The development of capitalism— the combination of growth and crisis—will expand the size of the population more than the number of jobs so that there is constant pressure keeping wages to a socially determined subsistence level.

(5) There are then two kinds of capital: variable—paid for wages; constant—paid for capital and raw materials. And there are two sorts of surplus. Absolute surplus is increased by lengthening the working day; relative surplus, by increasing the productivity of labor.

(6) The "transformation problem." How do we get from the labor theory of value to a theory of prices?

a) Profit directly proportional to the rate of exploitation but inversely proportional to the organic composition of capital, i.e. to the relative proportions of constant and variable capital.

b) Prices result from an addition of the portion of constant capital invested in a commodity, the portion of variable capital, and an average rate of profit.

(7) The special contradictions of capitalist development.

a) The exchange economy depends on competition but the process of struggle among production units leads to concentration undermining the bases of competition.

b) The capitalists try to increase profit by increasing productivity through higher capital investments. They cancel out each others advantage by competition and diminis
the relative importance of the ultimate basis of profit, which is the relation between what the workers are paid and what they produce.

c) Capitalism suffers from chronic crises of overproduction and underconsumption. It is essential both to produce more and more and to keep the workers close to a subsistence level. More is produced than can be bought. Crises are constantly more violent but increasingly less successful efforts to reestablish equilibrium through the periodic destruction of large amounts of capital.

(8) These are all displacements of, or variations on, the fundamental contradiction between labor and capital, which has become identical to the contradiction between the forces and the relations of production.

V. The virtues of Marx's political economy

(1) What is the great strength of Marx's political economy? May be contrasted with neoclassical economics, the dominant form of economic science today, which began to take shape in Europe during the 1870's. A systematic view of economic life from the standpoint of the conception of the subjectivity of values. Starts out from a basic postulate and a basic theorem. The postulate: As we go on acquiring successive increments of each good, "the intensity of our desire for one additional unit declines monotonically until it reaches—and then conceivably falls below—zero." The theorem: "In order to secure a maximum of satisfaction from any good that is
capable of satisfying different wants, an individual (or household) must allocate it to these different uses in such a way as to equalize its marginal utilities in all of them." On this basis it has proved possible to work out a general, formal theory of relative prices, which is ultimately shown to be a special case of a still more general and more formal theory of maximizing behavior. Extraordinarily beautiful and powerful, a wonderful achievement in the history of social thought.

(2) The hidden flaw in neo-classical economics has to do with its method rather than with any direct political implications it may have.

a) Elementary assumptions about human behavior and rationality from which, under stated empirical conditions, one deduces a large number of conclusions with an increasing degree of concreteness.

b) This model will be more or less distinct from actuality, and the further away one moves from the classical exchange economy the more distant it will be. One may then use the model for prescriptive purposes to contrast it with how economic life really operates. Or one may feed empirical information into the system and relax some of the assumptions about behavior and market structure thereby making the model more realistic.

c) The difficulty is that the empirical elements are introduced in an essentially piecemeal or ad hoc fashion. They are not themselves theorized about. This is so even with respect to the empirical elements that determine the
evolution of prices under ideal market economy conditions: the content and relative power of tastes and changes in external cost constraints, e.g. the available technology. All this is taken as given. The system consists of a juxtaposition of two heterogeneous elements: an essentially tautological logical formalism and a set of random pieces of information about the historical world. There is an inside and an outside to the theory, and the historical forms of economic activity are deliberately left on the outside.

But a mature "science"—e.g. physics—is characterized by a merger of the formal and the empirical. Whatever cannot be theorized about in the science's own terms becomes a counterinstance and the accumulation of counterinstances throws the science into crisis.

(3) The virtue of Marx's political economy is precisely to attempt such a synthesis between the formal and the empirical. His empirical statements about how different classes in fact behave under capitalism, what forms the organization of the market assumes, and how the system as a whole develops are not introduced \textit{ad hoc}. They are generated from within the theory.

(4) The occasion to state a general dilemma of social theory.

a) Neoclassical economics: juxtaposition of logical formalism and \textit{ad hoc} empiricism.

b) Comparative and historical social theory: Everything causes everything else. The possibility of imputing particular effects to particular causes is undermined.
Causation diluted into an indeterminate idea of dialectical totality.

c) Is there some alternative to these two modes of social thought?

VI. Criticism of Marx's political economy

(1) The reification of economic science. What is the labor theory of value about? As Marx himself made clear, it was not meant to be the direct statement of a price theory. Serves two main functions.

a) The first and least important: to mediate between a theory of use value and theory of prices. The paradox of prices in classical political economy: how to get from use values to prices. But this problem was definitively solved by marginalist economics though only in a narrow sense. The empirical determinants of prices--the use values and cost constraints--are taken as given and exogenous. This leaves the second function.

b) To serve as a measure of exploitation and as a way of showing how exploitation arises in the day-to-day events of economic life. But, once the other function of the theory of value is dispensed with, what is gained by dealing with the problem of domination in the language of a quasi-metaphysical theory of economic values rather than in the language of a general social theory of domination? The polemical advantages are perhaps outweighed by the suspicion of hocus-pocus which inevitably falls upon a system of thought that attempts to turn definitional points
to political advantage. The centrality of the labor theory of value may not do justice to Marx's own intentions. If the crises of capitalism were to bring the rate of surplus value close to zero, Marx would still want to say that capitalism was neither stable nor perhaps desirable as a final form of social life.

(2) The reification of the economy itself.

a) Marx accepts the notion of the relative autonomy of technical development. To a very substantial extent, the forces of production have an immanent historical logic of their own, which is, in the last analysis, decisive over the organization of social relations. Marx seems to have accepted too uncritically Adam Smith's notion that the objective requirements of efficiency dictated the structure of the division of labor under capitalism. (At one point, there was a more or less complete coincidence between the interest of the capitalist class and the universal interest in developing the productive forces of society.)

b) Consider, for example, the central role Marx assigns to machine technology. Marx believes it will contribute to the homogeneization of the labor force. It will keep workers' wages close to a socially defined subsistence level. And it will help unleash the following contradiction. The development of machine technology under the conditions of capitalism deadens the workers destroying the traditions of craftsmanship and narrowing the range of their skills. Yet the development of the productive forces itself requires the workers to have these skills.
The evidence for any of these developments is doubtful. The working class remains substantially heterogeneous; wages may rise well above socially defined subsistence levels (contrast the industrial workers and the semi-employed underclass); and capitalism accommodates to a deadened worker class even at the cost of limiting the development of production.

c) The root of the failure lies in the design of Marx's system. On the one hand, he criticized classical political economy for taking as natural what is contingent. On the other hand, however, his rejection of the possibilities of a theory of human nature and its development in history led him to look for the ultimate source of historical change in the relatively autonomous development of technique. Thus, he continued to commit the sin of reification for which he had condemned his predecessors.

(3) The problem of normative economics. An unsatisfactory basis for normative thinking.

a) Alternates between the implicit elementary psychology of welfare economics and the utopian psychology of communism.

b) The welfare-economic postulates: (1) psychology of self-interest and incentives; (2) distributive justice as concerned primarily with the amount of goods and services different individuals and classes end up with rather than with the quality of the relations among individuals and classes; (3) the primacy of economic growth over other human objectives.
c) Under communism, then, the economy of abundance, and the overcoming of the individual-society distinction is supposed to render these postulates unnecessary.

d) But what then is the basis of criticism before communism arrives? Only the traditional postulates. Perhaps this is why we find that most so-called radical economics ends up meaning econometrics for the poor. The same theoretical instruments are used to achieve different political objectives. Too much critical social theory alternates between a cynical psychology of self-interest and a utopian psychology of altruism.

e) What is missing: a view of the interplay among motivations, forms of social organizations, and social ideals.

(4) Conclusion. The common ground of all these criticisms is that, seen from our perspective today, Marx's attack on classical political economy was not radical enough. This failure of radicalism was associated with a failure to address the problem of human nature in history and with an attempt to find a partial surrogate for the unfolding of conscious human needs and purposes in a spurious automatism of technological development.

It is only when one has completely rejected the notion of an immanent logic of economic and, above all, of technological change that one is free to reconstruct economic analysis as social theory, to recognize the contingent social element in allegedly objective technical requirements, and to deny that the motivations of economic men are simply given and unchanging. Until that time, the revolution in political economy, which Marx began, will remain unfinished.
Marx's conception of classes and the state

I. Review

(1) I began my discussion of Marx's economic theory with remarks about his view of the place of his economic views within the broader context of his work as a whole. I shall say nothing further about this for the moment because I shall have occasion to expand on my comments later in the hour.

(2) Points highlighted in the discussion of the structure of the economic theory.

a) The labor theory of value and the genesis of surplus value. The capitalist pays the laborer the exchange value of labor power, which is the socially determined standard of subsistence for himself and his family. This corresponds to a certain portion of the working day. But the capitalist gets the use of the worker's labor for the whole working day. The value produced by the worker beyond what the capitalist pays him is the surplus value, and the relation between surplus and salary is the rate of exploitation.

b) The transformation problem. Profit directly proportional to the rate of exploitation but inversely proportional to the organic composition of capital. Prices result from an addition of the portion of constant capital invested in a commodity, the portion of variable capital, and an average rate of profit.
c) The specific contradictions of the concentration, the falling rate of profit, and crises—all variants of the fundamental contradiction between labor and capital.

(3) The virtue of Marx's political economy.
   a) In neo-classical economics there is the juxtaposition of a logical formalism and a random empiricism. Even the empirical determinants of the evolution of prices—the content and power of preferences and the external cost constraints—are taken as given and exogenous.
   b) In Marx, the two elements are merged: the empirical hypotheses are generated from within the system.
   c) The methodological dilemma in social theory. We seem confronted with a choice between two inadequate methods:
      1) The method exemplified in neo-classical economics: the logical and the empirical elements are heterogeneous.
      2) The method of comparative and historical social theory: the classical idea of causation is watered down into an indeterminate idea of dialectical totality.

(4) The weaknesses of Marx's economic theory.
   a) The reification of economic science. What is the labor theory of value about?
      1) Not a theory of prices, but of the mediation between use values and prices. This problem solved in a narrow sense by marginalist economics.
2) A theory of the measure and genesis of exploitation.

3) Why state such a theory in the form of a theory of economic values? Why not state it in explicit terms as a theory of exploitation? One reason: the extreme reluctance in Marx to assume a normative position. In the economic theory, the search for a theoretical system that will have a normative bite without relying on normative presuppositions. In the theory of history, the description of a historical process that, at first, appears to render the normative standpoint illusory but on closer inspection is perhaps an immanent moral rationality.

b) The reification of economics.

1) The idea of the ultimate driving force of the productive forces. Acceptance of the efficiency view of capitalism.

2) Example of this: the central role of machine technology under capitalism.

3) Marx driven to this reification by the need to find a substitute for a theory of human nature.

c) Marx's economics as basis for a normative thinking. Before communism, a cynical psychology of self-interest. After communism, a utopian psychology of altruism. What is lacking: a view of how changes in social situations interact with change in motivations and orientations to make new social ideals conceivable and realizable.
(5) The common ground of these criticisms. The need to abandon the idea of an immanent logic of technological change.

II. Introduction

(1) The topic: Marx's more general view of history and class struggle, sometimes called historical materialism.

(2) Plan:
   a) The schema of historical materialism;
   b) Problems of historical materialism;
   c) The revision of Marxist social theory in contemporary critical thought.
   d) The problems that continue to confront the "Marxist" tradition as a whole.

III. The schema of historical materialism

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IDELOGY
↑     ↓
MODE OF PRODUCTION
RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
↑  ↓
FORCES OF PRODUCTION
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(1) MP > I

(2) FP x RP > MP x I

(1) Explanation of the diagram:
   a) The distinction between ideology and modes of production;
   b) The distinction between forces of production and relations of production;
   c) The leading role of the forces of production;
   d) The genesis of ideology and its reverse power: the need to cast particular interests in universal terms;
e) The alternative role of ideology: the breakthrough of the forces of production occurs through the conscious action of a particular class, whose particular interests momentarily coincide with the universal interests of mankind.

(2) The driving forces of history:
   a) The mode of production dominant in the last analysis over ideology;
   b) The conflict between the f.p. and the r.p. dominant in the last analysis over the conflict between the m.p. and ideology, with the qualification stated under (1)e.
   c) Thus, the conflict between the f.p. and the r.p. must play itself out at the level of ideology.

(3) The state:
   a) Controlled by dominant classes. Two qualifications.
   b) First qualification: The state influenced by the need to serve a legitimating function. Thus, occasional conflict with the interests of the dominant class. However, if the economic interests of this class conflict with its political ideals, the latter are likely to be sacrificed to the former. One aspect of the kind of absolutism that may arise in bourgeois societies.
   c) Second qualification: Despite the general division between a dominant and a dominated class, there are many more specific "classes.” In the event of a stand-off, the appeal to a dictator. Another aspect of bourgeois absolutism
d) Often the two aspects are combined. It is the atomization of classes that makes the situation dangerous for the bourgeois order. Absolute power has a dynamic of its own; the state may make war on civil society. All these strands exemplified by the 18th Brumaire.

IV. Problems in historical materialism

The ultimate prevalence of the mode of production over ideology

(1) Refer to earlier remarks about the theory of group domination as a basis of social order:
   a) Denies premises of other theories;
   b) Does it do justice to the problem of legitimacy?

(2) Restatement of the basic idea: possibility of distinguishing between the realm of power and the realm of moral belief. The former can be largely understood independently of the latter, but the latter can hardly be understood apart from the former.

(3) Problems in the application of this idea to advanced capitalist societies.
   a) The proliferation of legitimizing forms of organization: bureaucratic impersonality, meritocracy, the rule of law.
   b) These rooted in an effort to preserve autonomy--avoiding direct subservience to another's will--without destroying the class system.
   c) Nevertheless, they change the character of the class system as well as the place of individuals within it.
(4) Ought one not to prefer a mode of thought that would move the center of the dialectic to the relationship between organization and consciousness, power and its legitimation? This might be useful to:

a) help account for our own political situation;

b) avoid relying on the automatism of forces of production.

The relationship between objective class interest and political action

(1) How is one to reconcile the idea of determination by objective class interest with the political character of history (men make their history)? On one side, there is the ultimately undirectional character of the process oriented to a unitary result (communism). On the other side, there is the necessity of consciousness and therefore the possibility of mistakes. (Remember that the forces of production break through the relations of production thanks to the intervention of a class that becomes conscious that its own interests require the reorganization of society.)

(2) An interpretation consistent with the fact that Marx seems to admit a greater variety of forms of class struggle and ideological responses to them in the earlier than in the later stages of history. There is a funnel of diminishing possibilities in politics and thought. Earlier possibilities cancel each other out until one arrives at the threshold of communism.

(3) But why not admit that new possibilities are created as old ones are destroyed so that the funnel opens as well as closes? And what is dynamic that pushes history through the funnel?
The logic of history

(1) Two interpretations of the dynamic pattern of history?
   a) The causal, amoral interpretation.
      1) Difficult to see how it could be unidirectional except insofar as it is largely determined from the start.
      2) Difficult to reconcile it with a normative standpoint and with critical thought insofar as criticism is normative.
   b) The teleological interpretation (history as immanent rationality).
      1) There is neither divine purpose nor human nature to rely on.
      2) Inconsistent with the spirit of modern philosophy; seems to require a return to the premises of classical metaphysics.

(2) Here again, the struggle between the depth and the surface, the intention and the language of the thought. In Marx, as in Freud, one repeatedly finds an antimechanistic outlook dressed up as nineteenth century mechanism. But one senses that for want of an alternative philosophical standpoint, the mask has clung to the face and become part of it.

(3) A theory of human nature developing in history—neither suprahistorical nor historicist—might suggest the general form of a resolution of this conflict between the surface and the depth. Consider these two aspects of such a theory.
a) The breakdown of a contrast between teleology and causality. Final causes (the root human aspirations and needs) become efficient causes (determinants of conduct).

b) The breakdown of the fact-value contrast. Such a view would have to be both descriptive and evaluative.

V. The dilemmas of contemporary critical thought

(1) Contemporary efforts to revise this Marxist tradition of thought. The revision not far-reaching enough. Thus, it remains prey to some of the same basic problems.

(2) Reasons given for the revision. In advanced capitalist society, it is no longer possible to treat politics as largely a dependent variable of economics because:

a) there are few or no areas of privileged immunity from state action;

b) there are no formal legal techniques by which to exclude inferior groups from power.

(3) The question: how are legitimation, stabilization, and repression nevertheless achieved in advanced capitalist societies?

a) The incongruity of the relationship between groups and vital interests. Basic human needs either not associated with specific groups or associated with groups that pose no serious threat to the existing system.

b) There is a class of technocratic planners (the executive bureaucracy) and political managers (of trade unions, parties, and parliaments) devoted to conflict avoidance.
c) As a result of a and b, there is a failure of a politics of self-enlightenment capable of doing justice to basic human needs.

(4) Buy why does the bureaucratic class oppose "self-enlightenment"?

a) First explanation. They are motivated solely by their power interests. They see through the myths of bourgeois democracy; the plebs don't. But can either point be believed?

b) Second explanation. They are simply mistaken. Why couldn't they be persuaded?

c) Third explanation. They distrust each other. Every claim to speak for a universal interest is perceived as a front for a factional interest of some class or for the personal ambitions of the spokesmen themselves. That people should discount each other's good faith to such an extent is not a fact of nature but a puzzling historical event.

d) The underlying moral beliefs about the limits of political possibility turn out to be crucial. They hide under the stage giving cues to the actors. If one doesn't bring them out into the open, they become all the more formidable and mysterious.

e) Critical social thought has foolishly surrendered the study of the moral life to a conservative tradition.


a) The endogenous value problem. Values and needs at least partly created by the society. In order to judge the society from their standpoint, one must suppose that they partially transcend social life.
b) The weakness of the strategy that appeals to basic human needs and then says nothing about them. The reflections of a view that both rejects and presupposes a substantive image of human nature.

(6) Even when critical thought seeks to revise the Marxist tradition, it is still hampered by:
   a) a commitment to abandon the idea of human nature;
   b) a failure to grasp the centrality of the interplay between the influence of power structures and the beliefs people have about what is desirable and what is possible.

VI. Conclusion

(1) The true unity of history— to the extent that there is a unity at all—lies in the permanence of certain root human problems rather than in any independent logic of the things men produce. But this unity is not simply given; it is constructed.

   The problem arises when we imagine ourselves forced to choose between a supra-historical view of human nature and a rejection of the idea of human nature. A false dilemma.

(2) The focus of historical change is the dialectic between what is and what ought to be. Each form of social life generates interests and ideals that reveal its secret flaws and contain its principle of dissolution.

(3) The two themes are connected. As long as you say that the ideals and interests that enter into conflict with power relations are simply creations of these structures of power, then the structures of power themselves will be viewed as having the leading role.
We shall inescapably slide into the view that we are prisoners of each form of social life.

(4) Alternative view: Each form of social life responds to basic questions, e.g. the question about individuality and sociability. There are interests and ideals that transcend the particular forms of social life. We cannot say either that these problems are given or that they are fabricated by each form of social life. Politics is the process by which they are constantly reinterpreted and remade.

(5) There are two ways in which we fail to do justice to our freedom and hand ourselves over to a sense of fate.

a) If we take the ideals of our striving as forever given to us by a timeless moral order in whose creation we do not ourselves have any role.

b) If the aims of our actions are simply projections of the forms of social life in which we participate, so that even in our boldest endeavors we are prisoners of convention. The constraints imposed upon us by circumstance make a mockery of our pretensions to moral insight.

(6) Thus, we have the elements for another answer to Kant's question: Under what conditions is human freedom possible?

There must be a developing moral order to which we can appeal from the conventions of each form of social life. Yet this moral order must always stand in need of being interpreted, completed, and recreated through the struggles for power by which we establish new forms of social organization. We must achieve individuality in
community, yet as individuals we must also be able to stand slightly outside the circle of shared understandings and values that bind us to our fellows.

(7) The more we throw ourselves into this dialogue between the objective and the subjective aspects of our existence, the better do we transform fate into freedom.
Social Theory

March 15, 1976

Marx's dialectical method and his relation to Marxism

I. Review

(1) Last week, my topic was the general structure of Marx's theory of society and history, sometimes called historical materialism. I began by describing the elementary schema of historical materialism:

a) the interplay among forces of production, relations of production, and ideology;

b) the hierarchy of dominance among them with respect to the sources of social change;

c) the role of classes and of the state.

I then went on to mention three kinds of problems with this view.

(2) The focus of change: In the previous lecture I had already suggested that insofar as we attribute an ultimate priority to the forces of production over the relations of production, we seem driven to ascribe a certain autonomous dynamism to the former. Another aspect of the problem: Is it more promising to locate the center in the dialectic in the interplay between the organization of power and the forms of its legitimation? This may be especially important in view of the central role occupied in advanced capitalist and in socialist bureaucratic societies by legitimizing types of organization: bureaucratic, meritocratic, and legalistic.

What is at stake: denying the ultimate priority of forces of
production over relations of production and of the mode of produ-
duction as a whole over ideology.

(3) The reconciliation of voluntarism and determinism. The idea
of a funnel of diminishing possibilities in history. The implausi-
bility of this view: As some possibilities are destroyed, others
are created.

(4) The nature of the logic of history. Insofar as there are
objective tendencies in history, what is their character—an objec-
tive causal process or an immanent moral rationality? Neither
response satisfactory. One needs a theory of the development of
human nature in history that shows how human purposes become deter-
minants of conduct and moves beyond the fact-value distinction.
Presupposes finding a position beyond classical and modern philos-
ophy.

(5) After enumerating these problems with historical materialism,
I argued that the fundamental difficulties reappear, in changed
form, in contemporary versions of critical thought.

   a) How stabilization, repression, and legitimation are
      achieved in contemporary societies. Emphasis on the
      existence of a bureaucratic class devoted to conflict
      avoidance and to the suppression of a politics of self-
enlightenment about basic human needs.

   b) One of the crucial factors in the tenacity of conflict
      avoidance is the authority of beliefs, shared by rulers
      and ruled alike, about the limits of political possibility.
c) The idea of a politics of self-enlightenment makes sense only insofar as there are needs and values that transcend particular forms of social life. The problem of history and human nature is not adequately disposed of by the thesis that there are as many human natures as there are societies.

d) The revision of Marx's thought will never have gone far enough until it moves the tension between the ideal and actuality to a central place in social thought and until it confronts head-on the power of human nature to transcend its particular social embodiments.

(6) I concluded with an evocation of the conditions under which human freedom is possible.

a) We must not be prisoners of the particular forms of social life, but must be able to appeal in some slight measure to a transcendent moral order.

b) This moral order must be incomplete rather than merely given. The process of discovering it must also be a process of helping create it.

II. Introduction

(1) Conclusion of the discussion of Marx. Two distinct topics:

a) The idea of the dialectical method.

b) The relationship between Marx and "Marxism."

III. The dialectical method

(1) Two main methodological strands in Marx.

a) Conventional causal, or even deterministic, thinker.
b) The practitioner of an alternative, "dialectical," method.

This ambivalence perfectly parallels the more general two-sidedness of Marx's conception of historical tendencies—as amoral objective forces and as an immanent moral rationality. The two methodological strands, like the two conceptions of historical tendencies, are not at the same level. Conventional causality at the level of the surface acceptance of the standpoint of modern thought. The dialectic at the level of the deeply-rooted aspiration to escape this standpoint.

(2) What does it mean to think dialectically? The dialectic most often defined in largely negative terms. By opposition to "formal" or Cartesian reason. The prototypical modes of formal reason:

a) Formal logic: a type of thought in which the rules governing the validity of the formation of propositions and the making of inferences from some propositions to others are more or less rigidly distinguished from the content of what is actually said.

b) Straightforward causation: particular effects are imputed to particular causes.

Neither of these methods seems sufficient to the study of societies as interrelated and developing wholes. The methods of formal reason disrespect the unity of historical situations; they lead us to various degrees of abstraction from the particulars of social life; and they impose a false sense of necessity and closure upon the open-endedness of historical experience. What then are the marks of the dialectic?
(3) First mark. The orientation to totality. The search for a whole in which the conflicts themselves are interlocking. Two major interpretations.

a) Centered around the idea of structure. The parts cannot be understood separately from the whole. Yet they are differentiated rather than being microcosms of the whole, as in Leibniz' monadology. Analogous to the biological concept of the organism.

b) Centered around the idea of internal relations. The relations of each element of a system internal rather than external to it. We ought to conceive of each element as the sum of its relations, and therefore as the whole viewed from a particular perspective.

Both these interpretations of totality are reactions against a fractionated knowledge of society. Only when we grasp a mode of social existence as a whole do we unlock the secret of its contingency and conceive the design of transforming it as a whole.

Under either of these interpretations, we confront the difficulty we have already discovered in all comparative, historical social study. If everything is related to everything else, how can one single out discrete connections of cause and effect? Thus, the search for certain privileged causal links. Marx's notion of the ultimate dominance of some structures over others may be viewed as an example of this.

(4) Second mark. The emphasis on contradiction and on becoming. The effort to account for historical change in structured terms.
But all conceptual categories freeze the flow of becoming. Thus, classical essentialism seems inimical to a process-oriented view. Fixed ideas of sameness and difference mean that an entity is either this or that; transition is more or less unintelligible. On the other hand, modern nominalism views conceptual distinctions as conveniences of explanation whereas the dialectic sees the discontinuous process of change from one structure to another as one that really occurs in the world. The dialectic directs its attention to the immanent structure of contradiction that at crucial moments change one situation into another. These contradictions—superficial or deep—are seen as actual realities.

(5) Third mark. The search for concreteness. Formal reason achieves generality through abstraction; it flattens out the particularity of things. The universal is abstract and the particular, ineffable. Dialectical thought tries to reach the concrete through the multiplication of deliberately one-sided perspectives. In this effort, it is disciplined by its project of reaching from appearance to reality. The approach to concreteness is always incomplete.

(6) Fourth mark. The practical character of dialectical knowledge. The subject comprehends the object by grappling with it, trying to change it, and thereby changing itself. The distinction between subject and object is constantly annulled and reestablished.

(7) These are but the general features of the dialectical method in Marx—shared in common with other thinkers who have been or less consciously interested in the dialectic. Should be distinguished
from the particular dialectic embodied in Marx's account of the structure and evolution of capitalism.

(8) Despite the fact that we lack an adequate account of the dialectical method, it can still be practiced in a semiconscious and undeveloped form. The great historians and critics of society have always been dialectical thinkers in one degree or another. And dialectical thinking--however limited in scope--may characterize much of our everyday moral and political discourse.

(9) The program of a dialectical method amounts to a frontal assault on the dominant strand in modern philosophy.

a) Formal logic and traditional causation not accepted as the only modes of systematic, discursive reason.

b) Attacks both classical essentialism and modern nominalism.

c) Rejects the idea of the abstraction of the universal and the ineffability of the particular.

d) Undermines the subject-object distinction.

The theory of the dialectic can only be developed when and if it becomes possible to elaborate more fully an alternative to the dominant traditions of ancient and modern metaphysics. Yet the practice and study of the method may itself be a major inspiration in the effort to formulate this alternative.

(10) Here one confronts one of the deepest of philosophical puzzles to which philosophers have proposed different solutions. When there is a strife between laws of thought or modes of reason by what criteria is one to judge the dispute if not by reference to one of the very forms of rationality whose claims are at issue? Whatever
the specific form of the solution, one must suppose that the province of truth criteria and of pragmatic considerations bound up with these criteria is never wholly exhausted by its specific embodiments in forms of discourse. We are always able to preserve a measure of ironic distance from our modes of reasoning. This is the cognitive parallel to the political idea that no form of social life represents a definitive and complete embodiment of human nature.

IV. Marx and Marxism

(1) The correct spirit in which to approach a thinker. He formulates a somewhat integrated body of ideas. Then he dies. What is valuable in his works enters more or less gradually into the general current of thought. He is dust, and he returns to dust.

(2) But when a thinker becomes a figure—as Marx has become—a different spirit takes over. There is a tendency to reify his work. The issue of fidelity to him becomes a serious question. A number of preposterous concerns proliferate:

   a) Platonizing discussions about what is essential and what is accidental in his work.

   b) The issue of what is true fades imperceptibly into an inquiry about what is most faithful to the master.

   c) People feel they must either accept or reject the work, as if the dead thinker were a candidate for some position one might offer him.

(3) These attitudes have deeply affected the interpretation of Marx. Two wrong kinds of interpretations:
a) The vulgar interpretation sponsored by many of Marx's enemies and some of his disciples. Marx as a vulgar Marxist. The so-called Engels line. Emphasizes the scientific character of the system, the element of historical determinism, and the one-way causal determination of ideology by the mode of production and of the relations of production by the forces of production. There are many passages in which Marx is a vulgar Marxist.

b) The hyper-subtle interpretation, in favor especially among many of the contemporary Western followers of Marx. Sees Marx as an infinitely qualified dialectical thinker, attentive to the open-endedness of history and unwilling to affirm the priority or the greater autonomy of any sphere of life. Like the vulgar interpretation, this view also finds a great deal of support, especially in some of the more concrete political writings, where Marx often shows that cavalier attitude toward one's own theoretical ideas which one expects from any intelligent man.

(4) The vulgar and the hypersubtle possibilities exist in the interpretation of any great social thinker. Typically, the defenders of each theorist adopt the hypersubtle account of their master and the vulgar account of his rivals.

As a lawyer and a teacher of contract law, I know that it is possible to make almost any interpretation of anything look plausible. But the better interpretation is the one that tries to hold on to complexity of the underlying intention and the limited structure of
the language through which the intention is formulated. In the case of Marx, this can be translated into the notion of a deep level in which one can discern ideas irreducible to 19th century mechanistic and determinist ideas and a superficial level that often appears bogged down in these ideas. Both levels are part of the thought. Hence, I reject the vulgar and the hypersubtle interpretations.

The crucial point is perhaps one's interpretation of the general view of history. Thus, one must reject the idea of a one-way determination of the r.p. by the f.p. and of ideology by the m.p. But one must also recognize that for Marx some levels are, on the whole and in the long run, dominant over others. Such a system can work only if it ascribes a significant measure of autonomous dynamism to the most basic of levels, the level of the forces of production.

(5) Given that one can interpret Marx's theory in the hypersubtle manner, why would you want to? The answer has to do with the tendency of the left to accept and to exaggerate a peculiar bourgeois style of doctrinaire politics, which became dominant around the time of the French Revolution. The chief elements of this style.

a) A belief in the existence of a determinate structure of ideas mediating between a general philosophical outlook and the concrete struggle for power. One can present political practice as dictated by the system of general ideas. Denial of the central role of prudential choice and gratuitous commitment.

b) A framework that seems to tell you what you ought to do or must do without making any explicit normative claims.
Tries to combine the force of condemnation or exhortation with the invulnerability of science. A surrogate for religious consciousness, which grounds a view of the ideal in a general conception of the world.

(6) An exceptional rather than a typical mode of political practice: In societies in which the bourgeoisie has not become the dominant element, this mode of politics never gained the sympathy of either the aristocracy or the working classes. The only other possible analogue is perhaps the outlook of the bureaucracy in some imperial states like the Chinese and Byzantine.

(7) Why the bourgeois classes and especially the intelligentsia and the professional-bureaucratic groups were attracted to this mode of politics in Western Europe and Latin America:

   a) The characteristic abstractness of bourgeois man's ambitions and of his relationship to the social contexts of his own existence. No intuitive grasp of politics; the exercise of power in the state not part of his normal social situation.

   b) The need to develop a countertheology.

   c) The cultural and social insecurity that makes the bourgeois want to disguise normative claims as scientific theses.

(8) The special situation of the U.S. in which these conditions did not operate to the same extent and there was no clear differentiation between the bourgeois and the aristocratic classes.

(9) After the French Revolution all classes in Western Europe and Latin America adopted this style to some extent. The right, however,
was often rescued from the excesses of doctrinaire politics by two factors:

a) The tradition of aristocratic contempt for such pretenses.
b) The oscillation between laissez-faire liberalism and reactionary communisticianism. Unable to organize itself coherently on doctrinal lines. A factor in its effectiveness.

(10) The left, however, was infatuated with a vengeance by the doctrinaire style of bourgeois politics. The leftist parties, dominated by bourgeois intellectuals, settled upon Marx's work as a vehicle for this.

The advantages were significant:

a) A powerful system of thought capable of unmasking many of the phony justifications of the established order.
b) A magnet of organizational unity.

But these advantages were perhaps overcompensated by the costs:

a) The misunderstanding of politics and of its intellectual content. The search for a false determinateness: the oddly gestural, rhetorical, and delusional character of bourgeois politics.
b) The misunderstanding of theory and its limits. The stunting of theoretical development that occurs when one reifies the work of past thinkers.
c) The fabrication of unnecessary enemies. The impression created that to a leftist one had to subscribe to the theses of dialectical materialism. Division of energies in sectarianism and intellectual self-defense.
For all these reasons, the bourgeoisie never secured a greater triumph than by convincing the left to adopt its own style of politics.

(11) One would need a separate analysis of the role of Marxism in societies outside the central area of the West, societies in which it has served as a way to:
   a) react against the West in Western language;
   b) destroy or transform whole civilizations as well as social structures.

(12) The problem that remains. Critical political thought and practice does require an emphasis on totality. How to develop an integrated criticism of social situations without falling into the delusions of doctrinaire politics.

V. Marx's moral achievement

(1) All extraordinary intellectual achievements like Marx's depend upon a moral accomplishment. The strengths and weaknesses of an intellectual life work reflect the play of moral forces.

(2) The most striking and constantly observed characteristic of the man—the ability to sustain indignation against injustice and to give this indignation a rigorous intellectual content. The fact that Marx's plan was executed under the dispensation of exile, calumny, indifference, and persecution constitutes a permanent remonstrance against all who work in security and comfort.

(3) But there were also certain very crucial limitations. Too often the love of justice remains bound up in Marx with the hatred of persons. Described by one of the victims of his many, often
petty and spiteful polemics, as the kind of man who would use heavy artillery to smash a window pane. Lacking in that most difficult and wonderful of virtues—the ability to sympathize with the unjust even as one struggles against them and to delight in the particularity of one's enemies, in their own mode of being. The intellectual significance of this lies in the importance of recognizing insight in one's adversaries, a feat Marx accomplished often—as in his response to Hegel and to the classical political economists—but not often enough to preserve himself from crucial errors.

(4) Marx's other major moral limitation was perhaps his inability to sympathize with the transcendent, contemplative turn of mind that produces a Newton or a Spinoza. He correctly saw what we have already discovered in Montesquieu: the subtle affinity that may exist between the contemplative posture and an exploitative, irresponsible attitude of the mind toward the world. Yet this is only half of the truth. The products of culture are weapons but they are also valuable apart from the warfare for which we use them, so that, though in the historical world, they are not wholly of this world. Marx's lack of sympathy with the ambition of detached universal understanding may have made him impatient with the philosophical riddles that he would have had to confront in order to resolve the tension between the surface and the depth of his thought.

(5) These virtues and defects would not be enough to distinguish Marx from many others. The ultimate source of his inspiration must be sought elsewhere.
The acceptance of vulnerability is the precondition of discovery in thought, as it is the basis for trust in the moral life. No one can become a great thinker or a great mover in the world unless he has, as Marx did, a willingness to make himself extraordinarily vulnerable. He must think and talk and act in such a way as to offend his contemporaries' sense of propriety and possibility and for this he must be willing to pay the price they will exact from him in the coin of the time and place. He must work and work and work until he has managed to lose his friends and to be surrounded by his enemies. Yet in the end he must still be able to see his own efforts as part of a collective project.

(6) To sustain such vulnerability something deeper and more complicated than courage is needed: the power to transform one's faith in what mankind might become into an analysis of our actual situation. Marx possessed in the highest degree this essence of moral genius, which is the capacity to make the sentiment of hope a form of knowledge. The greatest of the many great lessons he taught us is that it is possible to subject a vision of human redemption to the discipline of reason.
Durkheim's theory of the division of labor

I. Review

(1) In the last class, I addressed the problem of method in Marx and the issue of the relation between Marx and Marxism.

(2) The discussion of method.
   a) The causal and the dialectical strands in Marx.
   b) The dialectic defined at first negatively, by opposition to formal reason: formal logic and conventional causality.
   c) The affirmative marks of the dialectic: the orientation to totality (as structure and as internal relations), the emphasis on contradiction and becoming, the search for concreteness, and the insistence on the practical character of knowledge.
   d) The further development of the method would require us to find a position beyond the dominant standpoints of classical and modern philosophy.
   e) The problem of circularity. By what criteria are we to judge the claims of conflicting modes of reason?

(3) Marx and Marxism.
   a) The vulgar and the hypercritical interpretations of Marx are possible but inadequate.
   b) The whole problem of interpretation and judgment of Marx and other social thinkers has been clouded by the tendency of the left to press Marx's ideas into the service of a peculiar style of doctrinaire bourgeois politics, a fact
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for which Marx himself must be held at least partly responsible.

c) The defining characteristics of this mode of political practice: the belief in relatively determinate intellectual structures mediating between theory and practice; the transmutation of normative claims into quasi-science. (Not a true merger of understanding and evaluation, but a pretense to dispense with the latter while in fact practicing it.)

d) The need to reconcile an emphasis on systematic criticism with a rejection of this style of political thought and action.

II. Introduction

(1) Today's theme: Durkheim's argument in the Division of Labor. Contains the core of his interpretation of modern society. But also the expression of an early stage of his thought. Much of the later course of his work can be understood as an attempt to deal with the weaknesses of this early account--an attempt in which Durkheim never wholly succeeded.

(2) Plan of my remarks:

a) The problem to which the Division of Labor addresses itself; the theoretical context of the book.

b) Some aspects of the structure of the argument, leading up to the major problem of interpretation.

c) Two main kinds of objections to be made.
III. The problem of the Division of Labor

(1) Durkheim's question. How can individuality and sociability be combined? How is it in fact that, as the individual depends more upon society, he also becomes more autonomous?

(2) The customary interpretation of his position. Developed by contrast to two established traditions of social thought, which provided alternative accounts of modern society.

   a) The utilitarian-individualist view (the theory of private interest). Society as an association of self-interested individuals. Spontaneous harmony based upon the interdependence of interests.

   b) The idealist-holistic account. Social order could only be based upon a sharing of values and understandings (the theory of moral discipline). Insofar as this moral consensus had broken down, it would have to be re-established.

Durkheim rejected both these views on moral as well as descriptive grounds.

(3) The general thesis of the Division of Labor. Neither of the traditions can account adequately for the way in which individuality and sociability reinforce each other. There must be some kind of moral consensus, but in modern societies this consensus need not and indeed cannot consist simply in the reestablishment of earlier traditions. Social evolution consists in passing from a situation in which community is the denial of autonomy to one in which it is the vindication of autonomy.
(4) Interpretation of this thesis in the broader terms of a schematism of parts and wholes.
   a) Denial of the necessary relation of the parts to the whole: individualism.
   b) Denial of the separateness of the parts: collectivism.
   c) Recognition of both the separateness of the parts and their necessary relation to the whole: the true character of social life. Two modes:
      1) The parts are related to each other and to the whole by resemblance: mechanical solidarity.
      2) The parts are related to each other and to the whole by differentiation: organic solidarity.
   d) Progress means moving from mechanical to organic solidarity.

(5) Two ways in which to take this schematism according to how one interprets the forces that lead from mechanical to organic solidarity. These two interpretations parallel the ambivalence of Marx's thought between causal determinism and immanent moral rationality.
   a) Causal interpretation. The crucial factor is the growth in the size of the population (material density). The society must specialize to survive. Difficulty with this: too many possibilities of low-level adaptation.
   b) Teleological interpretation. The division of labor develops to make possible a high form of solidarity. A universal human impulse or need. Such a view tends to undermine the distinctions between efficient and final causes and between facts and values.
(6) This teleological interpretation finds a considerable amount of support in other works of Durkheim, especially his study of suicide. The inquiry into the causes of suicide suggests the notion, characteristic of a philosophical anthropology, that there are certain universal needs of mankind. There are four kinds of suicide, in two sets.

At one level, there is the distinction between altruistic and egoistic suicide that is related to the degree of social cohesion or solidarity. Too much or too little cohesion will weaken what Rousseau called the sentiment of being. At another level, there is the distinction between fatalistic and anomic suicide according to the degree of social regulation, the extent to which the individual's life is governed by collective norms. Too much or too little regulation also weakens the sentiment of being. There is a problem with this scheme: the two levels tend to collapse into each other because Durkheim ultimately defines cohesion in terms of regulation. Nevertheless, the view emerges that a society must satisfy certain requirements of the self. Its perfection has to do with its ability to provide both autonomy—as freedom from consensus and regulation—and community—as participation in consensus and regulation. The need to satisfy these requirements in a more inclusive way may itself become a source of change in history.

IV. Mechanical and organic solidarity

(1) In Book One of the Division of Labor, Durkheim provides a classification of basic social types, which is also an evolutionary schema. He contrasts two social types. Might be called primitive
and advanced society, because, strictly speaking, mechanical and
organic solidarity refer to the forms of consciousness in these
societies. These two types differ with respect to their structure,
their normative and specifically their legal order, and their domi-
ant mode of consciousness.

(2) Primitive society.

a) Structure: small territory and population. "Segmental"
organization: "a system of segments that are homogeneous
and similar to one another." One can add or subtract
elements without fundamentally disturbing the equilibrium
of the system. Few and minimally differentiated spheres
of social life: kinship, locality, and religion. Proper-
ty held by groups, mainly of land, and largely closed off
from free alienation.

b) Consciousness: mechanical solidarity. The collective
mental states embrace a large area of individual conscious-
ness; they are well-defined, intensely held, and largely
religious in content.

c) Law. The dominance of penal law and repressive sanctions
reflecting the collective consciousness. Legal rules not
clearly differentiated from other kinds of rules.

(3) Advanced society.

a) Structure: large territory and population. Groups to
which individuals belong are numerous, internally hetero-
genous, and differentiated in their activities. High
degree of interaction and interdependence. Impossible
to add or subtract elements without disturbing the equilibrium of the system. Increasing proliferation and distinction of spheres of social life. Property mainly held by individuals, of movables, and freely alienable.

b) Consciousness. Organic. Diminishment of the collective consciousness in its volume, definiteness, intensity, and religious content. Individual minds come together through their very dissimilarity making possible a higher degree of interdependence. An ironical reflection on the use of the term organic—had been employed by Tönines and others to designate allegedly primitive societies. Durkheim suggests that advanced societies do not really represent the unequivocal triumph of individualism over communitarianism that they may at first appear to signify.

c) Law. The predominance of cooperative law with restitutive sanctions reflecting the new prominence of differentiated interdependence. Legal rules increasingly distinct from moral and religious norms.

(4) Book Two of the Division of Labor. Reasons for the passage from the primitive to the advanced:

a) Efficient causality. The growth of material and moral density.

b) Final causality. The realization of a more perfect form of solidarity.

(5) Book Three of the Division of Labor. Deals with the so-called abnormal forms of the Division of Labor.
a) The concepts of the normal and the pathological. A first approximation to the definition of the normal: the average. Not enough, especially in phases of transition. The alternative criterion: what is in accord with the conditions of existence of a social type.

b) Abnormal aspects of the division of labor:

1) Anomic: the relations between labor and capital, production and consumption, inadequately regulated with respect to both their economic functions and their justice.

2) Coerced rather than spontaneous: The individual's place in the division of labor too often coerced, a result of his rank in the class system of inherited social positions rather than of his talents and vocation.

3) Insufficient coordination. When technical functions become more continuous, solidarity increases. Individual activity and social organization increase together.

(6) The great interpretive difficulty. What distinguishes organic solidarity from the individualist utilitarian interpretation of modern society which Durkheim plainly rejected? The interdependence of technical functions is insufficient to distinguish Durkheim's view from that of the classical political economists. There are two answers to this question in Durkheim's work.
(7) The first answer is the one he gave in his early work, especially in the book in the Division of Labor itself. The focus of the collective consciousness is the ideal of the sanctity of the individual. But how should one interpret this ideal? Its crucial meaning in Durkheim is that society should be devoted to creating circumstances in which individuals can realize their vocations. Self-realization means the fulfillment of talent. Society must distribute individuals within the division of labor by this standard. Meritocracy is the highest form of solidarity.

(8) Durkheim became increasingly dissatisfied with this response in his later work, because he became aware of at least some of the difficulties with which I shall soon deal. This is indicated by his second preface to the book, by his studies of morality, religion and politics, and by his explicit statement in the last of the last general set of lectures he gave, that meritocracy is a transitional and imperfect form of organization. He became concerned with the role of altruism—which was to be stimulated by new forms of associational life and by the reinforcement of the sanctity of social bonds that religion and its modern surrogates would provide.

(9) Neither of these two responses (meritocracy and altruism) were satisfactory in the form in which Durkheim made them. Today I shall criticize the meritocracy solution.

V. The failures of meritocracy

(1) Two sets of problems—one having to do with the relation between meritocracy and power; the other with the relation between meritocracy and individual aptitudes.
Meritocracy and power

(2) First aspect: the issue of value. The division of labor would only be spontaneous rather than coerced if goods and services were exchanged at their true value. Groups and classes as well as individuals must bargain on a footing of equal power. Equal bargaining position tested by the reciprocity of exchange. But how do we determine whether goods and services are being exchanged at their true value? Durkheim adopted a rather naive version of the labor theory of value: value as the quantity of useful labor contained in each object of exchange, but only of that portion of labor capable of satisfying "normal needs." The collective consciousness would determine value, operating through the forces of supply and demand. But advanced societies are characterized precisely by a narrowing of the range of the collective consciousness so that the basis for a theory of value that could test reciprocity is undermined by the same process that would make such testing important.

(3) Second aspect: the relationship of the division of labor as we know it—both as social division of labor (occupational specialization) and as technical division of labor (breakdown of the work task into small separate constituents)—has been shaped by its association with the class system. Moreover, as a political matter, the struggles that could lead to the successful breakdown of class domination would affect the very foundations of life in the advanced societies. They could not be seen as mere rejections of aberrational forms.
(4) Third aspect: the internal inconsistency of the meritocratic ideal. This inconsistency exists even if one could exclude all direct and indirect effects of inherited opportunity. Meritocracy calls for unequal rewards: success demonstrated by the rewards. One's needs in advanced capitalist or socialist bureaucratic societies are shaped by more or less tacit comparisons with those in higher or lower positions than oneself. To be successful is to achieve the rewards of the higher-ups. But an acknowledged condition of the legitimacy of a meritocratic system is that the contestants conduct their competition for rewards from a position of equality. Thus, the very operation of a meritocratic system constantly undermines the conditions of that system's legitimacy.

(5) Fourth aspect: the irreducibility of solidarity to functional interdependence. Not only is a meritocratic system internally inconsistent, it is also unfaithful to a plausible ideal of solidarity. No one could confuse the brutal degradation of work in a modern factory or bureau or even in the Ecole Normale with an ideal of social harmony. On Durkheim's own terms, solidarity must mean that to a significant extent the assertion of individuality reinforces sociability rather than defeating it. But meritocracy is by its very nature a system of relative comparisons in which each person's triumph is directly and necessarily related to the comparative failure of others. It cannot satisfy the impulse toward solidarity.

(6) Hence, the relative winners in a meritocratic system are cursed with a constant ambivalence toward the meritocracy. On the one hand, they need to accept it because it is the justification of
their own success and preeminence. On the other hand, they must ceaselessly try to escape the risks and fears to which it exposes them and try to establish among themselves an oligarchic community of the winners in which competition has been brought under control.

**Meritocracy and individual aptitudes**

(7) What is the relationship of the meritocratic division of labor to individual talents? On one view, individual talents are biologically determined. Hence, there can be only one division of labor wholly consistent with the biological distribution of talents.

**Difficulties with this:**

a) If there is a natural distribution of endowments, it is itself random with respect to our moral purposes. Why should one attribute any inherent moral force to it? Insofar as the division of labor involves an allocation of power, it is difficult to see why one should allow the division of labor to be determined by the play of natural forces, if one's overriding aim is the perfection of solidarity rather than some independent aim of "efficiency."

b) But, in fact, the whole conception of a biological allocation of vocations seems untenable. To a large extent, the determination must be social. The social structure and culture themselves shape individual vocations.

(8) Insofar as individual vocations are socially determined, it is circular to justify a meritocratic division of labor on the ground that it allows for the realization of individual talents. The system
is, as it were, sitting in judgment upon itself.

(9) Thus, one finds this other moral sentiment prominent among even the winners in the meritocratic race. On the one hand, they gloat over their victory. On the other hand, however, they have some inescapable awareness of the flimsiness and manipulability of the criteria that led to their ascension. The pride of prominence is combined with the shameful feeling that they are frauds and that someone is about to find them out.

Conclusion

(10) The desire to escape from ruthless competition into oligarchic community and the guilt of arbitrary success—these are the tell-tale signs that reveal the moral inadequacy and instability of a meritocratic order.

(11) But here is a baffling problem. Progress toward the meritocratic division of labor may represent an indispensable step toward the transformation and eventual subversion of the class system. Yet meritocracy is not enough. This most advanced mode of contemporary political ideal so proudly defended by the elites— is itself in the end revealed to be a mutilated form of solidarity.

(12) That is what is most arresting about the study of Durkheim. When one comes to the frontiers of his analysis of the division of labor, one realizes that the limits of his argument are the limits of the modern political imagination itself.
Durkheim's view of occupational groups and of religion

I. Review

(1) Last time I discussed Durkheim's theory of the division of labor and his ideal of meritocracy as developed in his book on the division of labor.

(2) The problem of the division of labor: the reconciliation of individuality and sociability in history.

(3) Two views of the process of leading from primitive to advanced societies: causal and teleological.

(4) The main problem of interpretation of the argument about the division of labor. What distinguishes organic solidarity from the mere harmony of private interests postulated by the classical political economists? Two answers in Durkheim's work:
   a) The institutionalization of meritocracy.
   b) The development of altruism.

(5) Criticisms having to do with the relation of meritocracy to power.
   a) The issue of value. The test of reciprocity in exchange undermined by the same historical process that would render such a test more important.
   b) The inseparability of the division of labor as we know it from the class system.
   c) The internal inconsistency of the meritocratic ideal. Its operation undermines its own professed conditions of
legitimacy. It is oriented to differential rewards, but presupposes equality of condition.
d) The irreducibility of solidarity to functional interdependence.

(6) Criticisms having to do with the relation of meritocracy to individual aptitudes.
   a) If aptitudes are biologically given, what is their legitimacy as determinants of power?
   b) If they are socially conditioned, they are produced by what they are used to justify.

(7) The characteristic sentiments of the winners:
   a) They depend on meritocracy, yet try to escape from it into oligarchic community.
   b) The effort to defend meritocracy combines with the half-suppressed sense of the flimsiness of meritocratic criteria.

(8) The political difficulty lies in the fact that meritocracy is an intrinsic part of the struggle against the class system. The need to recognize its imperfect and transitional nature.

(9) Both Marx and Durkheim aware of this imperfection of meritocracy. As to Marx, his characterization of communism or the second stage of socialism as one in which distribution according to social contributions has been replaced by distribution according to need. As to Durkheim, his statement in his last lecture (Physique des Moeurs et du Droit) that the duty of charity, which commands us to overcome
inequalities of merit, must and will pass into a duty of justice.

(10) Qualifications to the argument against meritocracy as I have formulated it:

a) The division of labor is an allocation of power as well as of occupational places. No objection in principle to the distribution of occupations according to talent so long as the power associated with these positions can be brought under direct democratic control.

b) There may be a significant trade-off with efficiency in fostering more perfect forms of solidarity. The material interests of even the worst-off members of the group might be prejudiced by an attack on meritocracy. But we can never tell a priori to what extent there really is a trade-off. And, though efficiency may be a constraint, the overriding aim is solidarity itself.

II. Introduction: the conception of altruism

(1) Today I turn to the second major response that Durkheim's work contains to the question: What distinguishes or might distinguish the social life of the advanced societies from a mere harmony of private interests (functional interdependence)? This answer was provided by Durkheim's conception of altruism.

(2) The conception of altruism:

a) Its manifestation. The willingness to limit one's self-interest in behalf of other people's needs. Contrast this to the ideal of market society, in which each person views others as simply a means to his own ends. He satisfies their wants only as a way of furthering his own.
b) Its mediation. Operates always through the acceptance of social norms. The individual recognizes the pre-eminence of the social bond over the pursuit of private advantage.

c) Its presupposition. The ability each person must have to understand the situations of those with whom he deals and to put himself in their place. This seems to require a basic similarity of experience. Thus, like the ideal of the sanctity of the person, the demand for altruism represents another form of mechanical solidarity—a kind of mechanical solidarity that would make organic solidarity possible.

d) Its ambiguity. There is a question in this, as in most, theories of altruism. To what extent is it a view that prescribes love—the gift of self—and to what degree is it a doctrine of enlightened self-interest (you are helped by helping others, etc.)?

(3) How the altruism solution differs from the meritocracy one. The meritocratic ideal was conceived by Durkheim as part of the normal evolution of the advanced societies. He viewed the forces standing in the way of the realization of meritocracy as transitional and pathological. But what is the relation of the doctrine of the reinforcement of altruism to the advanced societies? The doctrine calls for changes in social behavior, social regulation, and social consciousness. But Durkheim never clarified the extent to which these changes would require and bring about a transformation of the
character of these societies. Thus, the main difficulty in understanding his later thought consists in the unclarity of the bearing of his program on the established system of power. One feels that the oscillation between conservatism and radicalism has reached the very center of Durkheim's thought.

(4) My comments today will be devoted to the two sides of Durkheim's doctrine of altruism:
   a) the theory of occupational groups;
   b) the theory of religion and moral education.

   The parallel to Tocqueville: the creation of voluntary associations and the resurgence of religion as the cures for the pathology of liberalism.

   By describing both of them as aspects of the theory of altruism, I mean to suggest the nature of the concern to which they were designed to respond. Such an interpretation may help us appreciate the unity of Durkheim's life work.

III. The theory of occupational groups

(1) The central conception. Durkheim became convinced that the problems of the anomic, coerced, and uncoordinated division of labor could be resolved only by the development of a new form of social organization: the corporations or occupational groups. These groups would mediate between the state and the individual. They would bring together at a nationwide level all those who worked within a given occupation. But what sorts of changes would have to occur in the relations between capital and labor? On this crucial point, Durkheim is almost completely silent. We can develop further our
understanding of the occupational groups by considering, first, Durkheim's critique of communism and socialism and, then, the tasks he assigned to the corporate bodies.

(2) The critique of communism and socialism.

a) Communism. The utopian social thinkers. Production private; consumption, socialized. Moralize the state by separating it from industry. Repression of material desires. Durkheim criticizes communism for its lack of realism, its failure to take off from the actual conditions of life in the advanced societies.

b) Socialism. A modern movement. Production and distribution socialized but consumption remains private. Moralize the economic forces by bringing them into the center of political decision. Durkheim criticizes socialism for the inadequacy of its ideal of justice (distribution according to merit or the social utility of labor). But he also views it as insufficient because it fails to recognize that the advanced societies require moral constraints as well as economic regulation.

c) Implications of the critique of communism and socialism. The occupational groups must start out from the real circumstances of the developed capitalist societies. They must have it as part of their mission to foster not just a different distribution of wealth and power but relationships among people that are morally more perfect.
This perfection consists in responsiveness to a higher degree of altruism.

(3) The tasks of the occupational groups.

a) Political. The corporations constitute a buffer between the individual and the state defending the former against the latter. At the same time, the overarching power of the state protects the individual against the potential tyranny of the groups.

b) Moral. The occupational groups foster altruism. When individuals are brought into close contact with each other, in a constant manner, and in conditions of increasing justice, social norms are generated. These norms constitute a restraint on self-interest. Moreover, by imposing limits on the individual's desires, they liberate him from the inferno of dissatisfied ambition.

(4) The ambiguity of the occupational groups.

a) Are they simply modern professional associations of role occupants or are they more inclusive communities, like the medieval communes and guilds, embracing a large part of their members' lives?

b) A symptom of a deeper ambiguity in the conception of community. Two views. The community as interdependence of functionally specialized parts (the chords of the well-tempered lyre). The community as a fraternity of sentiments (a sharing of understandings and values).
c) Problem with the occupational groups as mere role associations. An inadequate basis for altruism. Such a view would, like meritocracy, represent a reduction of solidarity to functional interdependence.

d) Problem with the occupational groups as inclusive communities. How could they be generated without a radical transformation of the structures of power in the advanced societies? And how could they be constructed so as to encourage rather than to crush individuality?

(5) The ambiguity of the occupational groups manifests itself in the form of tensions that mark the internal life of those professional associations and corporate bodies that most nearly resemble Durkheim's occupational groups and have come closest to institutionalizing an ideal of meritocracy.

a) The dialectic of merit and sympathy. The members of the group encounter each other as abstract role occupants with talents to sell and display. Distance from civil society and contact with the ideals of high culture stimulate the desire to share in community. But the legitimacy of one's membership is based upon meritocratic criteria that transcend--though only partially--the class system. Thus, it is impossible for the group either to rest content with meritocracy or to develop sympathetic community.

b) The dialectic of neutrality and engagement. At first each corporate body views itself as neutral within the broader politics of the national society. When it discovers that
it has a political impact willy nilly, it is caught between the attachment to neutrality and the desire for engagement. It becomes aware of its own power but also of the arbitrariness of the ideals by which it makes use of that power.

c) The dialectic of consciousness and illusion. Because it is wracked by contradiction, it must survive on illusion. But it is also distinguished by the mastery of intellectual technique, and therefore makes room for theory. But theory may undermine the group's appearance of legitimacy, by laying bare its hidden conflicts. The group is attracted to that which demoralizes it.

(6) The basic problem in Durkheim's theory of occupational groups. Failure to deal adequately with the relationship between associational life and the general organization of power in society. In different terms: how to extract the division of labor from a hierarchical power structure and, more specifically, from the class system.

More concretely. The problem with Durkheim's reformist communalism does not lie in any inherent conservatism. It lies in the absence of a theoretical apparatus that would show what kinds of reformism are revolutionary because they affect crucial points of organization and consciousness and what kinds simply reinstate the problems of the society one is trying to change and to perfect. The political hesitation and the theoretical gap are bound together.
IV. The theory of religion

(1) In Durkheim's own terms, the occupational group is not a sufficient solution to the problem of altruism. It is, like the family, a partial experience. Its cohesion is based upon the willingness of its members to accept the authority of the collective norms. But what is the process by which these norms acquire authority? How is legitimacy established? This is the task of religion and of the modern surrogates and successors of religion.

(2) The conception of religion. Its fundamental elements:
   a) The distinction between the sacred and the profane.
   b) The ambivalence of the sacred as that which is prohibited yet supremely valuable.
   c) The idea of the sacred or the divine as society transfigured and symbolically expressed. Society as a whole is invisible. If you look at the surface of social life, you see only the bustling of individuals and individual interests. The whole is hidden behind this screen. It must be recalled to individuals by myths and rituals that punctuate their day-to-day lives. Another way to put this: our ordinary experience is one of apartness. If society and personality are not to disintegrate, the experience of separateness must be overwhelmed by the experience of belonging to a greater whole. This experience must be triggered by events and symbols in society itself. These events and symbols form the region of the sacred.
(3) Religion and solidarity. The ultimate basis of altruism is the sentiment of the sanctity of society and of the force of the obligations it imposes upon us. Religion is the means by which social solidarity is maintained. It is the response to the threat of disintegration inherent in the division of labor and the source of the element of mechanical solidarity that must survive in the advanced societies.

(4) For Durkheim, religion is the paradigmatic social phenomenon in a double sense.
   a) Historically, it is the center from which all other spheres of society and culture break away. Myth leads to science; ritual, to morality, law, and art.
   b) Functionally and phenomenologically, it is the aspect of social life that presents most fully the characteristics of social phenomena in general: the constraint exercised over individuals and the corresponding sentiment of obligation on their part.

(5) Religion and the theory of social change. Social change occurs in those moments of collective effervescence when interaction among people within or outside established groups becomes more intense. New systems of moral ideas are born and these in turn make new forms of group life possible. These changes participate in the character of religious life, which is ecstasis, the raising of the individual above the limits of his own individuality.

(6) The methodological premises of Durkheim's theory of religion.
   a) Durkheim rejects the view that religion means what it
says, that it is literally true. But he also repudiates the conception that it is a veil of illusion cast over the working out of group interests and of primitive psychological needs. It is a necessary delirium that represents to us a right and true feature of existence—the preeminence of the group over its members.

b) The idea that society is possible because individuals participate in a universe of common representations. Religion—and more broadly the system of normative ideas—the most basic level of this world of symbolic structures.

c) Thanks to the availability of these symbolic structures, society acquires a certain reality of its own. It acts upon individual minds. It, rather than the individual, is the true agent of history.

(7) Historical criticism of Durkheim's theory of religion.

a) It focuses on one of the great poles of the religious consciousness to the exclusion of the other. Immanent religion: the dwelling of God in nature and society. Transcendent religion: the separation of God from the world; a transcendent person with whom one can have, by analogy, the kinds of relations one has with a person. Durkheim's theory is better understood as a view of immanent religion, but even as such it is inadequate, for it fails to take account of the thrust toward transcendence.

b) Thus, Durkheim wrote mainly about the religion of tribal societies and attempted to pass directly from there to the
problem of moral education in the advanced societies,

c) The religious history of historical societies shows a complex and still unresolved interplay between the demands for immanence and transcendence.

(8) Moral and political criticism of Durkheim's theory of religion. Leads to the subordination of the individual, who is part of the realm of the profane, to society. Moreover, it tends to confer ultimate authority on society as it is or as it is becoming. Durkheim seems led to betray his own doctrine of the equal claims of the individual and the collective. He undermines the basis of the power of transcendence of the person over the group and of future or possible society over present order. The effort to understand this betrayal takes us to the heart not only of Durkheim's thought but of the whole situation of modern culture.

(9) Three levels, of increasing depth, at which to read Durkheim:

a) Durkheim as a materialist monist. An adherent to 19th century scientism and a believer in the ultimate unity of the material world.

b) Durkheim as a Cartesian dualist. His thought is organized around the classic dualities of the sacred and the profane, society and the individual, the mind and the body. Nevertheless, these dichotomies tend to break down because they are asymmetrical. In each case, the first member of the pair overwhelms the second. The limits between the sacred and the profane are defined by the sacred. The individual is himself a product of society and his peculi
arities are a residual category of profane resistance to the preeminence of the group. The body belongs to the profane and the individual whereas the mind is associated with the sacred and the collective.

c) Thus, at a third level, Durkheim turns out to be a spiritualist monist. The persistent tendency of his thought is to emphasize the superior reality of spirit. The world of matter, of technical-instrumental relations, and of power is expelled to the periphery. Its relative autonomy is denied. That is the dangerous political delusion fostered by a monistic spiritualism. And it is the key to the limitations of Durkheim's thought. Spirit is the quicklime consuming the reality of the material world.

(10) Thus, there is an extraordinary discrepancy between the superficial appearance and the hidden intention of Durkheim's thought. But this seeming flight from one kind of monism to another is characteristic of modern culture. The moderns seem to have lost their grip on the interlocking ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence. They can only conceive of the power of spirit to overcome its embodiments in the form of a stark dualism between spirit and its embodiments. When they try to escape this dualism, they fall into an all-consuming materialism or an equally relentless spiritualism. Much of modern thought and art is dominated by the oscillation between a denial of the material world and a clinging to that world as self-sufficient. The metaphysical error is also a political, a moral, and an aesthetic lapse.
(11) We are now in a position to understand the relationship between the defects of Durkheim's theory of religion and the failings of his doctrine of occupational groups. The collectivist spiritualism of the theory of religion and the ambiguous reformism of the theory of corporate bodies have in common the same vice we have already discerned in the theory of meritocracy: the failure to come to terms with the extent of the conflict between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of power as we know them.

V. Conclusion

(1) A theory of community that is not joined to a theory of domination will mislead. A politics of community that is not oriented to the problem of domination may inspire, but it will also corrupt. Durkheim is remarkable for his vision of human fraternity, but this vision is limited and marred by his failure to wrestle with the demon of power.

(2) Nevertheless, deep within the cocoon of academic propriety, intellectual equivocation, and political compromise that surrounds Durkheim's thought there lies a critical impulse. The force of this impulse derives from the violent though tacit contrast between the ideal of solidarity and our experience of modern life. The search for that hidden source of criticism and enlightenment ought to be the principle that governs not only our reading of Durkheim but all our transactions with the official culture within which we move.
Durkheim's methodological ideas and his professorial role

I. Review

(1) In the last class, I discussed Durkheim's doctrine of altruism as developed in both his theory of occupational groups and his theory of religion.

(2) The theory of altruism attempts to provide, alongside, and often instead of, the idea of meritocracy, an answer to the question: What distinguishes the organic solidarity of the advanced societies from mere functional interdependence? The basic idea is that of the reinforcement of the social bond through the acceptance by the individual of the authority of collective norms.

The need to strengthen both associational life and the sources of legitimation in religious and moral consciousness.

(3) The theory of occupational groups.

a) The tasks of freedom and altruism.

b) The ambiguity: caught between role association (functional specialization) and inclusive, multipurpose community.

c) The lack of definition of the degree of change in the structure of power in society--both at the national level and within institutions--that would be required to realize the ideal of solidarity through the occupational groups.
(4) The theory of religion.
a) The sacred as society transfigured and symbolically expressed. Views religion as the indirect expression of a social truth (the preeminence of the social bond), the ultimate form of social order through participation in common mental structures, and the supreme device through which society acts upon its members.
b) Historical criticism. Does not do justice to the transcendent pole of the religious consciousness.
c) Moral criticism. The deification of society and actuality.
d) The levels of Durkheim's thought: monistic materialism, dualism, and monistic spiritualism. The political danger of such a spiritualism. Durkheim's position as representative of the situation of modern culture.

(5) The common source of the defects of the theories of meritocracy, association, and religion: the failure to clarify the relationship of reciprocal dependence that must exist between the progress of the ideal of solidarity and the reorganization of power in society.

II. Introduction

(1) Today I conclude my discussion of Durkheim. I shall address myself to two issues:
a) Durkheim's methodological program and practice;
b) the moral character of the tradition of academic sociology Durkheim helped create.

(2) It will come as no surprise if there turns out to be a close connection between Durkheim's ideas about method and the substance of his social theory. But the most significant connections are not
the visible ones.

III. Durkheim's methodological program and practice

(1) Sources of information about Durkheim's method:
   a) His relatively early work, "The Rules of Sociological Method";
   b) His later philosophical writings;
   c) Above all, the actual practice of his works.

(2) Plan for the discussion of Durkheim's methodology:
   a) Three major aspects of his methodological ideas;
   b) Criticism of each of these aspects;
   c) Philosophical premises of the resolution of the unresolved problems in Durkheim's methodology.

Major aspects of Durkheim's methodology

(3) The idea of the externality of social facts. Social facts ought to be treated as things. And they are characterized by the external constraint that they exercise over the individual members of a group.

   a) The thesis that social facts should be treated as things is meant to evoke the possibility of an empirical science of society rather than to defend the reduction of sociological explanations to physical ones. It is part of a polemic against rationalism in social study: the view that would treat relations among social facts as if they were relations among concepts and thereby make logical analysis the supreme method of social study.
b) By calling attention to the externality of social facts, Durkheim means to make two different points. On the one hand, he argues that we must be able to judge social facts from the outside, that is to say, objectively and universally. On the other hand, he emphasizes that a social fact is experienced by the individual as a reality outside and superior to himself. Thus, the practices and rules of social life appear to the individual as constraints that are fundamentally given.

c) As time went on, Durkheim emphasized increasingly that the acceptance of the social bond was more than a mere constraint—the satisfaction of a basic human need. A system of rules can operate only if the rules are accepted for the most part spontaneously; coercive enforcement must be exceptional.

(4) The idea of the autonomy of social study. Durkheim complemented his thesis that social facts ought to be treated as things by arguing that social facts are autonomous from, or irreducible to, psychological facts, just as psychological facts (i.e. phenomena of individual psychology) are irreducible to biological, chemical, and physical facts. Thus, Durkheim was an antireductionist.

a) There are two main senses of antireductionism. First, one may acknowledge that a lower-level explanation could contain everything that is contained within a higher-level explanation. Nevertheless, the higher-level explanation would still have a role because it filters out information
that we might consider useless and distracting for certain purposes. This would be a strictly epistemological antireductionism. Second, one may claim that the higher-level explanation deals with a reality that is itself qualitatively different from the reality to which the lower-level explanation is addressed. This would be an ontological antireductionism.

b) Durkheim was an antireductionist in this stronger, ontological sense. He believed in the existence of emergent properties of social life—properties not found in individual minds and actions. In Durkheim, this tends to slide into the yet stronger claim that groups and, above all, societies are real beings, indeed the real agents of history.

(5) The distinction between the normal and the pathological. Social study must be scientific. Yet, at the same time, it must perform a role as a guide to practical decision. The resolution of the conflict between these aims is to be provided by the distinction between the normal and the pathological.

a) The typological method. One begins by classifying societies into types, discovering the inner logic of each form of social life. This allows one to reconcile the objectives of historiography and of systematic social theory, to rise above historical antinomianism without falling into a cosmic philosophy of history.
b) The first interpretation of normalcy: the statistical average. What is average in a social type. Difficulty with this: dangerous when applied to transitional or incompletely developed types of social life. What is average may be the vestiges of the type of social life already in disintegration.

c) The second interpretation of normalcy: those phenomena that are bound up with the general conditions of collective life of the social type considered.

d) Durkheim expects his distinction between the normal and the pathological to serve as the basis for a special kind of moral judgment. Such a judgment will be founded upon an analysis of social reality rather than upon an abstract moral theory.

e) The parallel with Marx. As in Marx, but more explicitly, there is the search for an immanent moral rationality and an overcoming of the fact-value distinction. Though Durkheim claims this mode of moral judgment is based on a typology of societies rather than on a philosophy of history, he does have a general evolutionary view.

Criticism of Durkheim's methodology

(6) The ideal of the externality of social facts. Internal tension between the insistence on treating social facts as things (i.e. observing them from an outsider's objective or universal standpoint) and defining them by reference to the moral authority they exercise
over the individual. How do we ascertain the existence of this authority if not by viewing the situation from the standpoint of the individual's own subjectivity and thereby abandoning the outsider's point of view.

(7) This internal tension simply the expression of a deeper but tacit conflict between two ideals of social study in Durkheim.

a) On the surface of his thought, and especially in the explicit methodological writings, there is an ideal of empirical science, formulated by analogy to the dominant conception of the natural sciences. The controlling conception is that of the causal explanation of facts. The empirical reality of social life is what it is—a one-dimensional bundle of facts waiting to be explained in causal terms. The preeminent ideal of social study is that of the objectivity and universality of knowledge.

b) But at another level of Durkheim's thought and of modern social study in general the dominant view is that of an interpretation of symbols (the method of the humanities). Social reality has a screen of appearances and a domain of underlying meanings. Durkheim emphasizes that even the most general categories of knowledge—e.g. the views of space and time—are shaped by features of social organization. To understand those categories one must interpret them in the light of the partially unconscious structure of society. The characteristic operation of sociology is decoding rather than explaining. Its ideal
is that of fidelity to subjective experience. But this ideal enters into conflict with that of objective and universal knowledge.

c) The same tension plays itself out in the role of the sociologist in Durkheim's thought. He must be beyond collective prejudice, an objective and universal scientist. But such a person, beyond the limits of the collective consciousness, a rebel to its authority, would be in Durkheim's own terms, a moral monster.

d) The suggestion to a solution of this conflict in Durkheim's propagandistic pamphlets against Germany's role in the First World War--written in the last years of Durkheim's life. Durkheim can judge Germany's conduct not simply by pitting French values against German values but by appealing to a more inclusive, developing set of moral standards that crosses national boundaries.

(8) The conflict between the principle of objectivity and universality in knowledge and the principle of fidelity to subjective experience is resolved to the extent that moral insight and consensus itself becomes more universal. To the degree that the collective consciousness whose symbolism the sociologist interprets and whose standpoint he assumes merges into the universal conscience of mankind, the tension between the two ideals of knowledge fades away. But to make sense of this view, one would have to suppose that the rules of the existing or emerging group or society are not the ultimate authority. Rather, they are the incomplete and transitory
embodiments of a moral order that, by fits and starts, is being constructed in history.

(9) The ideal of the autonomy of social study. Durkheim recognizes that social relations are always mediated by consciousness and he insists on the distinction between individual and social consciousness. Sociology is a science of moral facts, and these facts are essentially collective.

a) There is a crucial ambiguity in the Durkheimian conception of the moral -- (1) that which is mediated by consciousness; (2) that which is normative.

b) Durkheim's tendency is to collapse the social into the realm of consciousness, and then consciousness into the sphere of moral rules and constraints.

c) The consequence of this tendency is to underemphasize radically the material, technical, instrumental, and power aspects of social life.

(10) The ultimate source of this tendency in Durkheim is the triumph of a monistic spiritualism at the center of his thought, over the dualism that is in turn more central to Durkheim than the monistic materialism to which he at first seems to subscribe.

The roots of Durkheim's situation lie in the entire predicament of modern culture, which seems able to overcome dualism only by escaping into a materialist or a spiritualist monism.

The remedy to this lies in developing once again the core ideas of our civilization--the embodiment of spirit and the power of spirit to transcend its embodiments. Translated into the idea
of a human nature that is manifested in and developed through particular forms of social life, but is capable of transcending them. In this way, one rejects dualism and the two forms of monism as tenable starting points for thought about man and society.

(11) The distinction between the normal and the pathological.

a) An attempt to resolve the problem of fact and value through a biological metaphor. The effort is to go beyond the subjectivism of modern ethics without returning to the abstract objectivism of much ancient moral thought.

b) First objection. No real philosophical resolution. As in Marx, the attempt to give moral weight to the language of science.

c) Second objection. Despite Durkheim's disclaimers, the tendency to sanctify the existent or the emergent by the very fact of denying the presence of any realm of moral reality beyond them.

(12) One might begin to remedy these defects by turning to the suggestions of philosophical anthropology in Durkheim—as represented by Durkheim's notion in "Suicide" of universal, developing human needs that any form of social life must satisfy. Such a view would have to be part of a historical theory of human nature—a theory that would cross the divide between understanding and evaluation.

Conclusion

(13) Durkheim failed to come to terms with the tension between scientific and humanistic knowledge and between society as power
and society as moral order. Despite his own intentions, his social theory tends to degenerate into an apologetic science. Thus, the limitations of his methodological ideas are closely connected with the ambiguities of his substantive social theory.

(14) The political, moral, and aesthetic lapse is inseparable from a metaphysical error—the failure to conceive correctly the relationship between the spirit and its embodiments, and between human nature and history.

IV. Durkheim and professorial social theory

(1) I shall now say some things about Durkheim as a person and about the kind of social theory his work represents.

(2) Unlike Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim was a professor. He helped initiate the stage at which social theory consolidates its pretenses to science and finds a place within the academic bureaucracy, to whose benevolence and foresight we owe our meeting today.

(3) To understand Durkheim's thought, one must appreciate that he belonged to a particular group in civil society—the critical intelligentsia.

a) The social circumstance of this group is marked by a two-fold separation. Because they do not view themselves as servants of the state, the intellectuals lack the consolations of bureaucratic ideology—the appearance of direct service to the society. On the other hand, they are disjointed from the life of civil society and the assurances of its everyday routines.
b) Their relative distance from society enables them to grasp many of its inadequacies. But they are denied the solace of a well-defined role. For them, the solution to the problem of existence must lie in their ability to contribute to an ideal of thought and criticism. But the more ardent and single-minded they are in the service of this ideal, the more do they sacrifice their relationships with others.

c) That is one of the reasons why a large part of the intelligentsia is obsessed with the themes of sympathy and community. It wants a condition in which one will not have to choose between group life and service to universal ideals. It desires to disappear as a separate caste—to abolish its own existence through the transformation of society.

d) At the same time, however, the intelligentsia continues attached to the devices by which it exercises its influence. It entertains a mental reservation that in the coming order its exalted place will be revered. In its secret pride it wants to insist at any cost on its independence from everyday life. Sometimes it may even happen that the strained loftiness of its demeanor and language will betray a hidden love of hierarchy.

(4) We can come a little closer to Durkheim by comparing him to Saint-Simon. The immediate tradition from which Durkheim stems was founded by the Count of Saint-Simon, the master of August Comte,
who was, in many ways, Durkheim's own master.

Saint-Simon's relationship to society may be illustrated by the story of his unsuccessful marriage proposal to Madame de Staël. The story goes that he said to her: "Madam, you are the most extraordinary woman in the world, and I am the most extraordinary man. Between us, we would doubtless have an even more extraordinary child." He then added that the marriage should be consummated in a balloon.

In 1882, the young Émile Durkheim, with his stiff white collar, his ashen face, and his deadly seriousness, prepared to advance social theory and to serve mankind by bowing before the government examiners who admitted him to the academic profession. Only three generations had passed since the day when Durkheim's grandfather, Saint-Simon, had conspired to advance social theory and to serve mankind by copulating in a balloon. The change in style signifies a passage from a situation in which social theory is a denial of established society to one in which it fits into the existing order of things. We go from the almost Franciscan disregard for the prejudices of this world, indicated by Saint-Simon's marital scheme, to the tame deference of the professor, symbolized by Durkheim's bow.

A deeper vision, however, sees that Durkheim was conceived in Saint-Simon's balloon. In the tradition of academic sociology the critical impulse is hidden, but it survives nonetheless, and it will live to see another day.

(5) Ladies and Gentlemen, you are dismissed early, in consideration of the fact that today is my birthday.
Weber's basic categories

I. Review: Durkheim's methodology

(1) Last time I discussed Durkheim's methodological ideas. The main themes:
   a) the externality of social facts;
   b) the autonomy of social study (Durkheim as an anti-reductionist);
   c) the distinction between the normal and the pathological (the idea of an immanent morality).

(2) Critique of Durkheim's conception of the externality of social facts:
   a) There is a tension between the desire to treat facts as things -- i.e. from the objective standpoint of the outside observer -- and the view that a social fact is one that the individual experiences as external and preeminent over his own inclinations. To discern and to describe such an experience, we must view the social situation from the individual's own perspective.
   b) This conflict is the expression of a broader struggle in Durkheim's work between two images of social science: as causal explanation of facts and as decoding of symbols. The first devoted to an ideal of objectivity and universality in knowledge; the second, to an ideal of fidelity to subjective experience.
   c) The conflict between these two ideals would only be resolved insofar as the symbolism of social life and the
experience on which that symbolism is based became themselves universal.

(3) Critique of Durkheim's view of the autonomy of social study.
   a) Sociology defined as a science of moral facts.
   b) The ambiguity of the concept of moral facts: that which is mediated by consciousness and that which is normative. Durkheim's tendency to reduce the social to the conscious and the conscious to the normative. Deemphasis on the power aspects of social life.
   c) The roots of this reduction in a monistic spiritualism.

(4) Critique of Durkheim's use of the distinction between the normal and the pathological.
   a) A scientific metaphor made to carry moral weight.
   b) The danger of this metaphor: the tendency to sanctify established or emergent society over against all other moral possibilities.
   c) The elements of an alternative view might be found in Durkheim's own implicit philosophical anthropology -- the idea, perhaps most clearly expressed in "Suicide," that there are certain universal, developing human needs to which all societies must respond. Such a characterization of human needs inevitably crosses the divide between understanding and evaluation.

(5) The core of my criticism of Durkheim's substantive social theory is his failure to grapple with the relationship between the
advancement of the ideal of solidarity and the reorganization of power in society. The main theme of my criticism of Durkheim's methodological views is the corrupting influence of the monistic spiritualism that, in the end, dominates his work. These two themes are connected: the metaphysical error fosters the political lapse and is, in turn, reinforced by it. The disregard for the power aspect of social life becomes plausible in the context of a spiritualist monism. The lesson to be learned: the most concrete social ideas are bound by invisible threads to the most general problems of metaphysics.

II. Weber: introduction

(1) Plan of my discussion of Weber over this and the next two classes:

   a) Today I shall deal with the inner logic of Weber's social theory: some of the basic categories of his thought. A first, crude approximation to an understanding of his view of the process of rationalization or disenchantment that allegedly characterizes the modern world.

   b) Wednesday, I shall focus on Weber's account of the religious background and the political implications of this process of rationalization.

   c) Next Monday, I shall turn to Weber's methodological views and the moral and political message that his works contains.

(2) Let me start with some remarks about certain general characteristics of Weber's social theory. Two features above all others perhaps strike a reader of Weber:
a) The universal scope of his work, combined with his ability to understand and to respect the integrity -- the relative structural autonomy -- of the different fields of knowledge of which he made use. A ransacking of history as if it were one gigantic museum that had been set up to satisfy his curiosity. There is in Weber's work a precarious union of the universal and the particular, systematic social theory and historiography, a union that has been disrupted in later social thought. We have witnessed the tendency of social theory to be impoverished by its degeneration into unhistorical taxonomies, on the one hand, and naive empiricism, on the other.

b) The posture of tragic modernism. Weber prides himself on assuming the position of one who has seen through all the veils of illusion. He rejected both the beliefs that sought to legitimize the established order and the doctrines that proposed to show how modern men might overcome the dilemmas of their present condition. He regarded these dilemmas as, for the most part, insoluble.

(2) The moral forces that underlie these two general aspects of Weber's work:

a) The union of the universal and the particular in Weber is based upon a characteristic delight in the unique features of each historical situation, group, or individual. One senses that each of them has its own weight of being and its own independent worth in Weber just as each of the
persons whom Dante deposits on the road from Hell to Paradise has the grace and the dignity of individual selfhood. Yet this sentiment of the separateness of things and persons has lost in Weber's work its original social and theological roots without acquiring an alternative foundation. Its social basis was the aristocratic ethos that values people and objects for what they are rather than for what they produce or do. Its theological support was the notion that everything that exists has a place within the divine plan and proclaims the glory of God.

b) The posture of critical disenchantment is founded upon a sense of the ultimate arbitrariness of all normative commitments. Weber wants to conquer objective truth by voluntarily surrendering the consolations of views that treated history, in a more or less disguised manner, as a sequence of objective tendencies pointing toward greater human perfection.

(3) Thus far, I have spoken mainly negatively. What were the affirmative ambitions of Weber's program for social theory?

a) To construct a framework for the universal comparative and historical study of societies. A set of categories that would help elucidate the particularities of the modern West, but would also be so neutral and general that they could be applied to other societies as well. (Weber recognized that the choice of topics would be influenced by a normative standpoint: in his case, the destiny of freedom in the West.)
b) To formulate a social theory that would be independent of the traditional controversies of philosophy. Such a theory would be as neutral among metaphysical beliefs as it would be among normative attachments.

c) To recognize freedom and contingency in history by repudiating all forms of determinism and schematic evolutionism.

(4) We can begin to test the extent to which Weber achieved these objectives by looking at three of his sets of basic concepts -- those having to do with:

a) the types of social action;

b) the types of domination;

c) the nature of bureaucracy.

These are among the most central categories in Weber's entire theoretical system.

III. The theory of social action

(1) Social theory deals with social action. The concept of social action: all action meaningfully oriented to others. Elements:

a) Action must be interaction;

b) Action must be mediated through consciousness.

(2) The types of social action:

a) Instrumentally rational: the means-ends schema of conduct. Features of the situation approached as conditions or means to the actor's own (arbitrarily) chosen ends.

b) Value-rational: "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some form of behavior."
c) Affectual: "determined by the actor's affects."

d) Traditional: "determined by ingrained habituation."

Two problems with this scheme.

(3) First look at the last two categories: the affectual and the traditional. As Weber himself points out, they tend to fall beneath the threshold of social action to the extent that they are reflexive and unmediated by consciousness. On the other hand, insofar as they are conscious, they tend to merge into value rationality.

(4) Next, consider the relationship between instrumental and value rationality. Presumably, they are complementary. Instrumental rationality depends upon value rationality:

a) Most obviously, for there to be a choice among the ends to which the calculus of means is directed. But suppose we simply regard this choice as arbitrary.

b) There would still be need of value rationality to determine what does and what does not count as a permissible means to the achievement of our ends as social actors.

(5) But, though instrumental rationality requires value rationality in order to operate as a mode of human interaction, we lack any coherent conception of what value rationality is, and Weber certainly did not provide us with one.

a) The experience of the arbitrariness or conventionality of all hierarchies and moral beliefs.

b) Values become abstract ideals. From this derives the force of the technocratic mode of thought: the ceaseless attempt to suppress the need for value rationality and to reduce all thought to instrumental rationality. An effort doomed to fail.
(6) We see that in Weber's typology of social action instrumental rationality occupies a privileged place. All other forms of rationality tend to collapse into instrumental rationality. Yet the very coherence of instrumental rationality requires the existence of another mode of rationality beyond it. In this sense, Weber's theory of types of social action is an unwitting testimonial to the predicament of modern thought and politics. It is not simply a view of that predicament; it is trapped within it.

IV. The theory of domination

(1) Weber concerned with different ways of organizing power and with their relationship to different kinds of legitimation. There is a clear connection between the types of domination and the types of social action.

(2) The classification:

a) Charismatic domination corresponds to affectual action. Power based upon confidence in the special qualities of individual leaders.

b) Traditional domination corresponds to traditional action.

c) But to what does Weber's third type -- rational, bureaucratic, or legal domination correspond? It is characterized by a devotion to formal rules, which differs from both value and instrumental rationality. Operates against the background constituted by the necessary but impossible synthesis of instrumental and value rationality.

(3) Each type of domination has a characteristic dialectic:

a) Traditional domination: the ruler is bound by custom but
custom sanctions his use of arbitrary power.

b) Charismatic domination: legitimacy sustained by belief in the extraordinary powers of rulers, but there is a constant demand for the reassertion of these powers.

c) Legal domination: commitment to formal legality conflicts with the desire to achieve specific political results or to do equity in particular cases.

d) In modern capitalist society, traditional domination survives in a large number of forms; charismatic domination erupts as plebiscitarian leadership; but, on the whole, legal domination prevails.

(4) Thus, the basic model is one of occasional though perhaps violent deviations from a formal rationality of rule following.

V. The theory of bureaucracy

(a) Bureaucracy is the main institutional expression of legal domination. Characterizes both private and public organizations. Elements:

   a) Separation of office and incumbent: the means of administration no longer belong to the incumbent.

   b) Hierarchical allocation of roles.

   c) Under general rules.

(2) I shall discuss and criticize Weber's conception of bureaucracy by contrasting it with an opposing tradition of thought about the bureaucratic mode of organization. I shall call these, respectively, the formalist and the antiformalist theories.
(3) The formalist view represented by Weber. The essence of bureaucracy is organization by rules.

a) This type of organization has particular historical bases. Thus, in the history of public administration, the desire of the prince to supervise his staff under rules and the desire of the staff to use rules to protect itself against both the prince and its own clientele.

b) More generally, it is an antidote to the fear of direct personal subjection to other people's wills. Without destroying the structures of class society, the commitment to rules sets up a shield between the powerholders and those subject to them.

c) One could extend the argument by saying that bureaucratic organization represents a compromise between the ideals of security and merit. It takes people partially out of the fixed social hierarchy of estates and classes. Yet it also tempers the ruthless personal competition of market society by giving people places and tasks, with settled criteria of promotion.

(4) Criticism of this formalist view of bureaucracy. The system of bureaucratic rules does not in fact succeed in making power impersonal:

a) Application of rules shaped by choices among competing purposes and values;

b) The incumbents are drawn from civil society; they do not lose their particular class interests.
c) Personal domination inherent in the meritocratic allocation of roles itself.

(5) The informalist view of bureaucracy: formalism and centralization result from the pathology of management. Produced by a vicious circle rather than an inherent characteristic of organization. When there is a rigid definition of tasks this results in a lack of communication among groups in an organization. Each group attempts to improve its own position; the effort to control them from above leads to more centralization and formalism. What is needed instead is the establishment of common loyalties and understandings.

(6) Criticism of the antiformalist view. It trivializes the problem that leads to a constant resurgence of bureaucratic modes of organization. In contemporary class societies, non-rule bound relationships are experienced as relationships of personal dependence or domination from which one must try to escape in order to try to secure the good of autonomy.

(7) If we put together these criticisms of the formalist and the antiformalist view, we arrive at the following conception: the bureaucratic mode of organization is characterized by the juxtaposition of a desperate striving to control personal domination by impersonal rules and by the inability to overcome the experience of personal domination and dependence. Both the striving and the experience are integral elements of the bureaucratic type as we know it.

The key to a transformation of this system would have to lie in a simultaneous transformation of the power structures of class
societies and the kind of normative disbelief that accompanies those structures.

(8) Weber, however, sees no such transformative logic inherent in the situation. For him, the only escapes from bureaucracy are:
   a) personal emotion in private life;
   b) and political struggle and leadership in plebiscitarian democracy.

VI. Conclusion: the delusions of detachment

(1) The aspects of Weber's thought that I have mentioned share certain striking similarities.
   a) Instrumental rationality in social action contrasts with value rationality as a residual category.
   b) Formalism in law, with equity as an aside.
   c) Bureaucracy in politics, with charisma as an escape.

In all these instances, Weber pictures the triumph of a mode of rationality that is morally empty and from which there is deliverance only through something that is experienced as unexplainable in origin and unintelligible in content.

How does this result measure up to Weber's initial project of formulating a theory that applies across societies, that is neutral with respect to metaphysical premises, and that vindicates the contingency and open-endedness of history?

(2) Even the most abstract problems of the general theory of social action reflect the beliefs prevalent in the advanced capitalist societies, and, indirectly, the forms of social organization with which
those beliefs have been historically associated. The alternation between a hollow rationalism and an irrational flight from it is, alongside the oscillation between monism and dualism, another way of characterizing the central situation of modern culture. If there is a sense to the now unfashionable idea of modernity, it lies in the conception that these forms of belief and organization cut across traditional distinctions among different kinds of capitalism and socialism.

(3) Moreover, Weber remains wedded to a set of philosophical premises characteristic of the dominant traditions of modern Western philosophy. He sees the realm of values, of equity, and of charisma as both gratuitous in its source and irrational in its content. He is caught within a system of ideas that identifies the rational with the abstract universal and the amoral, and the irrational with the concrete particular and the moral.

(4) Finally, Weber's view was to be a celebration of human freedom. He wants to reject the idea of objective tendencies in history, though in the end he does not really succeed in doing so (e.g. his notion of a relatively irreversible process of bureaucratization). He takes the position of the totally disillusioned modern intellectual. But the curious result is the condemnation of history to unintelligible chance. Man is the prisoner of unseen gods -- the different values to which he commits himself without understanding why he does so or ought to do so and the forces of reason and passion that throw him back and forth as if he were their plaything. This is just as significant a denial of freedom as any theory of
universal evolution or of the ultimate moral authority of existing or emerging forms of social life.

(5) A lesson to be learned. Weber chose one of two different versions of what it means to be a person without illusions. He saw objectivity as a process of stripping away presuppositions until one is left with only those normative assumptions that are unavoidable though gratuitous because they control what one chooses to study. He gave his allegiance to a tradition that defines freedom as the denial of attachments -- in thought as well as in politics. The ultimate ideal is that of the mind transcending the world in the position of an unshakeable contemplative god.

But there is another view of the dynamics of liberation. According to this alternative view, one is propelled beyond a set of premises by a transformative vision -- a sense of secret flaws and hidden possibilities of improvement. One is drawn to this second view whenever one sees, as one must in Weber's work, freedom by detachment turning in against itself. Autonomy through disengagement is a mirage that has always dissolved and will dissolve always into the reality of involuntary, indeed unconscious, servitude.
Weber's account of religion and politics

I. Review

(1) Introduction to Weber's social theory. The problem of rationalization.

(2) Some general characteristics of his work:
   a) the desire to unite systematic social theory and historiography;
   b) the posture of critical disenchantment.

(3) The theory of social action: instrumental rationality depends on value rationality, yet it is hard to understand how value rationality operates. It is a residuum.

(4) The theory of domination. Advanced capitalist societies characterized by legal or bureaucratic domination. Would be even truer of socialism. Traditionalism may be pervasive, yet unstable because it has lost its legitimizing support. No longer touches the centers of power. Charismatic domination erupts as an occasional escape.

(5) The theory of bureaucracy. Weber stands at the center of a tradition that defines the task of bureaucracy as that of rendering power impersonal. Opposed to a tradition that sees bureaucracy as a pathological substitute for informal organization. An alternative view: the kind of institutional organization that prevails when an attempt is made to reconcile the hierarchies of class society with the desire to render those hierarchies as impersonal as possible.
because they are no longer experienced as legitimate. For Weber
the only alternative to bureaucratization is charisma in personal
and public life.

(6) Structural analogy:
   a) Instrumental rationality and value rationality.
   b) Legality and equity.
   c) Bureaucracy and charisma.

(7) Peculiarly descriptive of the predicament of modern culture and,
indirectly, of modern society. Not a universal framework.

(8) Dependent on a quite specific philosophical position: one that
identifies the rational with the abstract universal and the amoral;
the irrational, with the concrete particular and the moral.

(9) Not a true vindication of freedom. A view of freedom as the
possibility of an arbitrary commitment to values. Personality affirms
itself through such commitment.
   a) No reasons for choice; only causes. Tendency to reduce
      all analysis to causal explanation.
   b) View that there are forces operating in history -- toward
      bureaucratization and then toward the occasional disruption
      of bureaucracy by charisma. These forces seize upon the
      individual. Another version of my thesis that we subvert
      the conception of freedom by denying either the existence
      or the incompleteness of moral order.
II. Introduction

(1) My general concern today is to deepen the study of rationalization and disenchantment in Weber by studying the religious roots and the political implications of this process.

(2) My argument will proceed in the following three steps:
   a) Weber's account of the religious background of capitalism. I shall deal with this account in the context of Weber's more general typology of religions.
   b) Weber's treatment of the theory of modern politics: his conception of bureaucracy as a fate, charismatic leadership as a relief, and socialism as a delusion.
   c) In the last part of my remarks, I shall criticize Weber's use of the idea of rationalization by focusing on the way he uses that idea in his polemic against socialism.

III. Religion and capitalism

(1) Why religion was so important to Weber. He was centrally concerned with the relationship between the meanings men confer on their existence and the ways in which they organize their lives.

   Two parts of Weber's discussion of religion:
   a) His analysis of the Protestant ethic and its relationship to capitalism;
   b) His broader work in the sociology of religion.


   a) The core idea: A counterintuitive hypothesis. Weber
suggests the existence of an elective affinity between certain aspects of Protestant belief and the ethos of early capitalism. For this purpose, he singles out Calvinism. The crucial theological elements: (1) the universe has meaning only in relation to God's purposes; (2) God's purposes are unintelligible to man; (3) predestination. Relentless, self-denying action in the world as device with which to silence doubts about whether one is among the elect and even as an external sign of election. What seems to be a violently antimaterialist view issues in a commitment to relentless economic activity. The ethic that underlay early capitalism was one of self-denial rather than of complacent hedonism.

b) In his later work, Weber elaborated this thesis by adding another idea. Non-capitalist societies are characterized by a radical distinction between the treatment dispensed to insiders and strangers. There is predatory hostility toward the latter and fraternal solidarity toward the former. Under capitalism these standards are equalized in a universal ethic of impersonal respect that overrides distinctions of persons.

c) Weber insists that the relationship between Calvinist belief and capitalist entrepreneurship is simply one of elective affinity. There is no direct, univocal connection between religious beliefs and economic orientations.
Nevertheless, all behavioral orientations are mediated through systems of belief and symbolism.

d) Weber made clear that he did not intend his argument to be understood as an antimarxist tract about the superior importance of "ideal" factors in history.

(3) Weber's essays on the sociology of religion. All religion must come to terms with the general discrepancy between the ideal and actuality and, more specifically, with the questions of why the just suffer and the wicked prosper. (This latter is the problem of theodicy.)

a) The first point is the basis for Weber's typology of religions. Distinction between mysticism and asceticism depending on whether the believer proposes to achieve salvation through adjustment and assimilation (the path of quiescence) or through mastery and self-denial (the path of action). Distinction between the other worldly and innerworldly orientations depending on whether the believer seeks salvation by withdrawing from the world or by situating himself within it.

b) What is unique to the modern West is innerworldly asceticism. The Protestant ethic as an example of this orientation.

c) The problem of theodicy. The three basic solutions: individual redemption, the transmigration of souls, and cosmic dualism. The doctrines of theodicy may have an important relation to social organizations; thus, the
connection between the karma idea and the Indian caste system.

(4) A first major implication of Weber's discussion of religion for a more general understanding has to do with the notion of rationality. Weber never gives a comprehensive definition of rationality, of what is generic to his many specific uses of the term.

a) He usually organizes his references to rationality around the core concerns of totality and calculability. Rationalization means an increasing insistence on clarifying the relations of all the elements of a social or intellectual system—and on simplifying the relations so that they can become clearer. It also implies an effort to analyze and order the elements so that the consequences of one's manipulation of the elements can be understood beforehand.

b) But Weber's theory of religion suggests a further, and indeed a crucial, refinement in the conception of rationality: rationality as abstraction. Rationalization would mean the effort to order the world and one's actions in it according to abstract projects. This is what distinguishes the religious ethic of innerworldly asceticism at the point at which it touches most directly upon the economic order: on the one hand, the view that the world is profane and subject to unlimited manipulation; on the other hand, the desire to make the world responsive to one's own plans—conceived in terms of abstract desires
and ideals. Moreover, these ideals and desires are denied any natural or self-sustaining legitimacy. This comes close to the core of modernism as an experience.

(5) Another major implication of Weber's treatment of religion is implicit in the uses to which he puts his general typology.

a) Weber treats this typology as simply a scheme of classification designed to serve the purpose of helping elucidate the bearing of religion on economic organization. He combines this with the notion that one of these forms of spirituality--innerworldly asceticism--has a privileged relationship to the irreversible process of rationalization and bureaucratization. (Weber recognizes that once the process starts it can keep going of its own momentum and dispense with explicit theological foundations.)

b) Another view would insist that the different poles of the religious consciousness represent continuing human needs. A suppressed pole will tend to reassert itself later. One could make use of Weber's sociology of religion, as of Durkheim's work on suicide, to foster the purposes of a philosophical anthropology.

c) An especially important application of this notion. The history of our own culture has witnessed a change in the approved forms of spirituality. Alongside, and perhaps above "innerworldly asceticism," there is an egalitarian hedonism. This mode of moral judgment may be seen as a secularized, indeed a bastardized form of "innerworldly
mysticism." It is the manifestation in actual moral experience of what appears in philosophy as a passage from dualism to a materialist monism. The question that remains: Under what conditions of thought and social organization can we do justice to the conflicting designs of the moral and political imagination?

IV. Politics and rationalization

(1) Weber claims that the process of rationalization can and does go on even after having lost touch with its early religious stimulus. The characteristic form of rationalization in politics is the triumph of bureaucratic organization. Weber repeatedly asks himself whether there is some partial escape from the fate of bureaucratization.

(2) The modern form of domination is the bureaucratic state. I have already discussed the most general features of bureaucratic organization according to Weber. I shall now develop further my analysis of Weber's theory of politics by contrasting his approach to Marx's. The crucial differences lie not in the importance given to ideal factors, but rather in three other areas.

(3) First major difference: the priority of the development of the state apparatus over the economic events leading to the emergence of capitalism. Weber gives more of a role than Marx to the specifically political aspects of the development of the modern European state. The bureaucratic state is a prerequisite of capitalism; sets up the necessary framework of economic activity. Not itself determinately shaped by economic factors.
(4) Second major difference. The greater role given to status groups as distinguished from classes. A status group—an occupational group characterized both by its place in the division of labor and by the peculiar nature of the prestige attached to it by society, e.g. lawyers and priests.

(5) Third major difference. The importance of problems of legitimation. In his general theorizing, Weber assigned a major role to the devices by which different kinds of power are justified or criticized. He suggests that failures of legitimation are one of the chief sources of historical changes.

(6) These theoretical concerns are much less pronounced in some of Weber's more concrete writings on politics. I recently had the sobering experience of reading the analysis of the disintegration of Russian absolutism that Weber elaborated in the form of three articles published in his journal, the Archives for Social Science and Social Policy. The first of these was written after the 1905 revolution; the second after the February revolution; the third after the October revolution. A marvelously lucid account of the development of a concrete situation of political conflict. I then went back and compared this to the Marx essay on the 18th Brumaire. My uneasy feeling: in both cases the general theoretical ideas provided only modest guidance for the analysis. Very little interference of the presuppositions in the conduct of the argument. Moreover, it is hard to identify and clear theoretical differences between Marx's treatment of French absolutism and Weber's discussion of Russian absolutism. I awoke in the middle of the night preoccupied
with the following association of ideas. Marx and Weber were violently political men--locked out from politics by different circumstances. How else could they deal with the enormous boredom of powerlessness if not by inventing theories and writing lots of books about the politics they could not perform? In their theoretical writings, they rode their hobby horses to death. But they weren't crazy; they just pretended to be crazy. When it came to analyzing a real conflict among real people in the real world, they were just as smart as everyone else. Therefore, this body of social theory that the university is paying me to teach you is largely a hoax.

These were my pre-dawn thoughts. My waking self recognizes that there is a small but distinct element of truth in them. The theoretical ideas influence the concrete analysis, but do not determine its structure. A sign of the fact that union of social theory and historiography remains unaccomplished.

Looking more closely one sees an oblique influence of the theoretical ideas on the analysis of Russian absolutism:

a) The role of religion in strengthening the state;
b) The fact that the Russian bourgeoisie had no experience of power before it had to begin defending itself against an emergent industrial proletariat;
c) Industrial development occurred in Russia already in the form of a highly concentrated capitalism. It was early capitalism that was associated with an ethic of individualism.
(7) If one focuses on the overall thrust of Weber's analysis of modern politics, there is an emphasis on the existence of an almost irreversible trend toward bureaucratization in modern European society. This belief in the irreversibility of the trend toward bureaucracy was manifested in two basic aspects of Weber's thinking about politics:

a) His conception that modern democracy must choose between charismatic leadership and surrender to rule by bureaucrats and routine politicians.

b) His critique of socialism.

I shall make a few points about each these and then conclude by suggesting how Weber's treatment of socialism throws light on the limitations of his thought.

(8) Leadership or plebiscitarian democracy. The ordinary person has the alternative of acquiescing in the routines of bureaucratic life or responding to charismatic leadership. The true leader keeps the experts and bureaucrats in line by opposing their tendency to define matters of political choice as if they were susceptible to technical or scientific decision.

Note the conversation between Ludendorf and Weber recounted in Marianne Weber's biography.

(9) The critique of socialism was just the reverse side of this attack. Socialism would itself have to possess the same bureaucratic features as advanced capitalism; indeed it would possess them in a still more pronounced degree.
a) Weber believed that the basic factor was the control of entrepreneurial positions rather than traditional ownership. Transfer of property would not in and of itself change the hierarchy of bureaucratic control.

b) The "iron law of democracy." A commitment to impersonal rules and centralized administration was a requirement of democracy. A way of avoiding the assertion of factional privilege. But the need for administrative centralism and legal formalism inevitably leads to the formation of antidemocratic elites. This tension will be even stronger under socialism because of the growth in the scope of public administration.

c) The objective needs of efficiency identified with the process of bureaucratization.

(10) Criticism of Weber's treatment of socialism:

a) Control of entrepreneurial positions is, in fact, crucial. The problem of the distribution of wealth is an aspect of a broader problem of distribution of power. But it does not follow that there is a single form of distribution of power mandated by either the objective requirements of efficiency or the need to render power impersonal.

b) The "iron law of democracy": the need to surround personal dependence with rules arises to the extent that relationships of interdependence are asymmetrical or hierarchical and that these hierarchies are not capable of persuasive justification. Weber takes as given the basic structure
of power in society and the inability of the advanced societies to develop any kind of power to which a stable legitimacy attaches.

c) The idea of efficiency. We cannot determine a priori the extent to which an interest in material production is consistent with a change in the forms of organization. Weber reifies capitalist instrumental rationality. Despite his desire to vindicate freedom, he tends to treat what has been politically chosen as if it were technically required.

(11) Once you accept such a vision, the reversal of bureaucratic tendencies depends on extraordinary, contingent events:

a) charismatic leadership;

b) personal emotion.

(12) Conclusion: There is lurking here another version of an element that is also present in the thought of Durkheim and Marx: an automatism of history that escapes human foresight and control. The practice of social theory was from the start designed to reinforce the perception of human freedom in history by emphasizing the contingency of all forms of social life. What is the mysterious force that repeatedly draws social theory, despite the intentions of its practitioners, to the idea of almost irresistible historical forces? It is as if some invisible flaw in the genetic constitution of social theory were being handed down from generation to generation, vitiating the efforts of each succeeding group of thinkers. But no one knows the cause and no one has the cure.
Weber's methodological program and his normative vision

I. Review

(1) The theme of rationalization in the theories of religion and politics.

(2) Points emphasized in the discussion of religion:
   a) Rationality as devotion to abstract projects.
   b) Religious history, indeed the spiritual history of our own society, casts doubt on the notion of an irreversible process of rationalization. Capitalism was encouraged in its origins by innerworldly ascetism and then survived these origins. But perhaps the reassertion of other forms of spirituality represented by other poles of the religious consciousness, though conditioned by capitalism, will also contribute to a change in the nature of capitalism. This is exactly what one might be led to believe by Weber's general sociology of religion.

(3) Points emphasized in my discussion of Weber's theory of politics.
   a) Differences of emphasis from Marx.
   b) The discrepancy between the abstract and the concrete levels.
   c) The idea of an irreversible process of bureaucratization directly connected with both the idea of charismatic leadership as a partial alternative to bureaucratic routines and with the critique of socialism.
d) The critique of socialism as a good example of the strength and weakness of Weber's political thought:

1) Strength: perception of the centrality of power; transfer of property cannot in and of itself reverse the process of bureaucratization. May, on the contrary, accelerate it.

2) Weakness: tendency to see the present structures of society as dictated by the objective requirements of economic efficiency and democratic political organization.

II. Introduction

(1) Today I conclude my discussion of Weber by dealing with two themes:
   a) Weber's ideas about the method of social study;
   b) His moral and political vision.

(2) It may seem paradoxical to speak of the normative vision of a thinker who professed to draw a clear distinction between social study and political choice. Nevertheless, the specific way in which Weber seeks to distinguish the provinces of understanding and evaluation contains within itself the elements of a political and moral position. Weber prided himself on recognizing this.

III. Weber's methodological ideas

(1) Weber's view of the dangers and opportunities of methodological speculation. Very sceptical: "In order to walk, it is not necessary to know the anatomy of one's legs." Practice tends to be more
subtle than any methodological program; methodological guidelines are indeterminate where help is most needed. Methodological controversy in Germany had produced a cloud of speculation that Weber analogized to the plague of the frogs. Aaron used his rod to produce a plague of frogs. The magicians of the Pharaoh then brought about another frog plague in order to demonstrate the power of their own arts. There was a universal obsession with frogs. Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which methodological clarification becomes necessary: when basic doubts arise about the purpose of a theoretical enterprise or when a given field is invaded by people who claim to impose constraints on its practitioners in the name of philosophical or pseudo-philosophical ideas. Weber believed that both these conditions had come to prevail in social study.

(2) Plan of my discussion of Weber's methodology:

a) Its tasks, defined by the major traditions it sought to react against or reconcile.

b) Some of its stages or features.

c) A general remark about its purpose and limits.

The background of Weber's methodology

(1) Controversy about the possibility of social science and its relation to natural science. One extreme position (irrationalism) denied the possibility of a social science; another view (positivism) reduced social science to natural science. Like Durkheim, Weber believed both in the possibility and in the autonomy of social science. He was an antireductionist.
(2) Weber's critique of irrationalism. Irrationalism took two forms.

   a) Indeterminism: There can be no social science because human conduct is undetermined (postulate of free will). For Weber, it is a postulate of understanding that social affairs are as determined as natural events, even if one of the determinants is conscious choice.

   b) Intuitionism: The knowledge of social facts is an intuitive knowledge of particular events. For Weber, on the contrary, all knowledge must make use of generalizing categories.

(3) Weber's critique of positivism.

   a) Abstract generalization is insufficient in social study. Not for ontological or epistemological reasons as such but because of the character of what is most important to us in social reality.

   b) Human conduct is self-reflective. We are interested in understanding the historical world as we experience it—that is to say, as a world in which we carry out projects that sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. Our study of society is properly motivated by a concern with the relation between the meanings people impart to their activities and what ends up happening to them. The difficulty of social thought derives largely from the fact that these two things are neither the same nor wholly different.
c) As a result of this concern with meaning, the relationship of generals to particulars and the character of causal explanation change. We cannot rest content with abstract generalities but seek categories that reproduce as much as possible of the immediate particulars of historical experience. Causal explanation takes the form of asking to what extent the course of events paralleled the projects of the historical actors or deviated from them.

(4) a) Controversy about the relative importance of ideal and material factors in history. Weber rejected both the idealist and the materialist emphasis.

b) His view: ideas are shaped by interests, but interests cannot be defined independently of understandings and ideals.

c) Such a methodological preference is associated with the decision to put the problem of power and of the legitimation of power at the center of analysis. Power is an asymmetrical relation among individuals and groups. It manifests itself in external behavior and in differential degrees of control over material objects. But it is also a profoundly spiritualized phenomenon, made possible by beliefs and values.

(5) a) Controversy over the relation between individuals and groups as the ultimate subjects of history. A collectivist
tradition had asserted the priority of the group over the individual, looking for the "spirit" of a society, an institution, or a class. Another individualist tradition had built social theory upon an analysis of the structure of individual choice.

b) Weber was a methodological individualist in the sense that he believed that all values and perceptions become historically important insofar as they are held by individuals. These individuals are the ultimate historical subjects.

c) Yet he also maintained that the significance of these values and perceptions cannot be determined by an isolated consideration of individual psychology. To understand them one must grasp their social function and historical fate. The evolution of culture is unintelligible apart from an understanding of the history of forms of group life and of power relations within and among groups.

(6) Thus, Weber strove to overcome the dualisms into which Western social thought had wandered. His ambition was to construct a historically oriented social theory. But this would require a unification of the Western sensibility.

The stages of Weber's method

(1) I shall distinguish three features or stages of Weber's method.

(2) First stage: the attribution of meaning.
a) One employs a method of understanding or comprehension. The social theorist seeks to determine the meanings ascribed by social actors or individuals to their conduct. Example: the Protestant ethic as a reconstruction of the meaning of capitalist entrepreneurial activity.

b) But the way one penetrates into the historical world is also shaped by the observer's value position. Weber really has in mind the observer's intentions and concerns.

c) There is a tension between meaning as attributed by the agent and meaning as projected by the observer, interested in generalization and comparison.

d) Weber does not deal at length with the tension. At times, he suggests a technique of attributing standard hypothetical intentions, e.g. instrumental rationality as ascribed to economic actors.

(3) Second stage: the typification of meanings.

a) The meanings cluster together into complexes of meaning whose principle of organization is neither logical nor strictly causal. Example: the relationship among the elements of the Protestant ethic.

b) The cluster of meanings in the hand of the social theorist may form an ideal type. In the narrow sense, an ideal type is a simplifying picture of a unique historical phenomenon, like the Protestant ethic, not a category of comparison and generalization, like bureaucracy or patrimonialism.
It is shaped both by the experience of the observed and by the interests of the observer. Like a beam of light illuminating aspects of the phenomena that are viewed as especially interesting and representative from the standpoint of the observer's own concerns.

The effort to compromise between the demands of generality and particularity. A kind of generalization that would be suggestive rather than destructive of the particularity of historical events. Cannot achieve the perfection of art in the representation of the general through the particular.

c) Two complementary aspects of the unity of complexes of meaning:

1) The existence of some elements makes the presence of others more probable. But why? Not a direct causal agency. The striving of people to impose coherent meaningful order upon their lives.

2) This suggests a second aspect. The different elements of the complex constitute interpretations of each other. Each element extends the others by analogy. Different interpretations are possible but some are better than others.

(4) Third stage: Causal explanation. Social study requires causal explanation as well as the attribution and typification of meanings.

a) The causal nexus takes on a special character. We understand it from within by comparing what historical actors
thought they were accomplishing with what they actually accomplished.

b) The method of objective possibility suggested by the historian Eduard Meyer. We refine our understanding of the causal significance of an event by trying to reconstruct what might have happened had it not occurred.

c) One problem: What is the relation between causal explanation and meaningful interpretation for Weber? Another example of the tension we discovered in Durkheim between social science as an explanation of facts and as an interpretation of symbols.

d) A second problem: the paradox of causality to which I have already referred: Precise causal relations presuppose abstracting certain relationships from the totality of social life. This is what Weber suggested in his theoretical works. On the other hand, in his concrete political writings, he developed an informal analysis of a political situation as a whole (e.g. the writing on Russia). The cost is the blurring of precise distinctions of cause and effect through the emphasis on circular causation. Thus, the discrepancy between the abstract and the concrete levels of Weber's work manifests itself in two different approaches to the problem of causality.
One wonders whether it wouldn't have been wiser to cling to the totalistic approach and then attempt to clarify it as much as possible.

General remark

(1) The problems of Weber's methodology are those of contemporary social science itself.

(2) The basic difficulties:
   a) the tension between the perspective of the observed and of the observer as a basis for meaningful interpretation;
   b) the nature of meaningful cohesion beyond pure logic or causality and the relationship of the interpretation of meanings to causal explanation;
   c) the conflict between the demands of precision and completeness in causal explanation itself.

(3) I suggest to you, though I shall not develop the idea now, that all these problems are connected with a conflict between a view of history as pure contingency—a sequence of forms of culture and society each an island unto itself—and a view of history as the development of a more universal community of understandings and values. The latter conception suggests the sense in which one can reconcile the perspective of the observer and of the observed; of the external standpoint of causal explanation and the internal standpoint of meaningful interpretation. But can one justify such a view and reconcile it with the experienced open-endedness of history?
(4) The virtue of the implicit philosophy of history of Weber's methodological theory and practice is to insist on the way that history repeatedly jumbles things up and constantly creates new possibilities of action and new configurations of meaning.

IV. Weber's tragic liberalism

(1) The heart of the message. Normative commitments are ultimately groundless. The role of reason is clarification and chastening rather than ultimate choice. It teaches us that certain ends exclude each other or imply means that we may be unwilling to accept. This helps us reform our moral and political ideas but there is still the need to choose among conflicting ultimate values. Gratuitous choice exists not only in decisions about how to make abstract values concrete but in the selection of the values themselves.

A restatement of the central conviction of modern moral and political philosophy. Very close the the image of life presented to us by many of the major modernist novelists and poets.

(2) How I shall discuss this view.
   a) Its significance in the context of Weber's own personal orientation and historical context.
   b) Its relation to some other parts of his social theory.
   c) The interpretation that has been given to it. Criticism of the position.

The context

(3) Weber's struggle against the tendency in German historical
economics to clothe an effort to legitimate established power in the trappings of science.

(4) The biographical setting.

a) Weber's defiant declaration that he was a member of the bourgeois class, brought up in its beliefs and ideals.

b) Nevertheless, his whole outlook and conduct was profoundly patrician. Early bourgeois ameliorist optimism gives way to a deep agnosticism about values and a sense of the insolubility of the dilemmas of modern life. One solution—to take refuge in unthinking routine and hedonism. Such are the people whom Weber described as specialists without spirit and libertines without heart. The alternative for Weber: a life of struggle without delusion. The objective: to take the situation of crisis in normative judgment as the occasion for the resurgence of a heroic ethic. One commits oneself heroically to some of these ultimate values embodied in particular forms of social life, without any final certain about the basis of those values, and, then, one struggles ceaselessly in their behalf until death. The implicit theology of this view is a kind of secularized polytheism in which the war of the gods is changed into the conflict of the ultimate values. The effort to sublimate the experience of moral and political despair into a crypto-polytheistic heroism is a staple not only of Weber but
of much modern culture. It stands in an opposing but complementary relation to the more common acceptance of routinization and hedonism.

c) This throws light on some of the most frequently observed characteristics of Weber's conduct: his fierce independence from overweening power and collective prejudice and his gallant insistence on being first in the defense of his intellectual and political enemies whenever he stood in a position to protect their interests or to champion their honor.

The relationship to other doctrines of Weber's

(5) To his conception of the irreversibility of bureaucratization and disenchantment. No alternative to an empty form of rationality other than a flight into irrationality.

(6) To his nationalism. The different nation states embody conflicting cultures, which are in turn the embodiments of different values. The war of ultimate ends makes the war of nations inevitable.

(7) To his conception of charismatic leadership. Personality expresses and ennobles itself by a commitment to ultimate values. Most people cannot rise to the intellectual and moral level required for a totally gratuitous commitment to ultimate values. The charismatic figure—whether a political leader or a religious prophet—is the vessel of the ultimate values and the mediator between them and the rest of mankind. By following him they too participate in this commitment.
Criticism of the Implications of Weber's View

(1) Two forms of spirituality available to the elites in advanced capitalist and bureaucratic socialist societies.
   a) A shallow ameliorative liberalism or paternalism.
   b) A conception of the ultimate unity and tragedy of different forms of modern life. The ideology of the super-intellectuals. The extraordinary authority of this view is suggested by the extent of its influence upon modern literature and modern art.

(2) The ahistorical character of this position. Identification of problems of all ages. Even if such a view claims to be politically neutral, it is drawn toward an implicit conservatism, and, even if it is devoted to an ideal of heroic striving, it ends up as a kind of fatalism.

(3) The secret elitism of the doctrine. It says in effect that there is no satisfactory answer to the problem of legitimacy. But for society to go on, ordinary people must believe that there is a solution. The perception of the true state of affairs will, in the natural course of things, be restricted to a spiritual elite who can bear the truth.

(4) One might say that even if the consequences of the view are distasteful, it may still be true. The yearning for a knowledge without delusions and therefore a criticism without presuppositions. But the anxiousness to depend upon nothing does not truly lead one
into intellectual autonomy. Instead, it dulls one's sense of the contingency of existing society and suppresses the effort to discover through theory and practice the logic of its transformation.

Heroism without hope may be noble, but it is also blind. The same movement in the history of our cultures that frees us from illusion also seems to deny us that deeper understanding of what things are that depends upon a vision of what they might become.
The unity and limits of classical social theory

I. Review

(1) In the last class, I discussed Weber's methodological ideas and his normative program.

(2) Discussion of Weber's ideas about method:
   a) Reaction to the dilemmas of social theory. Opposed both irrationalism and positivism, idealism and materialism, abstract individualism and collectivism.
   b) A method concerned with the attribution of meanings, the typification of meanings, and causal explanation.
   c) The problems generated by each of these themes insoluble if history is viewed as a constellation or a sequence of societies and cultures with nothing in common.

(3) Discussion of Weber's normative vision:
   a) The clarifying and chastening role of reason: the arbitrariness of choices among ultimate values.
   b) The implicit theology of heroic polytheism.
   c) The connection with the themes of bureaucratic rationalization, national rivalry, and charismatic leadership.
   d) The ahistorical and elitist character of this view. Tragic modernism as an ideology of decadence.
II. Introduction

(1) The nature of my argument: criticism of these three theorists. A set of interlocking problems. A perspective implicit in my criticism. Effort to bring this perspective to light.

(2) Review of my initial presentation of the predicament of social theory.
   a) Classical social theory and Christianity. The ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence: accepted but given a secular interpretation.
   b) Classical social theory and ancient political philosophy. Superficial rejection of the fact-value continuum and the human nature idea. Attempt to escape the implications of this rejection. Unavailability of an adequate philosophical framework.
   c) Classical social theory and Enlightenment criticism. The problem of reconciling subjectivity and integration in nature and society. Interest in relating this to the problem of power in order to determine the extent to which the conflict might be resolved.

(3) The theme today: deepen an understanding of the unity of this tradition by considering some of its unresolved problems:
   a) An influential account of the unity of classical social theory (Parsons).
b) Two areas of comparison among the three theorists we have studied:

1) The relationship of the division of labor to the class system under capitalism.

2) The moral identity and proper direction of modern culture.

3) Deeper problems in the tradition of classical social theory:

   i) the issue of objective historical tendencies;

   ii) the issue of the relationship of normative judgment to social theory

II. The "voluntaristic theory of action"

(1) Parsons' Structure of Social Action (1937). Its historical importance.

   a) The quality of contemporary social science: an abstract empiricism. Unhistorical and unpolitical.

   b) The effort to use certain classical theorists as support for this position.

(2) Parsons' central argument. The development of a common theoretical scheme in the works of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber. A shared schema of the constituents and determinants of human action. At the same time, a shared mode of explanation. The emergence of this scheme took the form of synthesis of various one-sided traditions that had dominated social thought up to that time. Each tradition contributed an element to the inclusive body of explanation:
a) Radical positivism--heredity and environment;
b) Utilitarianism--the means-end sector;
c) Idealism--the ultimate-value system;
d) Effort--the element relating the normative and conditional elements of action.

(3) Durkheim and Weber at the center of the tradition reacting against both individualism and socialism. Tocqueville and Marx on opposite wings.

(4) The fact that such a common scheme developed despite strong differences in the historical experience, the political preferences, and the individual temperaments of the theorists, would suggest the truth of the view.

(5) Criticism of Parsons' approach:
   
a) Extrapolation of what is--though disguidedly--a psychological model. The focus on the elements of individual action, even if those elements are seen as social in origin. Then this model is extrapolated into a comprehensive account of social life.

b) Consequences of this. Power relations among groups and classes are deemphasized, as in Durkheim's sociology, though for other reasons. Moreover, there is a disregard for what is historically specific to the various collective formations of society and culture.

c) Thus, the way is opened for the abstract empiricism of contemporary social science. Eviscerates the work of
the social theorists of their critical content. They are the founders who need no longer be consulted.

IV. The division of labor and the class system

(1) Now I turn to two dimensions of contrast among the classical social theorists.

(2) The controversy about the division of labor. The division of labor under capitalism. Both specialized and hierarchical. To what extent was this bound up with the class system? Basis for a rudimentary contrast.

(3) Marx:
   a) The class system is determinative of the division of labor. It is the primary phenomenon. Thus, the centrality of the idea of capitalism.
   b) The solution: the destruction of the class system will radically change the character of the division of labor.

(4) Durkheim and Weber:
   a) For Durkheim, the coercive character of the division of labor is less significant than its anomic character. The ideal is to pervade the division of labor with moral regulation and gradually purify it of its coercive element.
   b) For Weber, the hierarchical division of labor is required by bureaucratic rationalization. The most that can be hoped for is its periodic charismatic disruption.
c) For both Durkheim and Weber, the structures of the division of labor are significantly independent of the class system and more lasting than they.

(5) Criticism of the Marxist view. The problems of hierarchy and specialization more general than those associated with any class system specific to a given form of capitalism. Crucial issue: the dialectic between the class system and the legitimizing forms of law, bureaucracy, and meritocracy.

(6) Criticism of the Durkheim-Weber view. Tendency to reify the capitalist division of labor. To justify it as a means of integration (Durkheim) or a requirement of political democracy and economic efficiency (Weber).

(7) Possibility of interpretation of each of these thinkers that moves them toward the ideal point described in my criticism. (But if you adopt a hypersubtle interpretation of one, then you should adopt such an interpretation of all.)

V. The situation of moral judgment

(1) What was common to these thinkers:
  a) A process of secularization--no return to religious legitimation in the traditional sense;
  b) Rejection of abstract moral judgment. Any powerful normative judgment must be implicit in the historical analysis.
(2) Marx: if there is moral progress it consists in the supersession of factional interests by more universal ones — until one reaches a stage in which the universal "becomes concrete" rather than being represented by a factional interest. All other modes of thought — these that present the factional is universal — are ideological.

I have criticized this view because it presupposes a closing of the circle of contingency and finitude. Clear distinction between the factional and the universal. At least implicitly, there is the notion that the former must be criticized from the standpoint of the latter.

(3) Durkheim: The direction of moral progress is the increasing reconciliation of the claims of individuality and sociability. A tension to be moderated though not resolved. The theoretical and practical means invoked by Durkheim to achieve this objective:

a) do not take sufficient account of the need to reorganize power in society;

b) end up subordinating the individual to the collective.

(4) Weber: There is no moral progress, but at best moral survival. Participation in the war of the gods. My criticism: such a view tends to identify the dilemmas of modern society with permanent dilemmas of the human condition.

(5) With respect to the problem of the division of labor, the important distinction is that between Marx, on the one hand, and Durkheim and Weber, on the other. Marx sees the basic structure
of the division of labor as derivative from the class system; Durkheim and Weber do not.

But with regard to the problem of moral rationality, the more important difference is between Marx and Durkheim, on one side, and Weber, on the other. Marx and Durkheim believe in the existence of immanent moral rationality in history; Weber does not.

The second problem is just as important as the first.

(6) No viable basis of legitimation and criticism has been found by the classical social theorists to substitute for religion and ethics. Signalled by inability to go beyond the language of a pure fact-value dichotomy.

VI. The logic of history and the idea of immanent moral judgment

(1) The need to deepen this analysis. Each focus of controversy corresponds to a deeper philosophical problem that we ought to bring out into the open.

(2) The idea of a logic of objective historical tendencies -- persists despite the concern with contingency. In Marx, it takes the form of a residual dynamism of the forces of production and a diminishing funnel of class struggle. In Durkheim, the notion of a logic internal to each of the social types and a logic of evolution of the types. In Weber, the idea of an irreversible process of rationalization with relatively determinate social implications.
(3) Consequences of this objectification of historical tendencies.
   a) Social life depoliticized to some extent; political choice presented as objective requirement.
   b) Unfaithfulness to the experienced open-endedness of history. Hence, susceptible to the interpretation suggested by abstract empiricism.

(4) The idea of immanent moral rationality. Two possibilities.
   a) Marx and Durkheim: history is an immanent moral rationality. Consequence of this: threatens to sanctify history in retrospect or prospect. The moral counterpart to the reification of historical tendencies.
   b) Weber: the gratuitousness of ultimate moral commitments subverts both freedom and resistance.

(5) What is the relation between these two basic limiting tendencies in classical social theory: the reification of a logic of history and the oscillation between moral idolatry and moral voluntarism?

(6) Possible explanations of the reification of historical tendencies:
   a) The unresolved tension between generality and particularity, systematic theory and historiography, in social study. The idea of a logic of types makes generalization possible while still allowing for distinctions among historical situations.
   b) But there is another factor: the suppression of an explicit theory of human nature as a basis of moral
judgment in all these thinkers. The philosophical anthropology in each case is either implicit or put to one side because of the desire to reject the idea of an unchanging essence of man as an obstacle to the advance of social theory.

(7) But once the idea of human nature is rejected some other position must be found in which to localize the dynamism of history. An alternative basis for comparative and historical generalization. The result is a search for an autonomous logic of man's deeds and products. Whence the reification of historical tendencies in Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.

(8) The underlying difficulty of arriving at an adequate appreciation of the relationship between human nature and history.
   a) The false dilemma of an unchanging human nature or no human nature.
   b) The loss of our grip on the correct relationship between the ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence. These suggest the notions of a developing human nature and a developing moral order.

(9) Another way to define the problem. The root of error in modern philosophy and of evil in modern culture as a whole is the hesitation between a dualism of matter and spirit and a monism -- whether materialist or spiritualist. The original ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence are incompatible with both dualism and monism. They suggest a different position.
(10) a) The deepest limitations of classical social theory are connected with the problems of historical tendencies and the issue of the relationship of normative judgment to these tendencies.

b) These constraints reflect the inability either to acquiesce in the modernist rejection of human nature and of the objectivity of normative judgments or to provide an alternative. The unresolved relationship to ancient political philosophy.

c) To deal in a satisfactory manner with these issues one would have to break out of monistic or dualistic views, regain a mastery of the ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence, and then give these ideas a concrete social interpretation.

(11) Thus, my argument has come full circle. If I cannot convince you of its truth, I still hope that you will recognize its symmetry.
The class system, the division of labor, and the idea of irreversible historical tendencies -- I

I. Review and introduction

(1) In the last class, I began to explicate some elements of the framework underlying my criticism of social theory. Plans for the classes ahead:

a) Today and next Wednesday I shall focus on the problem of objective historical tendencies. What kind of an analysis of the relationship between the class system and the division of labor will help us advance in constructing an account of contemporary society that does not replace contingent politics by immanent laws of history?

b) Next week my theme will be the problem of moral judgment and its relationship to social theory. What kind of view overcomes the twin dangers of voluntarism and idolatry? I shall exemplify my thesis by considering the contemporary predicament of legal thought.

c) In the second of next week's classes, I shall further develop my analysis by suggesting some of its implications for the understanding and the evaluation of everyday exchange relationships in commercial and non-commercial life.
(2) In the previous class, I started by contrasting my own approach to classical social theory to Parsons'. Parsons' view: classical social theory was a synthesis of the positivist concern with heredity and environment; the utilitarian interest in the choice of efficient means; and the idealist emphasis on the acceptance of collective values.

The very fact of the development of such a common scheme, despite enormous differences in the context within which each theorist worked, would count as evidence of the truth of the scheme. My criticism:

a) Extrapolation of a psychological model;
b) Deemphasizes power relations and historical particularity of societies and cultures;
c) Prepares the way for an abstract empiricism. Empties the work of the classical social theorists of its critical content.

(3) First dimension of comparison and contrast among the classical social theorists: the conception of the relationship between the class system and the division of labor.

a) Marx sees the features of specialization and hierarchy of the division of labor as determined by the capitalist class system.
b) For Durkheim and Weber the characteristics of the division of labor are more basic and lasting than those of the class system.
My criticism rejects the idea that the capitalist mode of production determines the most pervasive features of the division of labor. But it also repudiates the notion that the specialized and hierarchical organization of labor as we know it is a necessary means of social integration (Durkheim) or a requirement of political democracy and economic efficiency (Weber).

(4) Second dimension of comparison and contrast: the relationship of moral judgment to social theory.

a) Marx and Durkheim: Insofar as they go beyond a pure causal determinism they subscribe to the view that history displays moral truth. In Marx, the advent of an evermore universal interest that is evermore conscious of itself. In Durkheim, the increasingly perfect reconciliation of individuality and sociability.

b) Weber: Moral conflict as the war of the gods. Beyond the boundaries of reason.

c) I reject the first view as involving a sanctification of society in retrospect or prospect. A kind of historical idolatry that does not help us in the task of developing moral ideas and that depends ultimately upon an acceptance of the notion of immanent laws that give history a direction. I criticize the second view as tending to identify the specific conflicts and limitations of the advanced societies with eternal,
insoluble antagonisms among social ideals. The capacity to appeal to an idea of transcendent, though indeterminate, moral order is inseparable from the ability to deal with power systems critically.

(5) The philosophical idea underlying the two main kinds of approaches to the relation between class and the division of labor I have criticized is a version of historical necessitarianism. There are objective tendencies at work in history. The different manifestations of this idea in Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. The consequences: the deemphasis on politics and on contingency despite all intentions to the contrary.

(6) The reasons for the emphasis on objective historical tendencies:

a) The effort to reconcile generality and particularity in social study.

b) The reaction against the idea of human nature.

(7) Consequences of this deemphasis:

a) Search for historical laws -- a logic of man's deeds and products as a focus for the dynamism of history and a basis of comparison and generalization.

b) The destruction of a support for moral judgment. Always dependent upon a substantive view of humanity and human relations -- cutting across the fact/value distinction. Thus, one is led to the oscillation between idolatry and voluntarism, both of which represent an abandonment of the characteristic moral point of view.
(8) What stands in the way of the development of an adequate conception of the relation between human nature and history?
   a) The false dilemma of an unchanging human nature or no human nature. Parallels the false dilemma of either an objective moral order or no moral order.
   b) One would have to reacquire a mastery of the classical idea of embodied spirit and transcendences.
   c) These ideas are inconsistent with both monistic and dualist views of the relation between spirit and matter.

(9) The task is to break out of monism and dualism, to regain a mastery of the ideas of embodied spirit and transcendence, and then to give these ideas a concrete social interpretation.

   The emphasis ought to be on the concrete social interpretation rather than on dreaming up an alternative metaphysic from scratch.

   Thus, today I return in greater detail to the problem of the class system and the division of labor. Next Wednesday, I shall turn to the other focus of controversy in classical social theory -- the relationship of normative judgment to social theory.

II. A primitive conception of class

(1) To develop my argument about the relationship between the class system and the division of labor, I must be more explicit about the conception of class that I am using. Shall proceed in
two steps: first, a crude approximation; then, a more refined view. My thesis about the relationship between the class system and the division of labor will be stated in terms of each of these two conceptions of class.

(2) The crude idea: class is a principle of social organization that gives a determinant influence to inherited wealth and opportunities in the shaping of an individual's social circumstance -- what he can do with his life in society. One can think of meritocracy as the antithesis of class in this sense. Under a class system, the individual has certain formal legal or political entitlements that are distinct from his class position. Thus, it is useful to distinguish class organization from the kind of estate organization that characterizes "feudal" and aristocratic societies. The fact of being born into an estate immediately determines the content of one's major rights and obligations; political-legal status and social circumstance are indistinguishable.

(3) The most notable aspect of this conception of class is that it conceives of the class system as a continuum. There are an indefinite number of gradations along this spectrum of class position; as a result, there is no clear way to distinguish among major classes in any given historical situation.

(4) Statement of my thesis in the language of this conception of class:
a) In the advanced societies, changes in the importance of inherited social position will not necessarily alter many of the most striking characteristics of the organization of work as we know it: its typical modes of interaction, specialization, and hierarchy. One can imagine a subversion of the class principle either through the direct public appropriation of private property or through the restriction or abolition of inheritance together with educational measures designed to counteract differences of opportunity created by the position of the parents. Thus, the way would be open for a more complete assertion of the meritocratic principle. Yet the basic organization of work and its relation to leisure and culture might remain largely unaffected. Though the identity of the individuals occupying the superior hierarchical positions would change, the form of the hierarchy might be similar.

b) On the other hand, it does not follow that the organization of work in society is simply an expression of the requirements of social integration, political democracy, or economic efficiency.

c) What both these views fail to regard -- in a word, politics. By politics I mean two things:

1) The organization of work and everyday life as an arena of struggle for power. The effort by some
to seize control over others. The interests, forms, and stratagems of control are more general than any particular class system associated with a specific pattern of property relationships, but they are not mandated by the abstract social goals of integration, democracy, and efficiency.

2) The set of beliefs about what is desirable and what is possible that may be more or less shared by rulers and ruled alike, helping to legitimate power but also to set the limits of political insight.

III. Toward a more comprehensive theory of class

(1) The objective: to escape from the pure gradation view of class while avoiding an account that places primary or exclusive emphasis on the relation of different kinds of classes to different kinds of property.

Before we can hope to progress in the task of explanation, we need the elements of an adequate description. Should focus on the labor market -- the experience of work -- because that is the point at which the realities of the class system and those of the division of labor came most closely in touch.

(2) Relevant factors in class differences:
   a) External differences in wealth -- the most obvious and superficial level of analysis;
   b) Differences in the exercise of power and the availability of trust;
c) Differences in the mode of rationality employed.

A class as a major group in the labor market defined by a combination of the elements of shared economic position, shared experience of power and trust, and shared style of rationality at work. Any one of the elements without the others is insufficient to define a class.

Let me develop this idea by suggesting a schema for the analysis of class relations in advanced capitalist societies. May be applied with differences of emphasis to a broad spectrum of countries. I shall distinguish among three main classes: a managerial class, a working class consisting of an industrial or manual and a clerical or nonmanual part, and an underclass.

(3) In this more refined sense, the class system turns out to be analytically inseparable from the division of labor: the class order just is a certain way of organizing work and of arranging other aspects of social life by reference to this organization. Note that class position in this sense is not necessarily determined by inherited wealth or opportunity.

My critical thesis restated in the language of this conception of class is that we cannot understand adequately the unity constituted by the class system and the division of labor as a function of the capitalist mode of production when capitalism is defined in a manner sufficiently narrow to be useful. Nor can we understand this unity of the class system and the division of labor as a function of abstract goals like integration, democracy, or efficiency.
(4) A managerial class -- the upperlevel executives, professionals, and bureaucrats.

a) The highest remuneration. Moreover, the highest degree of power and discretion. It has access to trust as discretion, little supervision from above. But this coexists with a large degree of competitive distrust among those similarly situated. Trust as autonomy prevails over trust as community. Thus, the constant flight into elite havens of trust in family or private life and the attempt to moderate the disintegrating force of distrust in work. This attempt contributes to the bureaucratization of institutions. Because of the rough parallelism between material reward and discretion, this class suffers much less than any other from a conflict between material ambition and the desire for satisfying work. Hence, it is less pressed than any other class to view its work in a purely instrumental fashion -- as a means to survival rather than as an end in itself.

b) The characteristic mode of rationality is one of abstraction and analysis.

1) The image of rational progress described long ago by Descartes. There is an abstract problem or project. You decompose it into its constituent elements. Then you can understand the problem better, and you can come up with an alternative
abstract definition of the true nature of the problem, the solution, or the task. This has become a dominant model of the progress of science and the way one learns science. (The pre-eminence of this rational process and its transformation into a social process is one of the things that can give content to the otherwise empty idea of modernization.)

2) The division of labor in the advanced capitalist or socialist societies gives a concrete social manifestation to this rational process. The managerial class is the class with the power to define the abstract tasks to which the work of the other classes will be directed. It guides the process of breaking this task up into its component parts and then inferring from this experience appropriate revisions of the governing abstractions.

3) Moreover, in its work the managerial, professional, and bureaucratic staffs must employ skills that have a generalized character. A member of this class will typically be faced with an indefinite number of relatively discrete problems. He cannot deal with them successfully for long merely by mimicking a routinized response to earlier problems. He must know how to translate abstract rules and generalized skills into concrete operations.
4) Thus, the problem of education for these classes takes on a particular complexion. The objective: to train people in the ability to make abstractions operational and revise prior abstractions as a result of new experience. There are two main strategies with which to accomplish this objective. According to one strategy, one learns the abstractions, then one gets trained in its concrete applications. According to the second strategy one infers abstract norms and generalized skills from the practice of concrete operations. The pedagogues of the managerial class usually recognize that the two tasks are complementary and that learning to perform them begins with formal academic education but continues with on-the-job training. Education is said to fail either when people cannot pass successfully from generalized skills or projects to concrete operations or when they do not know how to use the experience of concrete operations as a basis for the redefinition of such projects and the improvement of such skills. No wonder that modern philosophy and education are so overwhelmingly concerned with the problem of the interplay between the abstract and the concrete. The reason is that the restatement of this interplay as a social process -- as a way of organizing work -- is decisive in shaping the
struggle for power in the advanced societies.

(5) The whole situation of the managerial class, its legitima-
tion before other classes, and its conception of itself, is
bound up with an effort to identify a rational process with a
social one. The rational process is the organization of indivi-
dual and collective work in society as a dialectic of abstract
projects and concrete operations. The social process is the one
by which a particular class retains control of the way the
governing abstractions are defined and redefined while other
classes execute these abstract projects without controlling or
even understanding them. Thus, the social interpretation that
is given to the project of rationalizing society and work is the
reverse side of the differential allocation of trust as autonomy
or discretion to the several classes of society. There is the
need to legitimate the identification between the social process
and the rational one as necessary and to present differences in
access to trust as dictated by a shared interest in efficiency.

(6) I have completed the first step of my schematic account of
classes -- a picture of the situation of the managerial class.
The perspective that underlies my account has been one that
denies that we can adequately understand the position of this
class as an aspect of the capitalist system of private ownership
of the means of production. As an explanation, capitalism is
both too much and too little -- too much because we find a
class similar in all basic respects in societies that have
shattered capitalist property relationships; too little because the richness of the particular features of this class as of other classes does not seem sufficiently explained by the available analyses of capitalism.

At the same time, however, I have resisted the identification of this system, that generates the position of the managerial classes with any rationality of social cohesion, economic efficiency, or scientific progress.

(7) We can go no further until we have turned our attention to the other classes of society. The spirit in which to pursue our study: Not that the class system as we know it today is something transparent with obvious explanations but rather that it is something mysterious for which there are no adequate explanations. As always in social life, the heart of the mystery lies in the relationship between the struggle for power and the beliefs people hold about what is good for them and what they are capable of achieving. That relationship is the cave into which we must follow the enigma.
The class system, the division of labor, and the idea of irreversible historical tendencies -- II

I. Review

(1) I am focusing on one of the two crucial problems that the tradition of classical social theory presents to us: the relationship of the class system to the division of labor. Next week, I shall turn to the other major problem: the relationship of normative judgment to social theory. The question before us now is: How can we develop a view of the relationship between the class system and the division of labor that escapes the vices of the approach that makes the basic hierarchical structures of the division of labor derivative of capitalism as well as the defects of the view that identifies these structures with objective requirements of cohesion, democracy, or efficiency?

Both these approaches belong to broader views that play up the role of objective historical tendencies or immanent laws in history. So, at a more general level, the question may be formulated as follows: What conception of the class system and the division of labor will help us dispense with the mythology of necessitarian history?

(2) I developed my argument in terms of two conceptions of class -- two successive approximations to the truth -- and then stated my thesis in the language of each of these two conceptions of class.
(3) The crude conception: class as the determination of social circumstance by inherited wealth and opportunity:
   a) A gradation view of class; no natural classes.
   b) The thesis in the language of this conception:
      1) Meritocracy would change the identity of those occupying different class positions without altering the fundamental structures of the division of labor.
      2) Yet there is no warrant for seeing these structures as imposed by "objective" requirements.
      3) Both views I am criticizing give insufficient regard to the specifically political dimension of the division of labor -- as a power struggle and as a set of limiting ideas.

(4) Second conception of class. Similar position with respect to enjoyment of wealth, access to power and trust, and characteristic style of rationality.
   a) On this view, no analytical distinction between the class system and the division of labor.
   b) The thesis restated:
      1) The unity of class and division of labor not derivative of capitalism. Capitalism both too much and too little as an explanation. Too much: many aspects of the same structure in non-capitalist situations. Too little: Richness of the features of the different classes not adequately accounted for by capitalism.
2) The unity of class and division of labor not just a necessary means of cohesion, democracy, efficiency, or scientific progress.

(5) If we apply the criteria suggested, we came up with three major classes in advanced capitalist societies.
   a) The managerial or, more precisely, the managerial-capitalist class.
   b) The working class with an industrial or manual and a clerical or nonmanual part.
   c) The underclass.

(6) I dealt solely with the managerial class in terms of the factors of wealth, power and trust, and rationality.
   a) Wealth: The managerial class may be characterized from a certain perspective as a capitalist class. Inherited wealth may play a greater or smaller role in its constitution. As this role diminishes, it becomes more useful to emphasize the managerial rather than the capitalist aspect.
   b) Power and trust. Ultimate control of the organization or work. High degree of trust as autonomy coinciding with a low degree of trust as community. This class faces much less than the others the need to choose between material satisfaction and satisfaction in the character of work; hence, it is less likely to have a
purely instrumental attitude toward labor. More inclined to view labor as an end in itself.

c) Rationality.

1) The image of reason. From abstraction to analysis to new abstraction.

2) The transformation of this rational process into the social process of the division of labor where one class controls the definition and the redefinition of the abstractions.

3) The primacy of an ability to pass from generalized skills or abstract norms to concrete operations and then back again, avoiding routinized responses.

4) A mode of education that is oriented to the perfecting of these capacities.

(7) How are we to understand the existence of this class?

a) Not simply a product of capitalism. What is specific to capitalism perhaps is the importance that may be given to inherited wealth in the constitution of this class.

b) Nor are we justified in viewing this class as the product of a rationality of cohesion, efficiency, or science. The identification of the rational process with a social one is unjustified.
II. The working class

(1) The working class may be defined in a preliminary fashion by contrast to both the managerial class and the underclass.

   a) Contrast to the managerial class: subordinate jobs; little or no control over the organization of production; and, above all, little say about the formulation and reformulation of the abstract tasks to which labor is devoted and in terms of which it is conceived.

   b) Contrast to the underclass: stable jobs, performed under relatively good conditions (i.e., as compared to the conditions under which the underclass performs its jobs); a bureaucratized relationship to supervisors.

(2) The wealth aspect. Limited but relatively secure salaries. The dominant attitude towards work is instrumental: securing the maximum economic reward to support one's private life in the family. This connected with the degree of access this class has to power and trust.

(3) The power and trust aspect. No significant control over the organization of work. Hence, little trust as discretion. But personal dependency relationships are institutionalized. Subject to general rules and customs: another manifestation of the effort to render power impersonal through the commitment to a rule of law ideal.

   But what of trust as community? There are two patterns:
a) The pattern characteristic of much traditional working class consciousness is one in which the restriction of trust as discretion is compensated by a large degree of trust as community among the workers in and outside the workplace. This solidarity of peers colors the character of trade-unionism.

b) The pattern that seems to be increasingly characteristic of the advanced capitalist societies. Little solidarity among the workers; the family becomes the residual haven of community; and the trade union itself is viewed in a more openly instrumental fashion as a tool of strictly monetary advantages.

c) But even when this second pattern prevails, life in the workplace is deeply affected by customary norms about how one ought to work and what kinds of relationships of priority and deference ought to exist among people at the workplace and among jobs. These norms are relatively intractable to narrowly "economic" considerations and they greatly influence the wage structure.

(4) The mode of rationality. The dominant style is one of routinized operations. No direct participation in the definition and redefinition of abstractions; hence there is no practice of the constant passage from the abstract to the concrete and back again. Learning occurs largely by variants of imitation in on-the-job training.
(5) I have developed this analysis of the working class without referring once to the distinction between its industrial and its clerical part.

a) The reason for this is that along the lines mentioned the condition of these two parts of the working class is basically the same.

b) Nevertheless, they differ greatly from each other in style of life, in external social appearance, and above all in their conception of themselves. They have little awareness of their own unity.

c) Thus, one might say of the working class what has been said of the ancient city state: that in it status consciousness masks class consciousness.

III. The underclass

(1) The underclass. Recognizable immediately by the character of the jobs its members perform -- "deadend" jobs, poorly paid unstable and uncertain, offering little prospect of advancement, and involving a direct personal dependency upon supervisors. Semi-skilled or unskilled help in services or industry.

(2) Moreover, the underclass in the advanced capitalist societies is massively recruited from special groups in the population: youth, women, third-world immigrants, and members of the working class who for some reason are unable to make the transition from adolescence to stable peer and family relations and stable employment.
(3) The view of the distinction between the working class and the underclass that has become widespread among labor economists and sociologists of labor is one that relates this duality in the labor market to technological and economic distinctions -- between capital intensive industries and industries producing for the stable part of demand, on one side, and less highly automated industries and industries serving the unstable part of demand on the other side. The former employ the working class; the latter, the underclass.

(4) The wealth aspect. The least well paid jobs. Engaged in on a wholly instrumental basis as necessary for survival. On the part of third-world populations, they may be seen as higher-up jobs in terms of the scale that prevails in the societies from which these workers come.

(5) The power and trust aspect. The degree of discretion and supervision will vary; in any case, the relationship of supervision and control will be personalized. The worker defines his life primarily in terms of a community outside the job. The migrant, third-world worker often sees his condition as a transitory one, punctuated by returns to the homeland.

(6) The mode of rationality. An indefinite bag of heterogeneous capacities rather than either an interplay between the abstract and the concrete or a small set of routinized operations. (Like the "bricolage" Lévi-Strauss describes as characteristic of the "savage mind.")
IV. Analogies among the classes

1. Consider now some of the ways in which the three major classes resemble each other.

2. The working class resembles the underclass in its basic lack of control and its non-orientation to abstraction.

3. But the working class resembles the managerial class in the stability of its social context and in its more or less successful assimilation into the existing structure of power.

4. But perhaps the most interesting analogy is the one that exists between the managerial class and the underclass. Both work in a relatively uninstitutionalized setting, with comparatively little routinization. Their social universe at the workplace is in this sense more open than that of the working class itself and some of the members of each of these classes are devoted to a style of adventure in their lives. This strange resemblance reproduces as drama under organized capitalism the similarity between the master and his valet, or the crown and its retainers, that Diderot and Hegel portrayed as farce at an earlier moment of the bourgeois order.

5. The very fact that the experiences of the classes is crisscrossing may help defuse confrontation among them. It indicates the seriousness of the obstacles confronting attempts to change the class structure.
V. **The class system under socialism**

(1) What are the chief differences between the class systems of the advanced capitalist societies and of the socialist societies as they now exist?

(2) First difference. The role of inherited wealth in the recruitment of the managerial class disappears, though inherited opportunity may continue to be important.

(3) Second difference. The tendency not to generate an underclass or to incorporate the underclass into the working class.

   a) In one sense, this development has a stabilizing influence. To be sure, the existence of an underclass may have certain stabilizing effects in capitalism. To the extent the members of the underclass are foreigners with restricted political rights they can be politically repressed or returned to their countries when economic cycles lead to their unemployment. But the underclass may also be a major destabilizing force in the advanced capitalist societies: the second generation of the migrant populations -- insofar as there is a second generation -- characteristically resist accepting underclass jobs. This in turn leads to pressures for a new supply of underclass workers.

   b) In another sense, however, the nonexistence of the underclass in a socialist society has a possible destabilizing influence because it establishes the
potential for a clear confrontation between the managerial and the working class. This possibility however has not come to fruition because of a

(4) Third difference. The suppression of political democracy and of the rights of dissidence historically associated with the means by which and the conditions under which socialism has been achieved though not inherently connected with other characteristics of socialism. The major social consequence of this: to diminish the possibility of establishing a revolutionary connection between factional struggle within the political elites and struggle among the major groups and classes in society. Thus, one might say that in certain ways the third difference cancels out a large part of the revolutionary potential of the other two differences. Were it not for the failure to achieve political democracy, the possibilities of fundamental transformation of the class system and the division of labor under socialism might be much greater than under advanced capitalism.

(5) In other respects, the class systems of the advanced capitalist and of the socialist societies are similar.

VI. How does the system survive?

(1) Now let me address myself to what is common in the class systems and division of labor in all the advanced societies -- capitalist or socialist. I shall ask the question: What are the general possibilities of action and the general constraints
on movement that operate within the system? Two more specific questions are decisive to an elucidation of this issue.

(2) The first is the question of obedience, disbelief, and despair, and therefore also of depoliticization on the part of the working class and the underclass. Much of contemporary social theory, allied with abstract empiricism, has been pre-occupied with some version of the mythical question: What holds society together? As if society were not already possessed of a structure of class and group domination. But there is a question that is worthy of being regarded as a true puzzle: What set of beliefs and disbeliefs, rooted in the experience of the different classes, contributes to the stability of this system? It is in fact curious that the members of the subordinate classes do not steal into the houses of their masters and murder them at night nor -- if the risk of doing that is unacceptable -- do they seem to dream of doing it. Some relevant factors:

a) The cross-cutting character of the experience of the different classes.

b) The capacity of the system to provide increasing levels of material satisfaction. These material benefits are rightly viewed as goods in themselves, but they are also seen as surrogates for other benefits of satisfaction in work and social life. These other benefits are in turn regarded as either unattainable or in necessary conflict with the desired economic advantages.
c) The capacity of the members of the working class and the underclass to find partial satisfaction within the existing system for their need of solidarity. Though they have little trust as autonomy, they may have a degree of trust as community. Moreover, they may share with the managerial class itself, which has more discretionary freedom than internal solidarity, the sense that these two experiences of trust cannot be reconciled.

d) The unavailability to the subordinate classes of a systematic understanding of their situation and of a normative perspective for the criticism of power. This unavailability is reinforced by the fact that these classes are not oriented to the style of rationality that is organized around the interplay between the abstract and the concrete.

With respect to each of these factors, obedience is decisively influenced by belief in a set of at least partially unjustified assumptions about the inherent constraints on political possibility. The conception of the specific social system as a cage and a machine, which underlies the theoretical mythology of objective historical tendencies, reappears here at the level of everyday experience and consciousness. But, though these beliefs are deeply rooted, there is no reason to suppose that they are wholly intractable to political action and political criticism.
(3) The second question can be addressed to the managerial, and especially to the political, elites themselves: What do they think they are doing?

a) At one level, it may be said that they are concerned mainly to provide for technological development and economic growth in order to dampen destabilizing social conflict and to secure national power against other states.

b) But, at another level, the decisive relationship is precisely the reverse. They want to bring domestic and national conflict under control so that the forces of technological development and economic growth may assert themselves more freely.

Their thought and conduct rarely has the admirable Machiavellian lucidity of the first thesis; it is shaped as well by the second thesis. The objective interests of technological development and economic growth are then more or less sincerely believed to require the class structure of the advanced capitalist or socialist societies. The confidence and orientation of the elites is therefore itself associated with some version of historical necessitarianism that combines the view that there are immanent laws of economic change with the notion that these laws dictate a certain kind of class system and division of labor.

(4) The task then for one who wants to transform this system is to work toward a change in politics at two levels.
a) At one level, of understanding, it must involve a criticism of necessitarian views, whether leftist or rightist, and a corresponding expansion of our sense of possibility.

b) At a second level, of practice, it ought to include an effort to relate factional struggles within the elites and day-to-day tensions and aspirations within the subordinate classes to the problems of class relationships in the society. Specifically, it ought to lead one to politicize everyday life by confronting the problems of control within the specific institutions of society. Only thus can one challenge the identification of the rational process of the interplay between the abstract and the concrete with the social process by which one class retains control of the abstractions.

For myself, I refuse to participate in the modern day disparagement of factional politics within and outside the elites. On the contrary, the practice of plots and counterplots, intrigue and conspiracy, rivalry and alliance, is by far the most amusing activity in which it is possible for a human being to engage. But it ought to be possible to focus some of this activity on some of the systemic problems of the society.

(5) The central theme of my remarks. At every crucial juncture, the effort to break through a system of power relations requires the rediscovery or invention of moral ideas. The attempt to develop deeper moral perception in turn forces us to change the
way we experience the world and therefore also the organization of power, which is a major determinant of that experience. A view that sees the history of power and the history of normative insight as two different stories cannot do justice to either: it leads to a false cynical disbelief in the possibilities of politics and to an equally mistaken naiveté about normative discourse. The struggle for power and the conflict over moral truth are inseparable: a person who has lost hope in the one will despair in the end of the other.
Moral judgment and social theory — I:
choosing among social theories

I. Review

(1) The problem of the class system and the division of labor.
   a) Specific formulation of the issue. The two views to be avoided.
   b) General formulation of the issue. Dispensing with the conception of immanent laws in history.

(2) The two conceptions of class and the restatement of my thesis in the language of each of these conceptions.

(3) The classes in advanced capitalist societies.

(4) The differences between the class systems of the advanced capitalist and the socialist societies. Despite these differences, there is a significant overlap in the fundamental conditions of the managerial class and the working class.

(5) The issue of what allows the system to survive: the possibilities of movement and the constraints on action. What we discover: certain sets of beliefs and disbeliefs contribute decisively to the stability of the system. These orientations do not follow necessarily from the objective situation of the different classes.

(6) The factors on the side of the subordinate classes.
   a) The resemblences among them, tending to defuse confrontation and conflict.
b) The enjoyment of rising levels of material benefits combined with the sense that these benefits are incapable of being reconciled with other forms of satisfaction in work and social life.

c) The partial fulfillment of the need for trust as solidarity combined with the sense that trust as community cannot be effectively reconciled with trust as autonomy.

d) One might add still another factor: the unavailability to the subordinate classes of a systematic analysis of their situation and of a normative perspective on the criticism of power.

(7) The factors on the side of the managerial class and especially of the political elite. Oscillation between a view that growth ought to be encouraged to avoid conflict and a view that conflict ought to be avoided to encourage growth and national power. Insofar as the latter view prevails, the belief that there are immanent laws of economic change is joined with the idea that these laws require a certain kind of class system and division of labor.

(8) With respect to both the subordinate classes and the managerial class, the conception of the specific social system as a cage and a machine, which underlies the theoretical mythology of objective historical tendencies, reappears at the level of everyday experience and consciousness.

(9) The task of politics:
    a) To explain our sense of possibility.
b) To politicize everyday life. Specifically, to raise the problem of control of different institutions, attacking the identification of nationality with class domination wherever it presents itself. To establish a connection between elite politics and class conflict.

II. Introduction

(1) My emphasis has been on the interplay between the organization of power and the beliefs people hold about what is desirable and what is possible. This leads to the second main focus of controversy in the tradition we have been studying: the relationship between moral judgment and social theory.

(2) The two kinds of views I have criticized and want to avoid:
   a) The view that history taken as a whole necessarily displays moral truth; in the long run, what happens is good. This may take the form of an identification of the good with the working out of objective tendencies and immanent laws in history. It may as well appear as a belief that whatever is required by a given form of social life is good and that there is no other basis upon which to rest normative judgment.
   b) The view that all moral judgments are ultimately groundless. One may be able to explain why they arise; but one cannot justify them through reason.
   c) Both these positions represent abandonments of the moral point of view. This point of view is necessary not only to the guidance of practice but to the advancement of our empirical understanding of society.
(3) My plan. To approach the issue of moral judgment and social theory indirectly through three steps of analyses:

a) The criteria of choice among social theories. Will lead to the question: In what sense must the social theorist himself make normative judgments as he theorizes?

b) How the social theorist ought to treat the moral experiences of his subjects. In what sense is he justified in speaking of moral order in history?

c) I shall begin to illustrate these ideas by suggesting their implications for law and legal thought. Shall continue this line of analysis in the next class.

III. The choice among social theories

(1) What are the criteria for choice among social theories?

(2) First criterion: Internal consistency. It is not enough to ask what positions a thinker has in fact taken in the several parts of his work. One must also ask what he is entitled to say simultaneously. The desire for a well-rounded plausibility often enters into conflict with the desire for coherence.

(3) This idea may be exemplified by my discussion of Marx:

a) The problem of technological determinism. There are parts of Marx's work that might be cited as suggesting a renunciation of all technological determinism, though there are also many texts pointing in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, we know that it is a very basic belief of Marx's that social space is not homogeneous;
Marx is not satisfied with the assertion that everything causes everything else. He wants to insist that certain structures are, on the whole, dominant over others. Why does he want to do this? On one interpretation, a way of avoiding the collapse of causal explanation into an undifferentiated circular causation. Thus, the forces of production prevail in the long run over the relations of production, and the mode of production prevails in the long run over ideology, with the qualifications I have mentioned. But how can one admit the relative dominance of some aspects of social life over others without attributing not only a relative autonomy but a relative autonomous dynamism to the most basic of all levels? That is the sense in which one is not entitled to define the hierarchy of levels of social life as Marx did and at the same time to deny responsibility for any residue of technological determinism.

b) Another example. How to reconcile the principle that history is contingent and political with the thesis that it has a determinate solution in communism? The need to suppose that the range of possible variation diminishes as one reaches the end. But this assumption may simply highlight the implausibility of the whole scheme.

(4) The lesson to be learned: Theory advances by becoming more inclusive. But one must always be careful to ascertain whether it is true synthesis or the mere juxtaposition of contraries that has been achieved.
(5) Second criterion: Empirical adequacy. What is most faithful to the materials of history? Two qualifications to this way of putting the matter:

a) Even if a statement is not directly verifiable or falsifiable, it may be capable of generating more concrete hypothesis that are.

b) Even if a statement is not verifiable or falsifiable, it may be part of a view that, when taken as a whole, is vulnerable to empirical criticism.

Nothing surprising about these qualifications. They would be widely regarded as applying to any science.

(6) But, although when expanded in this way, the empirical test is likely to be inconclusive in social theory. We are unlikely to arrive at any general agreement, even in academic settings, about which of major competing traditions of social theory should be accepted as a starting point for further inquiry. Two different interpretations of why this should be so

a) Because we just don't happen to know enough yet at an empirical level. Or because we haven't worked out in sufficient detail the implications of different social theories for empirical research.

b) Because we could never know enough. A comprehensive social theory has an explicit or tacit normative dimension and a bearing on how power ought to be organized. This normative dimension colors the empirical interpretation itself, though we can never be sure how much. The ability that we have within uncertain limits to
recognize inconvenient facts is part of intellectual honesty as well as political lucidity.

(7) A third criterion for choice among social theories is a normative one. Its necessity derives from the fact that any strictly empirical test is likely to be inconclusive if not impossible.

At the most modest level, this normative criterion may be stated as a pragmatic test. A comprehensive social theory is a vision of the world. If you act as if the world were like what the theory says it is like, the world may in fact become more like that. Theories will differ widely in the extent to which they have this transformative power.

But this still doesn't tell you what normative vision -- what conception of what the world should be like -- you ought to prefer.

(8) On one view to the extent that these social theories are normative, they represent mere individual posturings. The premise of this position is that there is no moral order. On another view, one chooses among normative visions -- and therefore among social theories that embody normative visions -- by abstract moral reasoning that is no different from other forms of rational demonstration. The premise of this view is that there does exist an objective moral order. Neither of these models of choice seems to accord with our experience of how social theory progresses or, more generally, I shall soon argue, with the facts of moral history.
(9) A third model of choice: There are normative demands or human needs that reassert themselves in varying historical contexts. A theory becomes more perfect by showing how these demands arise and what obstacles exist to their more complete reconciliation. The most general example of this in my argument: the reconciliation of individuality and sociability and the bearing of the organization of power upon this problem.

(10) Within the confines of this course, I have dealt with these human needs at a second remove -- less as they appear in actual social life than as organizing concerns of the major social theories themselves. The assumption must be that these concerns, far from being mere hobby-horses of the theorists, are grounded in much more pervasive aspirations.

(11) What kinds of assumptions about moral order does the social theorist make when he adopts this model of choice? He assumes that the problem of moral judgment is not merely one of idiosyncrasy. Human beings have access to these demands in part because each system of social practices constitutes an interpretation of these demands, but in part also because they are always capable of transcending the conventions amidst which they live and judging them from slightly outside. Our moral insight is itself capable of developing, and it characteristically develops by being partly freed from the concrete set of beliefs and practices in which it is embedded in any given society.
IV. The facts of moral history

(1) Now let me try to reach the same objective through a more direct route. What assumptions should one make about moral order to make sense of the facts of moral history, i.e., the way normative beliefs have developed and interacted with systems of power?

(2) First, take the assumption that there is an unchanging moral order -- instantaneously revealed and thereafter ceasing to grow. This is characteristic not of the major religious traditions as a whole, but only of certain strands within them. It flies in the face of our historical sense: the primary experience of the relativity and contingency of everything in history, including our normative ideas.

(3) Now take the opposite assumption that normative beliefs are simply shaped by social circumstances. The only constant factor in the history of these beliefs is the need of the dominant groups in each society to develop systems of thought that will lend their preeminence the appearance of legitimacy. The main kinds of historical facts that are difficult to square with this assumption.

a) The radical unpredictability of the acceptance of new normative beliefs and of the degree to which they transform actual power relations. When these beliefs enter into relation with established power, they accommodate to power, while power also accommodates to them. But it is always essentially open -- to political
action -- to determine where the line of accommodation will be drawn.

b) The extraordinary dynamic of invention and partial convergence in the history of moral ideas. The search for forms of spirituality that seem to do justice to aspirations previously believed to be in irremediable conflict.

c) The most spectacular example of both sets of facts: the spread and the effects of the major universal religions like Buddhism and Christianity.

(4) Perhaps facts such as these give greater plausibility to the view that people are capable of partly transcending their immediate circumstances and participating in both the discovery and the creation of a more universal moral order. This same postulate of a moral order at once transcendent and incomplete is needed to account for the experiences of subjectivity and freedom.

(5) My earlier argument implies that it is not enough to treat moral ideas as simply empirical givens -- something in which the subjects of history must be involved, but the social theorist himself may not. The theorist must himself appeal to moral criteria in developing theories and in choosing among them. What is true for the theorist theorizing is true for people in general striving and struggling.

(6) Conclusion. I have spoken in earlier classes about the relationship between moral belief and power struggle. Now I have suggested that there exists a connection between moral insight and our empirical understanding of society. We ought not to be afraid
of such bonds and to hide them; we should recognize them and rejoice in them. They are a sign of the unity of our most basic concerns.

V. The situation of legal thought

(1) The situation of legal thought presents the issue of the status of normative discourse in a peculiarly direct and urgent manner.

(2) The centrality of law:

(a) The point at which morals and power confront each other most directly. The law at once the legitimation and the control of established power. Legal doctrine has been at the center of culture -- regarded, together with theology, as the highest form of knowledge in many of history's major civilizations. Its relatively peripheral position in the high culture of contemporary societies is bizarre and must be connected to the disintegration of belief in the very possibility of normative discourse.

(b) Despite its peripheral position in high culture, there are many societies -- liberal, and above all constitutional, democracies -- in which the law is a major aspect of politics. The United States is the most striking example of this -- a society whose national religion is the law and where, as Tocqueville pointed out long ago, every great matter of politics ends up becoming a legal question.
(3) Perhaps the most central issue in jurisprudence is this: What is the nature of legal reasoning? Or, more precisely, given any set of legal rules and doctrines developed by the officially appropriate lawmaking institutions, how ought one to go about applying the rules and doctrines to particular cases? What counts as a good reason for or against a legal decision?

(4) The context in which this question arises in modern liberal democracies is a context shaped by two crucial, interrelated elements:

a) A power situation -- significant and systematic disparities of power reflected in the kind of class structure I have described. These disparities of power are more or less taken for granted.

b) A widespread disbelief in the possibility of a set of objective judgments of value. Any imposition of objective normative judgments other than by majoritarian decision would be seen as the imposition of factional interests and ideals falsely pretending to universality.

c) The two elements are connected:

1) The fact that the power system is relatively unstable, partial, and pluralistic contributes to the awareness that the conventional hierarchies and moral practices are contingent rather than a necessary part of a natural order of things. Practices and beliefs are rendered suspect by their association with past or present power systems.
2) On the other hand, the same dynamic deprives one of a secure normative perspective from which to criticize established power.

(5) In this context, it becomes important to tame, though not to undermine, power by impersonal rules. But, once the rules exist, they have to be uniformly or impersonally applied. That is the task of legal doctrine and legal institutions. But what is the proper character of this law-applying procedure?

(6) The classic answer: legal formalism. The law conceived as a deductive system of rules. Legal analysis as a deductive technique by which you derive from the rules the single correct solution to every legal problem.

This conception of legal analysis has been very generally abandoned. (I shall have more to say about this in the next class.) It is recognized that in applying a rule one must be attentive to a judgment about how best to advance in the concrete instance the purposes one attributes to the rule. This usually cannot be determined simply by a reference to the intention of the lawmaker. One imagines different policies the rule might promote or principles it might instantiate and one chooses among them. The interpretation of the rule is necessarily shaped by this choice. It is commonly said that the application of rules cannot itself be fully determined by rules. But what is the status of these principles and policies to which one must appeal? Two main answers in modern jurisprudence.
(7) There is a debunking jurisprudence that asserts the choice among these policies and principles is ultimately arbitrary. The choice among them will simply reflect the balance of power among competing interests in society. Legal doctrine is a sham though a convenient one -- to give a patina of legitimacy to power in liberal democracies. This view corresponds to the postulate of no moral order.

(8) Then there is a consensualist jurisprudence that says the policies and principles that ought to prevail in the interpretation of the law are those that reflect the society's dominant consensus. But this view offers us no way to deal with the conflicts among the values and interests of different groups. More seriously, it fails to do justice to one of the crucial elements in the situation that makes law so important as a constraint on power: the belief that all values and interests are necessarily both factional rather than universal and groundless rather than rationally demonstrable.

The consensualist view corresponds to the attempt wholly to identify moral order with a system of dominant beliefs and practices in a social group.

(9) The standoff brought about by the conflict between debunking and consensualist jurisprudence is deadly serious because:

a) law is the major form of legitimation in liberal democracies;

b) the situation of legal thought is representative of that of normative discourse more generally.
(11) We have to take a position with respect to this dilemma one way or another. We may not know the answer to the philosophical problem of moral judgment. But it will be answered every day in the law courts and in all the institutions where power is exercised and suffered, and where struggle among people takes place. The real question for one thrown into these conflicts -- as all of us are -- is not whether his moral judgment can achieve total clarity but rather whether it can escape utter blindness.
I. Review

1. The problem of moral judgment and social theory: the two views to avoid:
   a) that the good is identical to historical development or established consensus;
   b) that there is no good about which anything can be said in rational terms.

2. The first way in which I approached the issue: the criteria by which one chooses among social theories:
   a) the criterion of internal consistency;
   b) the criterion of empirical adequacy;
   c) the criterion of normative adequacy.

3. The criterion of normative adequacy necessary because the empirical test is likely to be inconclusive, which is in turn a result of the fact that these theories have an implicit normative dimension. What is the character of this normative choice? Does the theory help us identify recurrent human needs or normative demands and understand the sense and the extent to which these needs are capable of reconciliation?

4. The premise: Each system of social practices constitutes an interpretation of these needs. Yet our moral insight can develop by freeing itself, however partially, from the concrete set of beliefs and arrangements in which it is embedded in any given society.
(5) In the second stage of my remarks, I asked what assumptions one must accept to make sense of the facts of moral history.

a) Insufficient to presuppose an unchanging moral order -- conflicts with our experience of relativity and contingency.

b) Insufficient to presuppose that normative beliefs are more or less directly shaped by objective social circumstances:

1) the unpredictability of their acceptance and the transformative power of normative ideas;

2) the extraordinary counterpoint of revolutionary invention of new traditions and convergence among traditions.

c) Suggestion that people are capable of partly transcending their immediate circumstances to participate in the discovery and creation of a more universal moral order.

(6) In the third part of my remarks, I suggested that in legal thought one confronts the same dilemma and requires the same kind of alternative position.

(7) The importance of law: the point at which morals and power confront each other and accommodate to each other most directly. The situation of legal thought as a model of the more general situation of normative discourse.

(8) The central issue of jurisprudence: Given a set of rules and doctrines, what counts as a good reason for a decision under the rules and doctrines?
(9) Context in which this issue arises has two interrelated elements:
   a) A system of disparate power.
   b) A widespread disbelief in the possibility of objective judgments of value.

(10) The laws must render power impersonal without undermining it. To this end, they must be uniformly applied.

(11) Legal formalism as the easiest way to achieve this. Fails because the application of rules depends on judgments of principle or policy. What is the status of these principles or policies?

(12) A dilemma for legal thought:
   a) A debunking jurisprudence that refuses to sanctify society -- it insists that the result can only reflect the triumph of the interests of dominant groups. Hence, it renounces the normative perspective as inherently illusory and conservative.
   b) A consensualist jurisprudence that preserves the normative perspective, but does so at the cost of sanctifying the consensus of the dominant groups and their dominant culture.

(13) Debunking jurisprudence corresponds to the denial of moral order; consensualist jurisprudence to the identification of moral order with a system of dominant beliefs and practices in a social group.
(14) How can we be critical and normative or doctrinal at the same time? How can we fashion a style of legal doctrine that is critical?

(15) Plan:

a) How does one start to move beyond consensualist legal theory?

b) In the second part of my remarks, I shall turn from legal theory to the implicit model that infuses legal doctrine, i.e., practical legal thought. Just as I have begun to ask how one starts to move beyond consensualist legal theory, so too I shall ask how one starts to move beyond this model of legal doctrine.

II. Beyond consensualism

(1) The critique of consensualist jurisprudence must begin with an attack in the fundamental weapons of consensualist legal theory:

a) The reification of policies. One speaks about abstract purposes of legal rules without asking what are the actual consequences of different possible interpretations of the rules.

b) The denial of conflict among the ideals of different social groups and between these ideals and social reality.

(2) Attack on the reification of policies. Look to actual social interests. Example: We ought to abandon the abstract identification between a policy of certainty and predictability and a commitment to rigid rules. What actually promotes predictability in
law is the congruence between legal doctrine and everyday moral discourse, which is largely non-rule bound.

(3) Attack on the suppression of conflict. We ought to look upon validating consensus as something that is not simply given, but has to be constructed. It implies the resolution of conflicts among the ideals of different groups and between ideals and realities. Therefore, it requires us to deal with the power situations that give rise to these conflicts.

(4) What this means in legal argument: willingness to orient legal doctrine toward the suppression of power differentials and to take into account the ideals of dominated as well as dominant groups. The authority of every form of community, even if it is only a consensus about normative ideas, depends on the communal ideal not being used to mask a state of domination.

(5) What this means for the conception of the judicial role. The traditional conception of the judicial role obsessed with a dilemma. Either the judge applies impersonal rules or he is simply using his office to impose his own values on the populace. But once one rejects formalism, there is no alternative to moral discourse in law. The difference between legislation and adjudication no longer a difference between the arbitrary making of rules and their mechanical application, but between the conflict of interests on a mass scale and the hammering out of moral order in specific instances.
(6) By means as these, one turns the weapons of consensualist jurisprudence against consensualism itself. The consensualists dream their rosy dreams of social harmony -- with their pistols at their bedsides. We tiptoe into their rooms, pick up their pistols, and murder them in their sleep.

III. The classical system of law

(1) I turn now to the model infusing actual legal doctrine. A classical model only now in the process of disintegration. Moreover, this disintegration proceeds more or less simultaneously in a broad range of liberal democracies.

(2) I shall examine this classical system from three aspects, suggesting the limitations of each:

a) the model of substantive legal doctrine;

b) the model of the limits of law; the conception of the areas of social life to which that kind of substantive doctrine should or should not apply.

c) the model of institutions: the means by which individuals are supposed to defend their rights.

The model of substantive doctrine

(1) The ideal of individualism.

a) Individual autonomy has primacy over all other values that the legal system might uphold. The protected interests of the individual are identified with rights acquired under, or conferred by, clearcut rules.
b) The right as a domain of absolute discretion. Within the sphere of his rights, the individual may do as he pleases no matter what effect the exercise of the right would have on others. Each right like a loaded gun that one is absolutely privileged to shoot or not to shoot. Either one has the right or one doesn't. If one does, the fact that its exercise in a particular instance may prove harmful or even disastrous to somebody else is irrelevant.

c) But as soon as the individual goes beyond the sphere of his formal rights he looses all claim to protection of his interests. He may have a moral claim, but he has no legal one. He will be turned down in the name of the collective interest in preserving a formal, predictable system of law.

d) The true spirit of the system is not so much individualism as an oscillation between a radical individualism and an equally extreme collectivism. Corresponds to the conception of right as a sphere of absolute discretion, to the strict contrast of moral and legal obligations, and to a theory of obligations that sees obligations as arising from two main sources: private acts of will and the imposition of duties by the state.

e) But one can imagine a system concerned with the logic of trust and the reconciliation of individuality and sociability. In such system, the right is never absolute; its exercise is subject to standards that restrict one's ability to impose harms on others through the
the exercise of acquired rights. In such a system, there would be no stark distinction between moral and legal obligations, because legal obligations would be seen as arising primarily from the relationships of interdependence and mutual reliance, and only secondarily from private acts of will or state imposition.

(2) The separation of exchange justice and distributive justice.

a) Distributive justice governs the distribution of the divisible benefits of social life. Exchange justice governs relationships between individuals and groups situated in a relatively coordinate position.

b) Distributive justice believed to be political or arbitrary: handed over to the legislature or automatically resolved by the market. The specific province of law is an impersonal justice of exchange. Such a justice would be distributively blind. Social rank would be disregarded.

c) The resulting difficulties illustrated by the duress doctrine in contract law. The legitimacy of exchange presupposes free will. Contracts under coercion are invalid. But, given disparities of power, and, specifically, the class structure, it might seem that all other contracts between members of different classes -- and especially labor contracts -- would be voidable for duress. Thus, the need to hold to an inherently fuzzy line between aberrational and structural inequality.
d) In an alternative system, the sharp distinction between exchange and distributive justice and between aberrational and structural inequality would be rejected. Recognized that the definition of the parties' rights vis-à-vis each other must always depend upon a judgment of their relative power position and their relative ability to bear losses.

(3) Formalism. The third general feature of this model of substantive doctrine: formalism as a method for the justification of legal decisions.

a) The meaning of formalism.

b) Formalism presupposed by legal individualism and the absolutist conception of private rights. Sharp distinction between the areas of entitlement and no-entitlement.

c) Formalism presupposed by the sharp contrast of distributive and exchange justice. An impersonal justice of reciprocity is one that can be governed by formal rules that are neutral among substantive social interests in their applications as well as in their formulation.

d) A model of law that would attack the absolutist conception of rights and the sharp distinction between exchange and distributive justice would also have to play up the role in law of principles, policies, and standards, irreducible to rules.
(4) The underlying spirit of the classical model of law:
   a) The two elements of a structure of power that is taken for granted combined with a disbelief in the possibility of rational choice among values.
   b) Hence, the logic of distrust. The most that one can hope for is to minimize the degree of interference of people with each other. Property is the tangible form of absolute private entitlement: a license not to participate in communal life.
   c) The task of breaking through this model of law is the same as that of progressing toward a higher logic of trust -- of mutual vulnerability -- in social life.

The limits of law: commercial and non-commercial

(1) The model of distrust is viewed as tolerable because it applies to only a limited area of social life. There is a range of noncommercial life -- of friendship and family -- that is defined as lying largely beyond distrust and beyond law, which is the code of distrust.

(2) Why does the law, according to this classical model, adopt a policy of abstention toward the internal life of the family and of communal groups in general?
   a) The family is seen as being based upon love and affection. Law defines rigid areas of entitlement. But a relationship of sentiment -- it is thought -- cannot be regulated by rules without thereby being distorted or destroyed.
The law would be like Midas, turning to gold whatever it touched.

b) The family is a structure of power. As such, it calls upon its members to accept gross inequalities in the distribution of trust. The fluidity of entitlements is tolerable because of the existence of authority. The law, however, preaches equality in distrust. Alien to the personalized domination and dependence characteristic of the family.

c) Putting these two elements together, we come to this result. The family is a structure of power ennobled by sentiment. The redemptive union of authority and affection is the alternative to law.

(3) But what is the real consequence of this policy of abstention by the law? The communal ideal is not fully realized in fact; it is upheld only as a justification of established power. The weak are delivered into the hands of the strong.

(4) The problem of trust cannot be adequately solved by separating off a charmed circle of social relations. The problems of solidarity and trust must be dealt with throughout every aspect of social life. Otherwise one will exalt the ideals of communal spontaneity, but in so doing, bow before the harshness of existing power.

The institutional setting of legality: the adversarial defense of individual entitlements

(1) Under a legal and constitutional order, the primary mechanism for making the system work is the adversarial defense of individual
rights. The individual through his lawyers pushes his rights in court as far as he can. The procedural counterpart to the absolutist conception of rights.

(2) In the long run, and despite occasional reverses, these entitlements are defined ever more broadly and substantively.
   a) This is clearest with respect to constitutional rights like due process or equal protection.
   b) But it is also true with regard to the rights established by private law.

(3) What would happen in the United States if individual rights even as now defined and the ideal of equal adversarial representation were taken at their word? Most of the citizenry would be constantly sitting as jurors in judgment of the crimes committed by the rest of the citizens; civil litigation would be a major activity of everyday life; almost all madmen would be discharged and roam the streets; no important decisions by officials could be taken without endless hearings. The arrogance of the citizens would become insufferable, lending credence to Augustine's statement that under a society governed by law even the dogs walk down the streets arrogantly.

(4) My point: the working of the system depends upon the non-realization of its own ideals.

(5) The development of these substantive trends and, even more, of the kinds of tendencies for which I earlier argued pre-
supposes the abandonment of the primacy of adversarial representation of individual entitlements. It requires a much greater emphasis on communal self-regulation and on devices of mediation and reconciliation.

Conclusion

(1) The tendencies of reform of which I have spoken are alive within the legal orders of the major liberal democracies today. How ought one to interpret them?
   a) Are they simply devices that originate as ways to legitimize established power and then produce unexpected consequences when turned by the dominated against their dominators?
   b) Or are they also examples of moral invention and progress—not fully determined by the realities of power?

(2) There is the danger of overestimating these developments. They can be checked or circumvented whenever they pose a serious threat to established interests and ideals. Thus, they may come to nothing without fundamental political changes— at the national level as well as at the level of specific institutions. Until that time, the practical importance of changes in legal doctrine is largely their theoretical importance as part of an effort to develop new ways of thinking normatively. Without such normative standards, the struggle for the equalization of power is blind.

(3) But, on the other hand, it would be foolish to underestimate the potential for conflict in the situation. In the course of
the accommodation between the power system and new legitimizing beliefs, it is not possible to trace beforehand where the line of accommodation will be drawn. The position of the line will be set by political imagination and political action.

(4) As long as our powers of moral insight and aspiration are not wholly enslaved to established power, there is a possibility of movement, a chance of fragility, and an occasion for hope. It is on that narrow ground between the existent and the imagined that everything that we are capable of winning or losing is lost or won.
Moral judgment and social theory -- III:  
the direction of political practice

I. Review and introduction

(1) My topic: the relationship of social theory to moral judgment, the conception of moral order required by social theory.
   a) The two kinds of views that I am seeking to avoid.
   b) The elements of a solution at a philosophical level: a conception of the relationship of recurrent human needs and aspirations to particular forms of social life.

(2) The situation of moral discourse reproduced at a more concrete level by the condition of legal theory.
   a) The two main varieties of post-formalist legal theory -- a debunking and a consensualist jurisprudence -- correspond, respectively, to the denial of moral order and to its identification with the ideals and interests of dominant groups and classes.
   b) I suggested that the way beyond consensualist jurisprudence lies in turning its own weapons against it: substituting the consideration of real social interests for that of abstract policies, and the search for a consensus that would be validating for the assumption that such a consensus already exist. Legal doctrine can make a crucial contribution to the criticism and transformation of those structures of power in everyday life that stand in the way of the emergence of shared moral
ideals less heavily compromised than the ones with which we are familiar by their association with systems of domination.

(3) At a third and most concrete level, the issue presents itself as one of going beyond the model that tacitly infuses legal doctrine, the major form of legitimation in liberal, and especially constitutional, democracies.

(4) Today, my concerns will be twofold:
   a) To develop further the suggestions I have already made about the reconstruction of legal doctrine.
   b) To outline a general conception of political practice to which this reconstruction of doctrine corresponds, and of which it must be a part.

(5) But, before I turn to these two matters, it seems wise to say something in more general terms about the relationship of theory to practice.

II. Theory and practice

(1) In my argument, I have rejected the possibility of a sharp distinction between understanding and evaluation. The moral point of view is intrinsic to social theory itself and must provide one of the criteria for choice among competing social theories.

(2) In the course of rejecting this antithesis of social explanation and moral judgment, I have most definitely not accepted another view, with which the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy is often unjustifiably confused. This other view might be de-
scribed as the denial of the distinction between abstract and concrete knowledge. It would assert a continuity between theoretical analysis and concrete choice in particular instances. In the extreme, it is the notion that theory is a code in which you can look up the answers to concrete problems of choice. In its more subtle formulations, it is the idea that theory can become indefinitely more concrete through an interplay between its own development and practical experience -- until it is capable of resolving problems of choice. Marx probably subscribed to this view, as do most of his followers and as did many great philosophers of the past.

(3) This is not just a hobbyhorse of intellectuals. An especially bizarre example of the belief in a continuity of theoretical knowledge and practical choice can be found in military history. If you thought that when people got down to killing each other, they would cut out their nonsense and wake up, you would be mistaken. Illustrations taken from the attitude of the French General Staff toward Bergson, of the German General Staff toward Clausewitz, and of General Giap toward Hegel.

(4) What is wrong with the ideal of a fully concretized knowledge.

a) First cognitive reason is one that would be accepted by the more subtle exponents of the idea of a continuity between theory and practice. We ought not to sit down to plan the constitution of the future society like some of the French encyclopedists. Such a view disregards the necessary interplay between the development
of theoretical understanding and the transformation of experience. There is another more fundamental challenge to the ideal of concretized knowledge.

b) Second cognitive reason. All rational discourse as we know it involves an abstraction from particulars -- a flattening out of differences among situations. In social theory, we are concerned to diminish the degree of abstraction while still pursuing the goal of generalizing knowledge. Whence devices like the multiplication of perspectives characteristic of dialectical thought. But such knowledge is still not fully concrete, and a major element of practical judgment is our insight into immediate distinctions among situations and personalities. We make those distinctions with the help of theoretical tools, but we cannot derive them with any degree of necessity from theory itself.

c) Beyond theory there is another sphere of concrete insight and concrete judgment. The factors that shape our thinking in this sphere are essentially three: theory itself, the historical understanding of the particular situation within which are called upon to choose and to act, and prudence or practical wisdom. What is the relationship of the first element to the other two? Theory provides a framework for reflection, a set of basic orientations and concerns, of methods of analysis and guiding ideas. But it does not, and it cannot,
fully determine the content of either the historical understanding or the practical wisdom with which, as actors in history, we approach real issues of judgment.

There is the danger of confusing the limitations of a particular social theory with the inherent limitations of social theory. We have every reason to hope in the possibility of making social theory both more general and more concrete than it is today. But neither tomorrow nor ten thousand years from now will there be any way of passing directly from theoretical understanding to practical choice.

d) The demand for a fully concretized theoretical knowledge is morally suspect as well as misconceived. Too often it betrays a supercilious indolence or a craven desire to abdicate moral responsibility. Our attitude toward theory ought to be one of volunteering to construct for ourselves the necessary linkages between the abstract and the concrete rather than sitting back and asking: Where is the rest?

(5) There are affirmative reasons to rejoice in the relative indeterminacy of theory. It means that, in any given political situation, a person who spends most of his time theorizing will not necessarily be -- indeed, he is very unlikely to be -- the best interpreter of the practical implications of his own ideas. There are reasons to prefer some practical interpretations to others, but they are not of the same kind as the reasons for
preferring some theoretical ideas to others. It is this fact, rather than some utopian hope that everyone would be a theorist, that makes the claims of theory compatible with those of democracy.

(6) With this in mind, let me turn to the twin issues of:
   a) the reconstruction of legal doctrine;
   b) the spirit of political practice.

III. The reconstruction of classical legal doctrine

(1) It is widely agreed that the classical model of legal doctrine that I described in the last class is in the process of disintegration in all the major liberal democracies. No sense of an alternative has emerged, nor, if my argument is correct, can it emerge within the framework of consensualist jurisprudence. A large part of the energies of contemporary legal thought are devoted to preventing the dissolution of the cadaver. But the mummifiers forget that it is one thing to keep a corpse from rotting and another thing to restore it to life.

(2) What is the standpoint from which I state what progress would consist in? The perspective developed in my criticism of the tradition of social theory: the increasing reconciliation of individuality and sociability and the reorganization of power in the interests of this reconciliation.

(3) Moreover, I believe that many of these tendencies are at work in contemporary law and legal thought, though the question of the extent, the manner, and therefore also the concrete
political significance of their development remains essentially open.

The model of substantive doctrine

(4) The ideal of autonomy is complemented by an ideal of solidarity and thereby changed in its significance. The effort to overcome the oscillation between radical individualism and radical collectivism that marks the classical model.

a) The theory of rights. Deny in areas other than those teaching upon the basic personal freedoms of expression, association, and movement the sharp distinction between zones of entitlement and no-entitlement. The exercise of rights subject to standards determining the extent to which in a concrete situation one is empowered to sacrifice other people's interests. No reason to suppose that the same standard would be imposed in all kinds of relations. In the law as it now stands, there are certain kinds of special relations in which a party is obliged to treat the other party's interests as having a weight at least equal to his own. But in other relations -- in the ordinary bargain -- a party is entitled to treat the other party's interests as if they were of no account. In an alternative system, one might distinguish between relations in which the parties are compelled to treat each other's interests as of equal account, and relations in which one or both parties are required to treat the other party's interests
as of some account. Some of the relevant factors might be the intention of the parties, the extent to which a party has in fact trusted another, their comparative degree of power over each other, and the degree to which their relationship has some of the attributes of community. The main focus is on the quality of relations among people rather than on the conformity of their bargains to abstract criteria of just price or just value.

b) The theory of the sources of obligations. Obligations arise primarily from the facts of interdependence and mutual reliance. The fully articulated agreement and the act of imposition by the state are the exception rather than the standard sources of obligation. Within such a system there can be no hard and fast distinction between legal and moral obligations.

(5) The antithesis of distributive and exchange justice is rejected. Distributive considerations are recognized to be part of the justice of exchange. Does not mean a wholesale judicial revision of the terms of all agreements. Does mean, first, that our willingness to control within outer limits the substantive fairness of agreements ought to be related to a judgment of the extent to which the parties are in a situation of unequal power and, second, that in making such a judgment we abandon the inherently tenuous and haphazard line between aberrational and structural kinds of inequality.
(6) The reconsideration of the relationship between rule and non-rule elements in law, formalist and antiformalist methods.

a) The relativization of zones of entitlement and the convergence of exchange and distributive justice make it less necessary to rely upon rule formalism. Moreover, standards restraining the pursuit of self-interest may enumerate relevant factors but be resistent to statement as formal rules.

b) Nevertheless, there may be a need for an emphasis upon formal rules when we are in the area of basic personal freedoms, when the parties to a relationship have little contact and few shared purposes, or when the disparity of power among them is such that in the absence of fixed rules the weak would be too subject to abuse by the strong. This last case another example of the importance of approaching the problem of solidarity always in relation to the problem of power.

The limits of law: the division of areas of social life to which the law does and does not apply

(7) The whole spirit of such a system of legal doctrine is inimical to the idea that one can solve the problem of community by establishing beyond the frontiers of impersonal law a region of social life constituted by the marriage of personal affection and personalistic authority. The consequence would be to uphold the reality of domination under the name of community. Hence, the
alternative system of legal doctrine must embrace every area of social life.

The institutional framework: the adversarial vindication of individual entitlements

(8) Such transformations as I have outlined would require a much greater emphasis on non-adversarial means for the elaboration and protection of rights: devices of mediation and collaboration that allow people in different settings directly to participate in the development of the moral ideas that are to govern their lives.

(9) Nonetheless, in the actual world, where the existing forms of communal life are bound up with systems and doctrines of domination, it would be dangerous to dismantle too extensively and too soon the procedural machinery of legalism. For all its defects, that machinery serves as a vantage point from which to attack and transform existing modes or power.

The general problem

(10) In all these areas, my constant concern has been to suggest that we must keep our eyes fixed upon the relationship of the problem of solidarity to the problem of power; the interplay between the search for community and the struggle against domination.

IV. The spirit of politics

(1) None of these developments in legal doctrine would be possible or even significant unless accompanied by much broader political transformations to which they would nevertheless
contribute the indispensable normative element. Specifically, transformations designed to change the kind of class system and division of labor I earlier discussed.

(2) When we seek to make judgments about how to reach this goal in any particular society like the United States today we have to develop and complement our theoretical ideas with elements of historical understanding of that particular society and practical insight into the opportunities for action within it. That is quite a different kind of enterprise from the one I have sought to develop here.

Nevertheless, when we do engage in this other enterprise, we ought to bear in mind certain general, and indeed even classical, principles to which political practice should be faithful if the tenor of my argument is correct.

(3) The first of these principles is to assert the spirit of contingency which is the true spirit of politics and of history. That means that we ought to reject a conception of political practice that takes concrete features of social organization for granted as reflecting either unchangeable historical trends or objective dictates of abstract values like efficiency. It has been said that the crowning achievement of historical study is to gain an intuitive sense of how things do not happen. One of the ways they do not happen is by being born along irreversible historical tides. The only ultimate constraints are the constraints of human insight and aspiration.
(4) The second principle is to politicize everyday life. That means to relate the conflicts of national and international politics to the struggle for democratic control with specific social institutions. The possibilities of mass politics will be decisively affected by the extent to which politics and political consciousness can be made to enter every sphere of social life -- whether it be the factory, the bureau, or the family -- where power is exercised. To recur to an earlier metaphor, that means shattering the screen which separates the public from the private life.

(5) The third principle is to look for the points of cleavage and conflict in the situation. But most especially for those sources of unrest that reflect suppressed or displaced human needs and aspirations. To remember, as one does this, that the only kinds of community worth saving are the ones that can survive a great deal of conflict and be strengthened by it.

(6) The fourth principle is always to deal with the problem of community from the standpoint of the problem of power and with the problem of power from the angle of the problem of community. This is the dilemma with which one must grapple. On the one hand, there is the danger that communitarian ideals may mask and help legitimate a mode of domination. The task of taming power always has priority over that of building community. On the other hand, it is never enough to postpone to some indefinite time in the future the realization of our ideals of communal life, lest our
means breed their own ends. We must already seek to anticipate in the character of the political movements in which we participate some features of the social situation toward which we are trying to work.

(7) The fifth principle is to maintain a sense of the relative autonomy of political practice both from objective features of social organization and from abstract theoretical commitments. Politics is politics, and not something else. This means that we should be on the alert against allowing our actions to be guided by sectarian distinctions and prejudices inherited from the past. It also means that we can hope to forge in political practice itself new alliances and therefore new possibilities that would seem ruled out by established ideas about how different groups or classes are capable of acting.

V. Conclusion

(1) What is the view of moral progress and moral perfection that animates the conception of legal doctrine and political practice to which I have alluded? It is an absolutely classical view, and we have no reason to believe that it will ever change its content or decline in its authority. The only reason to mention it is to remind ourselves that it is the fixed star in the firmament, and that everything else revolves around it.

(2) It is the claim of this view that society becomes more perfect to the extent that it satisfies two conditions, neither of which it is capable of satisfying fully or wholly reconciling...
with the other. First, people must become more vulnerable to each other so that they carry each other's burdens and assume the risks of involvement in each other's lives. Second, this reciprocal vulnerability must occur under conditions of increasing equality so that it does not represent the domination of some by others. The whole art of politics is to determine to what extent, and by what means, these two objectives can be satisfied and brought into harmony with each other. Another way of saying that the ultimate political issue is the relationship of the problem of solidarity to the problem of power.

(3) This ideal of social perfection is based upon a view of the moral growth of the individual person. The core of this notion is the idea that no one rescues himself; that no man by his powers alone can bring his moral faculties to a higher development. By entering into the situation of his fellows, he can reinforce his independent sense of self through the strengthening of his life in community. By opening himself to other people, he runs the risk of almost irreparable harm, but he also wins the chance of receiving from them, as grace from heaven, the saving gift of love.
(1) All theoretical inquiry about man and society begins and ends in the elucidation of our immediate moral experience. So I thought that by way of conclusion I might say a few things about the relationship of moral experience to the kind of inquiry in which we have been engaged here.

a) What are the basic existential puzzles that provoke social theory?

b) What are the moral qualities most important to the successful pursuit of social theory?

c) What are the moral forces that most often stand in the way of progress in social theory and, most specifically, the moral forces active in a situation like the one we are in right here in this course? And how can one or ought one to deal with these obstacles?

(2) First, the existential riddles. Social theory arises from two basic questions. It loses its way when it forgets them; it regains strength when it returns to them.

a) One of these puzzles is how and why social life could ever generate a hierarchy that makes some individuals and groups subject to others.

b) The second puzzle is more general in the eyes of those who disbelieve that an inclusive and ordered hierarchy is a necessary feature of social life. How can or do
men in society come to terms with two conflicting sets of desires that they have: on the one hand, the desire to affirm their autonomy from nature, from other people and from their own works and deeds; on the other hand, the desire to recognize one's own self as integrated with nature, as at home in community, and as fully represented in one's own deeds and works?

c) The ruling ambition of any social theory, whether explicitly stated or tacitly held, must be to deal with these two puzzles -- the puzzle about domination and the puzzle about the place of the self in the world -- and to relate them to each other.

(3) What, then, are the qualities of moral vision required to pursue social theory in this spirit?

a) First, there must be a sense of wonderment about the very existence and possibility of power, and this sense is bound up at the deeper levels of the mind with an ardent hatred of servility in all its forms.

b) Second, there must be the quality of sympathetic imagination that allows us to recognize the bearing of even the most concrete and seemingly trivial features of social organization on man's ultimate concerns with his relationship to his own work, to other people, and to nature.

c) Third, the haughty independence of the critical mind must be accompanied by a delight in the integrity and the particularity of every event and person in history -- a delight that keeps us from sacrificing the richness of the
historical world on the altar of abstraction.

(4) What are the specific moral forces likely to deflect us from the right kind of approach to social theory -- in a course like this one, in a situation like our own? First consider a few of the wrong kinds of reasons that may attract people to such an inquiry.

a) Some may look for diversion from the serious business of specialized study or for a vacation in a field to which they have no serious intellectual or moral commitment. They will soon find social theory less entertaining than they expected. From their brief foray into it, they will get only what they deserve -- a permanent distaste for speculative social thought.

b) A second group looks for the organization and vindication of knowledge already acquired in more specialized study. Something that will help them fit together the bits and pieces that have been hoarded up elsewhere. Theirs is a fundamental misconception of the nature of theory, which creates only by first destroying. Social theory, like all theory, is revolutionary by its nature. It presupposes that we can understand our beliefs as a system and therefore as something contingent. It makes the hidden order of ideas that determines and limits the possibilities of our thinking open to attack and revision. It points out that we can grasp the contradictions in our thought and the conflicts in life to which those contradictions correspond.
c) Third, there will be those who are looking for a connection between social theory and their own discontent and puzzlement about their situations. These are the most serious and the best. With them, however, there is the danger that the longing for solace will overwhelm the desire for understanding. In their anxiety to receive from theory the consolation it cannot give, they may overlook the enlightenment it is able to provide.

(5) The teacher who views social theory from the perspective I have described is, in turn, likely to be in an equivocal moral position. The situation of abstract thinking and abstract criticism allows him to feign a carping disengagement from the reality he is criticizing combined with the pleasures of addressing a reasonably subdued crowd. The authorities of the university tell him, in effect, we shall pander to your narcissism and you, in exchange, will stand for our pluralism. You think you are a voice crying out in the desert, but give us time, and we shall make you into a minor ornament of our temple.

(6) There is then the temptation to feel that the whole enterprise is irretrievably tainted by the motives that draw one into it. I think that this response is wrong for two reasons, of which one has to do with the nature of virtue and the other with the powers of theory.

(7) There is a notion that constantly misleads us in the moral life. It is the tendency that repeatedly pushes people into the belief that there are only two possible positions one can ultimately have: innocence, which is identified with a contemplative
abstention from action, and corruption, which is equated with action in the world. One seems forced to choose between the powerlessness of an innocence that refuses to be compromised by the world and the determination to act, which seems to presuppose a rejection of every ideal of purity.

But such a view is mistaken at the core, and is itself the sign of corruption. First, theory is also a form of activity that is done in the world and involves the compromises of the world. It is not made in heaven; it is made on earth by people with earthly vices and earthly longings. Second, the only kind of virtue worth having is one that accepts the burdens and responsibilities of involvement. Virtue is not the serene possession of innocence, but the struggle for improvement from a compromised position within the world. When a tiger becomes perfect, it has long since turned into a rug, and it is much better to be an imperfect tiger than a perfect rug.

(8) I have spoken about the false alternative of innocence and corruption. There is another reason why one should hesitate to allow one's skepticism about motives and circumstances to shake one's confidence in the possibilities of social theory, in particular, and of speculative thought, in general. There just is something mysterious and terrible about the ability of speculative thought to reach us. Even in the most adverse of conditions and in the most corrupt of forms, it retains the power to speak to the mind and to move the soul. It begins in doubt, it works
in darkness and it leads often to despair. But those who pursue it with clarity and courage may find that it ends in the discovery of hope, a hope for once not based on illusion and complacency but on knowledge and striving.